Herring v. Welltech, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-245,85-245 |
| Parties | Carl HERRING, Appellant (Employee/Claimant), v. WELLTECH, INC., Appellee (Employer/Respondent). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Edwin H. Whitehead of Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.
John R. Vincent of Hettinger & Leedy, P.C., Riverton, for appellee.
Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and MACY, JJ., and ARTHUR T. HANSCUM, District Judge.
Appellant Carl Herring petitioned the district court to reopen his worker's compensation case, seeking additional benefits under § 27-12-606, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement). His employer, appellee Welltech, Inc., objected to reopening the case, raising as a bar a written stipulation settling the amount of worker's compensation benefits the employer would pay for appellant's injury. Appellant appeals from the order of the district court denying his petition to reopen the case.
Appellant claims he should be entitled to reopen the case, contending that the written stipulation violated constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting contractual devices to relieve an employer from a liability created by the worker's compensation laws. He further contends that he should have been afforded a hearing on his petition to reopen the case.
Relying on the doctrine that an award of worker's compensation benefits paid under a written settlement agreement ratified by the court constitutes a judicial determination of the parties' rights and is thus subject to the concept of finality, we affirm.
Appellant filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits for an injury suffered on December 1, 1981, while an employee of Welltech, Inc. The processing of appellant's claim was interrupted by an order of the district court dismissing his case for his failure to timely answer an objection raised by the employer. An appeal from the district court's denial of a petition to reopen the case was successfully taken, resulting in the reinstatement of the case with instructions to the district court to hold a hearing on the merits. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983).
On June 26, 1983, the district court set the case for hearing regarding appellant's request for temporary total disability and payment of a physician's claim. To accommodate discovery, the hearing previously set for September 2, 1983, was vacated and, instead, a pretrial conference was held on that date. Pretrial memoranda were filed, a pretrial conference was held, and a report was issued. The hearing was reset as a jury trial to be held on February 14, 1984.
Discovery ensued, witness designations were filed, jury instructions were requested, and memoranda of law were furnished. On February 1, 1984, appellant filed a pleading in which he waived a jury trial and advised the court that the issues were triable to the court. Appellee joined in the waiver of jury trial and requested specific findings. The jury trial was stricken, and the court set the case for trial to the court on July 5, 1984. Further discovery was conducted and correspondence exchanged between counsel.
No trial was held. On July 5, 1984, the clerk of court, referring to a telephone conversation with appellant's counsel the previous day, transmitted "several documents" to appellant's counsel for forwarding to appellant. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the case had been settled, court officials had been notified, and settlement documents were being prepared.
The first evidence that the case had been settled is contained within a motion for award of attorney's fees filed on July 26, 1984, by appellant, wherein he states:
A stipulation 1 was filed on August 13, 1984, in which the employer consented to an award to appellant for 18 months of temporary total disability payments for the period beginning December 1, 1981 (the approximate date of the original injury) and ending July 4, 1984 (the day before trial). As contemplated by the settlement, a surgery was scheduled for July 13, 1984. The employer consented to the surgery and agreed to a maximum of six additional months of temporary total disability payments from the date of surgery, on the condition that the treating physician rendered a competent medical opinion that appellant was disabled for each of those months that he claimed additional disability. The stipulation further provided that the seeming to effectuate a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), W.R.C.P., which applies to worker's compensation cases by virtue of § 27-12-607, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement).
A release in full and covenant not to sue was also executed by appellant on July 10, 1984, as a part of the settlement. The release was filed as a supplement to this record on appeal. This document has dubious value under the law and is not a basis for affirmance in this case.
A second stipulation was filed on August 23, 1984, reciting substantially the same terms as the earlier one. Although the earlier stipulation was never presented to the district judge and was earmarked "Not Used," this second stipulation was filed, utilized as the specific basis of the settlement, and presented to the district judge under cover letter from the clerk of court. In the dismissal portion of the stipulation, the term "with prejudice" was interlineated and initialed.
Thereafter, pursuant to and in furtherance of the stipulation, the following orders of award were entered:
8/27/84 -- Temporary Total Disability
$1,149.60 (Period: 7/12/84
through 7/31/84)
8/27/84 -- Temporary Total Disability
$1,781.91 (Period: 8/1/84
through 8/31/84)
8/31/84 -- Medical Expense: $3,994.17
9/27/84 -- Temporary Total Disability
$1,781.91 (Period: 9/1/84
through 9/30/84)
9/30/84 -- Medical Expense: $495.00
Medical Expense: $600.00
Medical Expense: $50.00
10/29/84 -- Temporary Total Disability:
$1,781.91 (Period: 10/1/84
through 10/31/84
10/29/84 -- Medical Expense: $71.22
11/27/84 -- Temporary Total Disability:
$1,781.91 (Period 11/1/84
through 11/30/84)
12/26/84 -- Temporary Total Disability:
$1,781.91 (Period 12/1/84
through 12/31/84)
3/01/85 -- Temporary Total Disability:
$689.76 (Period 1/1/85
through 1/12/85)
In each instance claims were made, all disabilities were certified, the employer consented to each payment, and each claim was paid under an order of award issued through the court.
Benefits ceased pursuant to the stipulation on January 12, 1985. Appellant filed an application to reopen the case, alleging unspecific grounds for modification under § 27-12-606, and a traverse to the application was entered by the appellee/employer. The district court denied the application on the face of the pleadings without hearing, and this appeal resulted.
Lea v. D & S Casing Service, Inc., Wyo., 707 P.2d 754 (1985), generally controls the decision in this case. There, too, appellant claimed he should have been entitled to reopen his case, contending the stipulation and order he entered into with his employer agreeing to damages were contrary to Art. 10, § 4 of the WYOMING CONSTITUTION, § 27-1-1052, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement), 3 and § 27-12-103(b), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement). 4 This Court held that the agreement in the Lea case did not violate constitutional or statutory provisions. The agreement was not a waiver of rights to recover damages, nor was it an agreement requiring release of the employer from liability as a condition of continuing employment.
Here, as in the Lea case, appellant also argues that the stipulated agreement is void, citing Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315 (1942). In the Horvath case, the employee entered into an oral agreement with the employer whereby the employee agreed to " 'forego and abandon his right to Workmen's Compensation allowances arising from the injuries received by him while employed by the Company' " in exchange for the rest of his life. 131 P.2d at 316. Such an agreement was clearly void, violating statutory and constitutional provisions, because it relieved the employer from a liability created by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.
This Court found the facts under review in the Lea case were "readily distinguishable...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Halstead
...the pleadings do not establish either litigant to be entitled to relief as a matter of law. Jackson, 786 P.2d 874; Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553 (Wyo.1986); Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 84 S.Ct. 1105, 12 L.Ed.2d 112, reh'g denied 377 U.S. 974, 377 U.S. 98......
-
Sopko v. C & R Transfer Co., Inc.
...at 915. With the addition of the word "made" to the statute, this interpretation is no longer wholly accurate.5 But see Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553 (Wyo.1986)(interpreting an equivalent statute: "No contract, rule, regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from a......
-
FMC v. Lane
...the obligation of the injured employee to plead the statutory ground for reopening, which Lane did do in this instance. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553 (Wyo.1986). Our conclusion is that this body of substantive law transfers to the proceedings before an independent hearing officer,......
-
Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div.
...rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, supra. We held in Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361, 365 (1983), reh. denied 715 P.2d 553 (1986), however, that "[i]n construing a statute, words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." In this case, § 27-13-106(a)(xviii) and......