Herron v. Fed. Express Corp.

Decision Date30 July 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action 1:19-cv-136
PartiesSONIA HERRON, Plaintiff v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IGNACIO TORTEYA, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Court is in receipt of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Federal Express Corporation (hereinafter FedEx). Dkt. No. 53. For the reasons provided below, it is recommended that the Court GRANT FedEx's Motion and CLOSE this civil action.

I. Jurisdiction

The Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. Background

Plaintiff Sonia Herron's First Amended Complaint (hereinafter, Herron's “Complaint” or “live Complaint”) asserts claims against her former employer, FedEx, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (hereinafter, the Act). Dkt. No. 35 at 3. Herron is an African American woman and claims that FedEx violated her civil rights under the Act by discriminating against her based upon her race and sex. She also claims that FedEx forced her to endure a hostile work environment and retaliated against her for engaging in activity that is protected under the Act. Id. at 5-6. Among other things, she seeks reinstatement, backpay, attorney's fees, court costs, various types of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 6.

FedEx filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 13, 2020. Dkt. No. 53. FedEx denies Herron's allegations and states that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of her claims. Id. at 6, 25. After receiving several unopposed extensions, Herron filed her “Response in Opposition” to FedEx's Motion (hereinafter, Herron's “Response”), along with accompanying exhibits on March 5, 2021. Dkt. Nos. 71-74. FedEx filed its “Reply” on March 17, 2021. Dkt. No. 75. The parties have completed discovery and this case is now ripe for review.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard applied when ruling on a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In pertinent part, Rule 56 provides that the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (same). Mere allegations of a factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Therefore, summary judgment is proper if, under governing laws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. If reasonable finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment should not issue. Id. at 249.

The movant seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to present affirmative evidence to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 257. All facts and inferences drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion for summary judgment. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

IV. Discussion

Herron's Complaint asserts civil rights claims which fall into three categories. Specifically, she asserts that, due to or because of her race and sex, FedEx: (1) discriminated against her; (2) forced her to endure a hostile working environment; and (3) retaliated against her for engaging in activity that is protected under the Act. Dkt. No. 35 at 5-6. Her Complaint makes the following allegations in support of her claims:

1. She worked for FedEx for ten years at its Harlingen, Texas facility until she was terminated on October 10, 2017. Dkt. No. 35 at 3. While working as a gatekeeper, FedEx subjected her to a working environment that was hostile to her due to her race and sex. When she complained about FedEx's discriminatory conduct, it retaliated against her, first disciplining her, and then terminating her employment. Id.
2. In 2012, a male coworker sent her picture of his genitalia. Id. He told her that, after seeing Herron, his girlfriend had said that she ‘liked what she saw and wanted a threesome.' Id. at 3-4. She reported the two texts to managers Manuel Rodriguez and Hiram Pena. These managers encouraged her not to file a formal complaint. Id. at 4.
3. In December of 2014, she filed a complaint with FedEx's human resources department to report that one manager, Raymond Hand, and two employees, Rodolfo Coronado and Aldo Tamez, where taking longer lunches than allowed and falsifying their timecards. These individuals discovered her complaint. News of her complaint leaked, she was ostracized, and the attitudes of the managers and employee towards her changed. Id. When she received an “employee of the month” award, one employee stated, ‘Wow, if you throw someone under the bus you get employee of the month.' Id.
4. Soon thereafter, a new coworker, William Lopez, arrived from New York City and began using the “n-word” in Herron's presence. Herron initially reported this to three station managers, Raymond Hand, Manuel Rodriguez, and Ruth Quinones. Despite reporting that Lopez's actions offended her, the three managers did nothing. Lopez continued to use the epithet and Herron reported it to a senior manager, Jeffery Feurtado, on March 20, 2015. Herron informed Feurtado that she had previously reported Lopez, but nothing had changed. Id. Feurtado responded by stating that he could not stop Lopez from using the word. He also stated that Lopez ‘was from the big city and that's how they talk.' Id. Later, Feurtado told Herron that he had “given Lopez a writeup” and asked her to inform him if Lopez used the word again. Id. Another employee told Herron that management did not discipline Lopez, did not care about his use of the epithet, and wanted Herron terminated. FedEx did not fire Lopez, but it did fire an African-American man for an “alleged policy violation.” Id.
5. On April 11, 2016, FedEx disciplined Herron in writing for allegedly leaking information that was already generally known and for violating the company's confidentiality policy. Id. at 5.
6. On May 16, 2017, Herron filed a complaint against a Hispanic female coworker, Belinda Garza, for workplace violence.[1] FedEx did not discipline Garza, but it suspended Herron without pay. Id.
7. On September 28, 2017, Herron refused to provide a Hispanic male coworker with keys to a vehicle that he was unauthorized to operate. After the coworker asked Herron for the keys, Herron complained to manager Ruth Quinones. FedEx suspended Herron while it investigated her complaint.
8. FedEx did not investigate Herron's complaints that she had been called ‘Felicia' ([i]n reference to a Black female character in the movie ‘Friday') or ‘Madea' (the Black female character portrayed by Tyler Perry in his movies) or Sonia la Ronia' which means ‘dog mange' in Spanish.” Id. However, FedEx did investigate complaints that Herron had called the Hispanic male employee “panson” which “means ‘fat stomach' in Spanish.” Id.
9. On October 10, 2017, FedEx fired Herron, allegedly because FedEx had reprimanded her three times within the five-year period leading up to her termination. FedEx fired Herron despite its policy to terminate an employee “if there are three (3) reprimands within a one-year period.” Id. Herron filed a formal charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on September 29, 2017, “based on the suspension and other acts of discrimination.” Id.[2]

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, FedEx largely denies Herron's factual allegations, stating that she was a toxic influence at the facility and that her own improper, unprofessional actions caused her termination. Dkt. No. 53 at 6.

During her ten years there, Plaintiff actively schemed to get co-workers in trouble, checking-up on her peers and compiling information to use against them. She started rumors and spread gossip. Her complaint history at FedEx shows that no one was immune from her criticism and that, no matter what management did, her desire for “action” in response to petty complaints was never appeased. Ultimately, Plaintiff lost her job because she disrupted the station.

Id. FedEx asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Herron's claims are either time-barred, procedurally barred, or unsupported by admissible evidence. Id. at 2.

A. Herron's Claims Regarding Conduct and Events Occurring Before April 30, 2016.

The parties agree that Herron filed her first “Charge of Discrimination” (hereinafter, 2016 Charge”) with the EEOC on April 30, 2016. See Dkt. No. 53-1 at 8; Dkt. No. 74-1 at 3. FedEx states, and Herron does not deny, that the EEOC responded to this 2016 Charge with a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” (hereinafter, “Dismissal Notice”) on May 26 2016. See Dkt. No. 53-1 at 10. The EEOC's Dismissal Notice stated that it was unable to conclude the FedEx had violated Herron's rights. Id. It also notified Herron that,...

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