Hesling v. Csx Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-60054.,No. 03-60374.,03-60374.,04-60054. |
| Citation | 396 F.3d 632 |
| Parties | Monica Bauer HESLING, Guardian and Next Friend of minors, Hannah Buck and Chelsey Buck, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., and National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Frederick N. Sager, Jr. (argued), Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, Tamara M. Ayres, Scherffius, Ballard, Still & Ayres, Atlanta, GA, Alan D. Lancaster, Liston & Lancaster, Winona, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Raymond L. Brown (argued), Brown Buchanan Sessoms, Pascagoula, MS, Patrick Russell Buchanan, Brown Buchanan Sessoms, Biloxi, MS, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before BENAVIDES, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of an automobile-train collision in Long Beach, Mississippi, involving the decedent, Erica Bauer Valentine ("Valentine"), and a train owned by National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), which was operating on single-rail tracks owned by CSX Transportation ("CSX"). Monica Bauer Hesling ("Hesling") brought this wrongful death action as guardian and next of friend of the decedent's two minor children. Hesling appeals the magistrate judge's denial of her Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. Hesling also appeals the judgment, claiming several errors for exclusion of evidence, and improper or failure to give jury instructions. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
On the morning of October 25, 1996, Valentine was driving west along West Railroad Street in Long Beach, Harrison County, Mississippi, parallel to railroad tracks owned by CSX. Valentine turned south onto White Harbor Road and attempted to cross the tracks at the White Harbor Road crossing when a passenger train owned and operated by Amtrak, traveling 61 m.p.h., collided with Valentine's vehicle killing her and her husband.
Amtrak alleges that at the time of the collision, its train was equipped with the minimal safety devices required by state standards.1 Amtrak also contends its train had its headlights on "bright," had its bell ringing, and sounded warning blasts for the crossing continuously from at least one-fourth mile prior to the White Harbor crossing, and continued to sound the horn at the time of the accident. The parties dispute the timing and length of the warning blast given by the Amtrak train. The crossing was marked with advance warning signs, advance pavement markings, a cross buck, and automatic flashers with lights and bells indicating the presence of a train, which were engaged at the time of the accident. At the time of the accident, the crossing was not equipped with gates or crossing arms. On May 11, 1994, two years prior to the accident, CSX was informed by the Mississippi Department of Transportation that it was required to develop estimates for the installation of gates because a diagnostic survey team had determined that crossing gates were needed at the White Harbor Road crossing. Following the accident, federal funds were provided for the installation of crossing gates.
Immediately preceding the accident, the locomotive engineer of a stationary eastbound CSX train, located on a nearby side track adjacent to and just west of the White Harbor Road crossing to avoid the oncoming Amtrak train, stated that the decedent did not look in the direction of the westbound Amtrak train prior to the collision. The parties dispute whether Valentine was mislead into associating the activation of the crossing's warning lights with the stationary CSX train on the side track. Witnesses testified that the stationary CSX train was facing the crossing with its headlights on and smoke was emanating from its engine. Also, the parties dispute whether the decedent's view of the Amtrak train was obscured by a stopped northbound van on White Harbor Road that had just traversed the crossing and by a railroad structure/housing located on the northern part of the railroad just east and in close proximity to the White Harbor Road crossing.
On October 22, 1999, Hesling brought a wrongful death action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Hesling alleged that CSX breached its duty in (1) maintaining an ultra-hazardous grade crossing at White Harbor Road; (2) failing to install automatic gates at the White Harbor Road crossing; (3) failing to protect the crossing by placing flagmen at the crossing until it was occupied by the Amtrak train; (4) failing to provide protection at the crossing in violation of Mississippi law and CSX Operating Rule 100-I; and (5) failing to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances then and there existing so as to avoid the subject accident. Hesling also alleged that Amtrak breached its duty in (1) operating its passenger train at an excessive rate of speed; (2) operating its passenger train at a speed at which the train could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, be stopped at the grade crossing to avoid the subject accident; (3) failing to maintain a reasonable and proper lookout for motorists approaching and using the crossing; (4) failing to see the decedent's motor vehicle in sufficient time to avoid the subject accident; (5) failing to sound its whistle and ring its bell as the passenger train approached within 300 yards of said crossing in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 77-9-225; and (6) in other ways failing to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances then and there existing so as to avoid the subject accident.
Discovery proceeded for approximately two and a half years. The jury trial began on January 21, 2003. The jury returned a verdict in favor of CSX and Amtrak on February 3, 2003. On February 18, 2003, Hesling moved for judgment as a matter of law, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). The magistrate judge declined to disturb the jury's verdict. Hesling then filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, two previously undisclosed CSX documents were discovered: (1) a CSX newsletter rating the Mississippi Gulf Coast corridor, which included the White Harbor Road crossing, as the most accident prone on the CSX system, and (2) an agreement between the City of Long Beach and CSX providing that CSX would not operate its trains faster than 45 m.p.h. through Long Beach. Based on this new discovery, Hesling made a motion for relief from judgment under three subsections of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence; 60(b)(3) based upon fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct; and the "catch-all" subsection 60(b)(6) based upon extraordinary circumstances. The magistrate judge denied Hesling's 60(b) Motion for Relief. Hesling filed a timely amended notice of appeal.
Much of Hesling's arguments hinge on her challenge to the magistrate judge's ruling on federal preemption; therefore, we first address whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA") preempted Hesling's claim that Amtrak violated a self-imposed CSX speed limit of 60 m.p.h.2 A district court's preemption ruling is reviewed de novo. Branson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 126 F.3d 747, 750 (5th Cir.1980).
Under 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") sets out maximum allowable speed limits for different classes of tracks. The White Harbor Road crossing was on a section of track rated as Class 4. A Class 4 track has a maximum allowable speed of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80 m.p.h. for passenger trains. Hesling contends that the magistrate judge prejudicially erred in finding that the issue of speed was preempted because, according to Hesling, the magistrate judge ignored statements in the Federal Register suggesting that track speed is distinguishable from train speed. Hesling proffered to the magistrate judge excerpts from the Federal Register, which Hesling argues demonstrate that while the FRA set track speed limits, it did not intend to establish train speed limits. Instead, according to Hesling's interpretation, train speed is left to the discretion of the railroads once a track classification is established. We disagree.
In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action claiming, inter alia, CSX was negligent for operating its trains at excessive speeds. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The Supreme Court found that the FRSA expressly preempted the plaintiff's claims insofar as she asserted state tort claims based on excessive train speed. Id. at 675-76, 113 S.Ct. 1732. The plaintiff in Easterwood conceded that the train was traveling less than the 60 m.p.h. maximum allowable speed based on its track classification. Id. at 673, 113 S.Ct. 1732. Nonetheless, the plaintiff argued that the train breached a duty to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed. The Court held that the track class designation not only set a ceiling for train speed but should be understood as "covering the subject matter of train speed;" in other words, § 213.9 substantially subsumes the relevant state law as to claims based on train speed. Id. at 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732. Therefore, the Court found that under the FRSA, any state law claim based on a train's allegedly excessive speed is preempted by federal law. Id. at 676, 113 S.Ct. 1732.
It is undisputed by the parties that the track at the White Harbor Road crossing was rated a Class 4 track and, therefore, passenger trains are designated as safe for operating on it up to 80 m.p.h. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (West 2004). It is also undisputed that the Amtrak train was traveling approximately 61 m.p.h. at the...
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