Herrington v. Bradford

• Decision Date: 28 March 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-CV-938-NJR
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
• Parties: STEPHANIE HERRINGTON, Independent Administrator of the Estate of JASON STRAHAN, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. JEREMY B. BRADFORD, MOLLY MARGARITIS, TIMOTHY MUDD, BRIANNA MARKEL, KEVIN BILLINGS, CITY OF STAUNTON, ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, and JOHN D. LAKIN, Defendants.

STEPHANIE HERRINGTON, Independent Administrator of the Estate of JASON STRAHAN, Deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
JEREMY B. BRADFORD, MOLLY MARGARITIS, TIMOTHY MUDD, BRIANNA MARKEL, KEVIN BILLINGS, CITY OF STAUNTON, ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, and JOHN D. LAKIN, Defendants.

No. 3:20-CV-938-NJR

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

March 28, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are four motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Timothy Mudd, Brianna Markel, and John D. Lakin (Doc. 26), Defendants Jeremy B. Bradford and the City of Staunton, Illinois (Doc. 27), Defendants Kevin Billings and the Illinois State Police (Doc. 48), and Defendant Molly Maragaritis (Doc. 50).

Factual Background^[1]

The alleged underlying events unfolded in less than an hour's time. At 10:57 p.m. on September 16, 2019, Staunton Police Officer Jeremy Bradford received notice that the Madison County Police Department needed backup after a complaint surfaced that a man in a white shirt and white pants had thrown an object at a vehicle. Dispatch reported that a

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deputy was in foot-pursuit of the suspect. Six minutes after receiving the initial request, Officer Bradford observed a man dressed in a white shirt running from a deputy past his patrol car. The deputy chasing the suspect was Timothy Mudd of the Madison County Police Department. Joining Deputy Mudd, Officer Bradford attempted to apprehend the suspect. He drew his taser initially but holstered it as Deputy Mudd reached the suspect. The two tackled the suspect onto the grass but failed to restrain him despite using a collapsible baton. Officer Bradford drew his taser, this time deploying it and contacting the suspect's right shoulder. Officer Bradford proceeded to “drive-stun” the suspect, drop the taser, pull the suspect's right arm back, and use his legs to restrain the suspect's arms. Officer Bradford walked to his patrol car to radio dispatch and report that he deployed his taser and the suspect was in custody. The suspect was identified as Jason Strahan, and Officer Bradford recognized him from prior contact. Returning to the scene, Officer Bradford and Deputy Mudd evaluated the need for emergency medical services, and Officer Bradford attempted to use his portable radio but it failed to transmit.^[2]

Deputy Mudd left Officer Bradford with Strahan while he retrieved his patrol car. Officer Bradford reported that Strahan mumbled nonsense about aliens trying to kill him. Looking for his missing flashlight, Officer Bradford stepped away from Strahan to check his patrol car. Seizing this opportunity, Strahan jumped up and tried fleeing. Officer Bradford grabbed him using a rear-waist takedown. Strahan rolled and tried to stand up when Officer Bradford “flanked” to his left side to subdue Strahan. A struggle ensued. Fresh on the scene, Officer Maragaritis assisted Officer Bradford by handling Strahan's legs. Officers Maragaritis

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and Bradford held Strahan down as other officers arrived. While pinned down, Strahan asked for water and for the officers to move because he could not breathe. The officers apparently ignored this request. According to Officer Bradford, Strahan did not appear to be struggling to breathe because he talked, his head was turned, and his nose was unobstructed. He commanded Strahan to stop trying to roll over and to relax. Another officer, Illinois State Police Trooper Kevin Billings, applied leg restraints to Strahan.

Awaiting emergency medical services, Officer Bradford noticed that Strahan was laying still and possibly not breathing. He rolled Strahan over to check for a pulse, which he could not feel through his gloves. Trooper Billings found a weak pulse. At this point, the officers implored emergency services to hurry. Deputy Mudd administered Narcan to Strahan and retrieved an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) while Officer Bradford performed sternum rubs. Strahan grunted and moved his head slightly. Deputy Mudd placed the AED pads on Strahan. Officer Bradford reported hearing the AED machine announce that a shock was not needed after analyzing Strahan's heartbeat. So instead, Bradford and Mudd took turns performing chest compressions until medical services arrived. An ambulance transported Strahan to Community Hospital of Staunton. Officer Bradford and Deputy Briana Markel went to the hospital. Tragically, Strahan was pronounced dead at 11:48 p.m. Strahan's autopsy report noted injuries of taser wounds to the back and blunt force injuries to the head, neck, trunk, and extremities.

Procedural Background

On September 15, 2020, Plaintiff Herrington filed a twenty-seven count Complaint against various Defendants alleging constitutional violations, as well as state law claims (Doc. 1). On January 5, 2021, Timothy Mudd, Brianna Markel, and the Madison County

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Sheriff's Department moved to dismiss Herrington's allegations against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Doc. 19). The Court granted that motion but allowed Herrington leave to correct the deficiencies in her complaint (Doc. 23). After Herrington filed her Amended Complaint (Doc. 24), each defendant moved to dismiss for various reasons (Docs. 26, 27, 48, 50). Herrington filed a timely response to each of the motions (Docs. 37, 41, 52, 53).

There are two types of defendants in this case: (1) law enforcement officers in their official capacities and (2) entities that sanction law enforcement (i.e., a city, state police force, and a Sheriff on behalf of the county). Defendants Bradford, Margaritis, Mudd, Markel, and Billings fall into the first category. Defendants City of Staunton, the Illinois State Police, and Sheriff John Lakin, representing Madison County Sheriff's Department, fall into the second category. Against the first category of defendants, Herrington asserts claims of: excessive force, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; willful and wanton conduct resulting in wrongful death under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act 9740 ILCS 180/1 et seq.; and willful and wanton conduct justifying recovery under The Illinois Survival Act 755 ILCS 5/27-6. Against the second category of defendants, Herrington asserts claims under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, the Illinois Survival Act, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for excessive force^[3]; and failure to properly hire, train, supervise, retain, and conduct fair and impartial investigations under Illinois state law.

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All Defendants bring their motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Margaritis also brings her motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).

Legal Standard

I. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To avoid dismissal, the complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” BancorpSouth, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 873 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to decide the adequacy of the complaint, not to determine the merits of the case or decide whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).

While a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012). However, “[the court] ‘need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.'” Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)). To be sure, although a plaintiff “need not plead detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to

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dismiss, she still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate.” Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

II. 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismiss

After commencing a federal suit, a plaintiff must ensure each defendant receives a summons and a copy of the complaint against it. Fed. R. Civ P. 4(b), (c)(1). The plaintiff must serve each defendant within 90 days of filing the complaint, unless the plaintiff can show good cause for being unable to do so. Fed. R. Civ P. 4(m). The purpose of these service requirements is to provide the parties notice, encourage parties and their counsel to diligently pursue their cases, and trigger a district court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A defendant may enforce the service of process requirements through a pretrial motion to dismiss. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5).

Analysis

I. First Category of Defendants - Law Enforcement Officers in Official Capacity

Official capacity suits are basically another way of pleading an action against the entity for which the officer is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 381-82 (7th Cir.1988). District courts routinely dismiss...