Herrera v. Baltazar

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
• Writing for the Court: Charlotte N. Sweeney United States District Judge
• Docket Number: Civil Action 1:25-cv-04014-CNS
• Decision Date: 13 January 2026
• Citation: Herrera v. Baltazar, Civil Action 1:25-cv-04014-CNS (D. Colo. Jan 13, 2026)
• Parties: JOSUE ALDAIR ALFARO HERRERA, Petitioner, v. JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Aurora Contract Detention Facility, ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Respondents.

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JOSUE ALDAIR ALFARO HERRERA, Petitioner, v. JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Aurora Contract Detention Facility, ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04014-CNS

United States District Court, D. Colorado

January 13, 2026

ORDER

Charlotte N. Sweeney United States District Judge

Before the Court is Petitioner Josue Aldair Alfaro Herrera's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction ECF No. 2. The petition and motion arise from the same set of facts: Petitioner's prolonged civil immigration detention following Respondents' decision to renew his removal proceedings, despite Petitioner's Special Immigrant Juvenile status. The petition and motion seek similar relief and ask the Court to “[g]rant a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to immediately release [Petitioner] on his own recognizance or, in the alternative, order his immediate release and afford him a subsequent individualized bond hearing before this Court.” ECF No. 1 at 19; see also ECF No. 2 at 32 (requesting that “the Court issue an order directing Respondents to immediately release Josue without imposing additional indefinite conditions of release”).

As the briefing demonstrates that Petitioner's challenge is fundamentally legal in nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. As explained further below, because Petitioner's prolonged detention violates his constitutional rights, as well as Respondents' obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court GRANTS the petition and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from immigration detention.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner's personal history and experience in the United States' immigration system, as well as the broader immigration framework through which Petitioner has navigated, are relevant to the Court's decision. Accordingly, this section provides an overview of the relevant legal framework applicable to the Special Immigrant Juvenile designation, as well as Petitioner's personal background and experience navigating the immigration system in the United States.

A. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status

Beginning in 1990, Congress created Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to protect vulnerable immigrant children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). In doing so, Congress intended to help “alleviate[] hardships experienced by some dependents of United States juvenile courts by providing qualified [noncitizens] with the opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, with [the] possibility of becoming citizens of the United States in the future.” See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (amending various sections of the INA); Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 43844 (Aug. 12, 1993); see also Osorio-Martinez v. Att'y Gen. United States of Am., 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Congress established SIJ status in 1990 in order to ‘protect abused, neglected or abandoned children who, with their families, illegally entered the United States'”) (citing Yeboah v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)).

SIJ status is not easily granted. “Pursuant to § 1101(a)(27)(J), applicants must complete a two-step process before receiving SIJ status,” Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F.Supp.3d 632, 657 (E.D. Va. 2020), and noncitizen youths must “satisfy[] a set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility criteria,” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163. To be eligible for SIJ status, a noncitizen youth must be (1) present in the United States; (2) dependent on a state juvenile court or placed in the custody of the state or someone appointed by the state; (3) unable to reunify with one or more parents due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (4) a state juvenile court must determine that it is not in the noncitizen youth's best interest to return to their country of origin. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). Once those requirements are met, the noncitizen youth must then “submit an application to [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration and Services (USCIS)], which includes the state juvenile court order, demonstrating his or her statutory eligibility.” Joshua, 439 F.Supp.3d at 657 (citation omitted). “After satisfying these two steps, the Secretary of Homeland Security, generally through USCIS's directors, must consent to the grant of SIJ status for each applicant.” Id. (citing Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 170).

The design of the SIJ program “show[s] a congressional intent to assist a limited group of abused children to remain safely in the country with a means to apply for [lawful permanent residence (LPR)] status.” Garcia v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other grounds). In furtherance of this goal, Congress removed numerous barriers for an SIJ beneficiary applying for an adjustment of status to become a LPR. For example, under the INA, SIJ beneficiaries are “deemed . . . to have been paroled into the United States” for the purposes of adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1).^[1] Put differently, parole permits the SIJ beneficiary to lawfully remain in “the United States for purposes of adjustment [of status],” which is “the process an individual, like [Petitioner], can use to apply for [LPR] status when present in the United States.” Joshua, 439 F.Supp.3d at 660; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). This makes sense, and is indeed crucial, for SIJ beneficiaries because SIJ status can only be maintained if the recipient is “present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]o apply for permanent residency,” an SIJ beneficiary “must not be ‘removable' from the United States.” Joshua, 439 F.Supp.3d at 660.

Despite providing a potential pathway for lawful permanent resident status, an SIJ beneficiary “may wait years for the opportunity to file for adjustment of status.” Id. at 661 n.19. This “delay comes from the prohibition against filing a Form I-485 application, (the form used to apply for register permanent residence or adjustment of status), until a visa becomes available.” Id. And because there are limits on “the number of immigrants from a given country who may receive visas during each fiscal year, a visa is not always immediately available to each person who has received SIJ status.” Id. (citations omitted). As a result, for “immigrants from Honduras, like [Petitioner], are forced to apply for adjustment of status to become a permanent resident using a staggered timeline based on visa availability.” Id. (citing Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 160 n.3). SIJ beneficiaries are thus assigned a priority date, which determines when they may apply for an adjustment of status. See Casa Libre/Freedom House v. Mayorkas, 637 F.Supp.3d 805, 810 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (“When the demand is higher than the number of immigrant visas available for a given year, the government allocates the availability of immigrant visas according to a ‘priority date' USCIS provides the SIJ upon approval of a petition.... Noncitizens, including SIJ petitioners, must wait for their priority dates to become ‘current' before they can apply for adjustment of status.”) (citation omitted).

In addition to providing a pathway for lawful permanent residence, Congress also created certain protections for SIJ status youths by exempting them from many common grounds of inadmissibility and creating a generous waiver of many of the non-exempted inadmissibility grounds. See Joshua, 439 F.Supp.3df at 657-58 (“SIJ status . . . provides significant benefits for young immigrants and certain protections against removal.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255). Specifically, and relevant to Petitioner's case here, Congress prohibited consideration of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(a) (noncitizens present without admission or parole) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A) (documentation requirements for immigrations) when determining an SIJ beneficiary's admissibility to the United States for purposes of an adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) (providing that “paragraphs (4), (5)(A), (6)(A), (6)(C), (6)(D), (7)(A), and (9)(B) of section 1182(a) [(Inadmissible noncitizens)] of this title shall not apply” when determining an SIJ beneficiary's admissibility). In addition, the INA also provides that certain grounds for removal “shall not apply to [SIJ beneficiaries] based upon circumstances that exist before the date the [noncitizen] was provided such special immigrant status.” Joshua, 439 F.Supp.3d at 656 (citation omitted). Accordingly, under the INA, an SIJ beneficiary cannot “be removed for having entered the country somewhere other than at an official checkpoint.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(c)). Likewise, “the INA exempts SIJ designees from inadmissibility based on the lack of ‘valid entry document[s],'” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).

Just as significant as the removability protections are the “host of procedural rights designed to sustain [the SIJ beneficiaries'] relationship to the United States and to ensure they would not be stripped of SIJ protections without due process.” Id. at 171. Once granted, SIJ status may be revoked only for “good and sufficient cause,” as determined by...