Herron v. Rose City Transit Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1966
• Citation: 243 Or. 64,411 P.2d 445
• Parties: Genevieve A. HERRON, Appellant, v. ROSE CITY TRANSIT COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 445

411 P.2d 445

243 Or. 64

Genevieve A. HERRON, Appellant, v. ROSE CITY TRANSIT COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 4, 1966.

Decided Feb. 24, 1966.

William C. Grant, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Ben T. Gray, Portland.

Arden E. Shenker, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Tooze, Powers, Kerr, Tooze & Peterson, Portland.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and PERRY, SLOAN, HOLMAN and LUSK, JJ.

HOLMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for damages occurring as a result of personal injuries suffered from a fall at a designated bus stop at the intersection of northwest 23rd and Everett Streets in the city of Portland. She contended defendant was negligent in stopping its bus an unreasonable distance from the curb. Plaintiff has appealed from an order of involuntary nonsuit at the completion of her case.

The only issue raised by defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit and the only issue considered here is whether there was any substantial evidence of negligence on the part of defendant as alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff states her position as follows:

'A bus company owes a duty to a prospective passenger to exercise reasonable care for her safety, and the creation of an unreasonable, foreseeable risk of harm to the prospective passenger, waiting at a bus stop, in getting to the bus is a breach of that duty.'

The following is a summary of the evidence most favorable to plaintiff. The weather was bad. There was snow and thick ice everywhere. The street was rutted and rough with frozen snow and ice. Plaintiff, a woman 69 years of age, was waiting for defendant's bus at the bus stop on the west side of 23rd Street just north of its intersection with Everett Street. Defendant's bus approached the stop traveling south on 23rd Street. The driver observed plaintiff waiting for his bus from a half block away. There were no vehicles parked on the west side of 23rd Street to the north of plaintiff for a distance of 62 feet. The bus was 34 feet 4 inches long. The bus was stopped for plaintiff a distance of from six to eight feet out from the curb and its door opened for her. Plaintiff stepped off the curb and walked toward the open bus door when she slipped and fell on the ice, breaking her hip and striking her head on the bus.

The jury could have found from the above evidence that the bus driver could have stopped the bus at the curb, thus making it unnecessary for plaintiff to traverse the rutted snow and ice between the curb and the bus. Under these conditions could the jury have found that the defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to pull the bus to the curb so that she might board it there?

In Lewis v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 147 Or. 588, 34 P.2d 616, 96 A.L.R. 718 (1934), plaintiff was discharged from a bus on the righthand shoulder of the highway opposite the bus station and was injured when struck by another vehicle while walking across the highway to the station. The court held there was no liability as plaintiff was allowed to alight from the bus in a safe place and that if, thereafter, he voluntarily walked into a situation of danger it was not the bus company's responsibility. In discussing the duty of the bus company to furnish a safe place to alight, the court said as follows, at page 592, 34 P.2d at page 617:

'* * * An automobile bus is able to move or stop in the street at the will of the driver. Ordinarily stations are not maintained by such carriers. The safety of the place afforded the passenger for alighting is entirely within the control of the driver, and passengers are discharged to suit their convenience. The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger involved. To discharge a passenger on a highway where he would be subject to the dangers of vehicular traffic would clearly not meet the degree of care which the law exacts.'

In the present case the passenger was seeking admission to the bus instead of debarking, and the danger was from slipping on the rutted frozen ice and snow and...