Herron v. Fed. Express Corp.
Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 1:19-cv-136 |
Parties | SONIA HERRON, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court is in receipt of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Federal Express Corporation (hereinafter “FedEx”). Dkt. No. 53. For the reasons provided below, it is recommended that the Court GRANT FedEx's Motion and CLOSE this civil action.
The Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiff Sonia Herron's First Amended Complaint (hereinafter, Herron's “Complaint” or “live Complaint”) asserts claims against her former employer, FedEx, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (hereinafter, “the Act”). Dkt. No. 35 at 3. Herron is an African American woman and claims that FedEx violated her civil rights under the Act by discriminating against her based upon her race and sex. She also claims that FedEx forced her to endure a hostile work environment and retaliated against her for engaging in activity that is protected under the Act. Id. at 5-6. Among other things, she seeks reinstatement, backpay, attorney's fees, court costs, various types of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 6.
FedEx filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 13, 2020. Dkt. No. 53. FedEx denies Herron's allegations and states that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of her claims. Id. at 6, 25. After receiving several unopposed extensions, Herron filed her “Response in Opposition” to FedEx's Motion (hereinafter, Herron's “Response”), along with accompanying exhibits on March 5, 2021. Dkt. Nos. 71-74. FedEx filed its “Reply” on March 17, 2021. Dkt. No. 75. The parties have completed discovery and this case is now ripe for review.
The standard applied when ruling on a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In pertinent part, Rule 56 provides that the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (same). Mere allegations of a factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Therefore, summary judgment is proper if, under governing laws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment should not issue. Id. at 249.
The movant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to present affirmative evidence to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 257. All facts and inferences drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Herron's Complaint asserts civil rights claims which fall into three categories. Specifically, she asserts that, due to or because of her race and sex, FedEx: (1) discriminated against her; (2) forced her to endure a hostile working environment; and (3) retaliated against her for engaging in activity that is protected under the Act. Dkt. No. 35 at 5-6. Her Complaint makes the following allegations in support of her claims:
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, FedEx largely denies Herron's factual allegations, stating that she was a toxic influence at the facility and that her own improper, unprofessional actions caused her termination. Dkt. No. 53 at 6.
During her ten years there, Plaintiff actively schemed to get co-workers in trouble, checking-up on her peers and compiling information to use against them. She started rumors and spread gossip. Her complaint history at FedEx shows that no one was immune from her criticism and that, no matter what management did, her desire for “action” in response to petty complaints was never appeased. Ultimately, Plaintiff lost her job because she disrupted the station.
Id. FedEx asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Herron's claims are either time-barred, procedurally barred, or unsupported by admissible evidence. Id. at 2.
The parties agree that Herron filed her first “Charge of Discrimination” (hereinafter, “2016 Charge”) with the EEOC on April 30, 2016. See Dkt. No. 53-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 74-1 at 3. FedEx states, and Herron does not deny, that the EEOC responded to this 2016 Charge with a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” (hereinafter, “Dismissal Notice”) on May 26 2016. See Dkt. No. 53-1 at 10. The EEOC's Dismissal Notice stated that it was unable to conclude the FedEx had violated Herron's rights. Id. It also notified Herron that,...
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