Herron v. State, 47589

• Decision Date: 07 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 47589,47589
• Citation: 287 So.2d 759
• Parties: R. C. HERRON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 759

287 So.2d 759

R. C. HERRON v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 47589.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1974.

Billy J. Jordan, Thomas R. Mayfield, Joe O. Sams, Jr., Columbus, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Billy L. Gore, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

RODGERS, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal case from a manslaughter conviction of the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, wherein the appellant, R. C. Herron, was indicted and tried on a charge of the murder of Mrs. June Carol Strickland Symons. The appellant offered the defense of insanity of the accused at the time of the homicide.

The defendant testified that on July 2, 1971, at approximately 4:00 P.M., Mrs. Symons offered him a ride home from his place of employment at Picks Truck Stop. The appellant's automobile had been left at a garage for repair at the time. Appellant had a bag containing some money and a .38 caliber revolver. He put the bag under the seat of Mrs. Symons' automobile. Appellant said that when they stopped at a stop sign near Suggs' Barbecue, Mrs. Symons reached under the seat into the money bag, brought out the gum, and said that she had a score to settle with a big blonde-headed girl at Suggs'. He said that he grabbed Mrs. Symons' arm and struggled with her for the possession of the pistol. During the struggle the pistol was discharged twice. The automobile came to a halt, and the appellant got out of the automobile. Appellant claimed that he did not remember anything after he got out of the automobile.

There were eyewitnesses who did know what occurred. They testified that when they saw the automobile driven by Mrs. Symons, it was apparently out of control, and that one of them heard two shots. A woman (Mrs. Symons) got out of the automobile on the driver's side, holding her arm across her stomach as she ran toward the witness. The witness observed that the woman was bleeding. The defendant Herron got out of the automobile with a pistol in his hand. He then followed Mrs. Symons to the back of an automobile and pointed his pistol at her. As the witness turned away she heard two shots. The witness saw the defendant run back to the car (belonging to Mrs. Symons) and get something out of the automobile. The defendant then went back out into the street where he fired two more shots and finally another shot. The defendant was then observed lying by Mrs. Symons on the ground. Other witnesses saw the defendant reload his pistol and shoot himself. Defendant asked one of the witnesses to 'Get help for the lady' and get 'Carol to the hospital.' He asked others to call the police.

Two medical doctors testified as defense witnesses. Dr. Gilbert Spencer, the surgeon who treated the defendant, testified that the defendant was suffering from gunshot wounds in the abdominal area. He said the appellant's emotional condition immediately after the shooting was 'abnormal'. He said appellant was oriented as to time, place, and person, but that he was suffering from an emotional condition known as a 'flat effect'. He said that the defendant knew 'when he was, where he was, who he was', but that he had a 'flat effect', 'no mood'.

Dr. Bernard Ellis, a medical doctor who had studied psychiatry and was qualified, but was not at that time a Board certified psychiatrist, testified from information obtained by an examination of the defendant and from a study of the testimony introduced in a habeas corpus hearing, together with other data gathered from some members of defendant's family, that it was his opinion that the defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong at the time he shot the deceased, Mrs. Symons, and that he was at that time insane. He said, however, that the defendant was sane prior to the homicide, was sane following the homicide, and at the time of the trial. He explained that in his opinion the defendant was at the time of the shooting suffering from a 'dissociative reaction' and that this condition was a 'psychotic degree reaction'.

The state offered Dr. Robert L. McKinley, Jr., a Board certified psychiatrist, as a professional psychiatrist. Dr. McKinley testified that 'a dissociative reaction' in a patient is a form of neurosis and a patient suffering from 'a dissociative reaction' is not suffering from insanity nor is he psychotic. He also testified that during eight years' practice of psychiatry he had never known a case where a patient was totally sane at one point and then insane for a brief period only to be totally sane again immediately thereafter.

The appellant contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty because it is said that the State of Mississippi failed to prove the sanity of the accused after his sanity had been put in issue.

The appellant cites the rule expressed in Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am.Rep. 360 (1879) as follows:

'We think the true rule is this: Every man is presumed to be sane, and, in the absence of testimony engendering a reasonable doubt of sanity, no evidence on the subject need be offered; but whenever the question of sanity is raised and put in issue by such facts, proven on either side, as engender such doubt, it devolves upon the State to remove it, and to establish the sanity of the prisoner to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt arising out of all the evidence in the case.' 56 Miss. at 276.

The foregoing rule has been approved in Waycaster v. State, 185 Miss. 25, 187 So. 205 (1939); Gambrell v. State, 238 Miss. 892, 120 So.2d 758 (1960); and Butler v. State, 245 So.2d 605 (1971). See also Pollard v. State, 53 Miss. 410 (1876); Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665 (1896). However, this rule is not universally accepted at will be seen from 26 Am.Jur. Homicide § 291, at 355 (1940).

The theory on which the appellant bases his appeal is that one doctor testified that at the time of the homicide the accused did not know the difference between right and wrong, and appellant says that this is a good defense of insanity under the M'Naghten rule (Harvey v. State, 207 So.2d 108 (1968)); therefore, since the State did not meet the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was sane at the very instant he shot Mrs. Symons, the court should have granted a directed verdict of acquittal.

We cannot agree with this thesis under the facts in this case for several reasons. First-the issue of the insanity of an accused is a jury issue. Section 2575, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) (Miss.Code Ann. § 99-13-7 (1972)).

The rule above cited and followed by the cases cited points up the fact that it devolves upon the state to remove the doubt and to establish the sanity of the prisoner to the 'satisfaction of the jury.'

The jury in making this determination will take into consideration all the testimony surrounding the homicide, including such expert testimony as may be offered as an aid in its effort to reach a true verdict. Kearney v. State, 224 Miss. 1, 79 So.2d 468 (1955). Expert testimony as an aid to the jury, see 20 Am.Jur. Evidence § 775, at 647 (1939).

The same argument presented in the present case was offered in Kearney, supra, and in answer to this argument, this Court had the following to say:

'. . . (W)hile it is true that aside from the statement of the sheriff that he believed that the defendant knew what he was doing that night, no witness for the State would express an affirmative opinion on the issue of whether the defendant knew right from wrong on the occasion of the shooting. However, they did relate facts and circumstances which occurred at or about the time of the shooting that would amply warrant a jury in finding that the defendant was angry with his wife and that he shot her pursuant to a premeditated design with the conscious intent to kill and murder her, . . .' 224 Miss. at 12, 79 So.2d at 473.

Of course, the jury is not required to accept the opinion of an expert witness, particularly in sanity hearings, since a layman may have an opinion as to the sanity of another, and may testify as to another's sanity based upon facts previously stated. Jurors themselves may from their experience in life have an opinion based upon the surrounding facts, acts and circumstances developed in the trial of a case. Moreover, the conclusions of an expert witness are not infallible. His opinion must be based upon his study and his own experience and if either is lacking, deficient, or immature, his conclusions may fall short of the accuracy essential to a true verdict.

In the case of Smith v. State, 245 So.2d 583 (Miss.1971) the defendant was charged with murdering a woman with whom he was supposedly in love. A defense of insanity was interposed and supported by the testimony of two psychiatrists who stated that in their opinion the defendant was insane at the time of the shooting. The State presented a staff member of the hospital where the defendant was examined as a rebuttal witness, and he testified regarding the examination of the defendant. The appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty against him. The Court answered:

'The thrust of appellant's argument on this point is that the jury was bound to accept the expert opinions of the two psychiatrists who testified for him upon the issue of insanity. The opinions of these experts were, of course, competent and relevant to the issue. However, uncontradicted evidence before the jury acquainted the jurors with the conduct of the appellant before, at the time of, and subsequent to the homicide. * * * It was the prerogative of the jury, and it was its duty, to consider all of this evidence. The jury was not deprived of the right to use common sense or of applying the lessons of human experience in resolving the question of whether the appellant had or had not appreciated the nature and consequences of his act and had or had not...