Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 26079.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1971
• Docket Number: No. 26079.,26079.
• Parties: Donald D. HESSELGESSER, Appellant, v. William J. REILLY, Sheriff of Spokane County, Washington, E. Byron Franz, and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

440 F.2d 901 (1971)

Donald D. HESSELGESSER, Appellant, v. William J. REILLY, Sheriff of Spokane County, Washington, E. Byron Franz, and Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellees.

No. 26079.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 8, 1971.

William J. Powell (argued), Spokane, Wash., for appellant.

Paul F. Schiffner (argued), of Mac-Gillivray, Jones, Clarke & Schiffner, Spokane, Wash., for appellees.

Before HAMLEY, KOELSCH and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge:

The issue presented on this appeal is whether, in a civil rights action, the Sheriff of Spokane County, Washington, and his official bond, are liable in damages for the act of a deputy sheriff, serving as jailer, in depriving a prisoner of his civil rights. The jury said "yes," and awarded the prisoner-plaintiff $12,500 damages against the sheriff and his surety, as well as against the deputy. The district court said "no," and granted judgment n. o. v. for the sheriff and his surety. The plaintiff appeals. We say "yes," and reverse.

The plaintiff is Donald D. Hesselgesser. He was arrested on October 11, 1967, on a charge of unlawful possession of an explosive device, and lodged in the Spokane County jail. The jail was under the direction and supervision of William J. Reilly, Sheriff of Spokane County. The surety on his official bond was Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. Deputy Sheriff E. Byron Franz was on duty at the jail.

On February 13, 1968, while still being held in jail, Hesselgesser prepared an application for a writ of habeas corpus and handed it to Deputy Sheriff Franz for delivery to the Spokane County Superior Court. Franz did not deliver the document to the court and it was eventually delivered to the Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney. Sheriff Reilly had not instructed his deputy to follow this course and was apparently unaware of it at the time. About March 15, 1968, Hesselgesser prepared another habeas corpus application which was delivered to the court. On March 27, 1968, the prosecuting attorney obtained an order dismissing the charges and releasing Hesselgesser from custody.

Hesselgesser then commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He named as defendants Reilly, the surety company, and Franz, and asked for $25,000 damages. As noted above, the jury awarded half that sum. The district court granted a new trial as to Franz on the ground that the size of the verdict indicated passion and prejudice.

The court granted judgment n. o. v. for Sheriff Reilly and his surety on the ground that, under Washington decisional law, they are not liable for the acts of deputies, such as Franz, whose appointment and tenure, by reason of civil service status, are subject to only limited control by the sheriff. The court order further provides that in the event judgment n. o. v. is not sustained on appeal, the sheriff and his bond are granted a new trial. On this appeal Hesselgesser confines his argument to the judgment n. o. v. and does not challenge the alternative order granting a new trial.

At the outset it should be observed that plaintiff's claim against Sheriff Reilly and his official bond is not predicated upon any contention that the deputy's conduct was pursuant to directions or instructions from the sheriff, or upon any other circumstance involving personal knowledge or maladministration by the sheriff. Nor does such claim against the sheriff and his bond rest upon common law principles of vicarious liability such as might arise from a respondeat superior relationship between the sheriff and his deputy. Instead, plaintiff's claim against these defendants is based upon Washington statutes which establish the authority and duties of sheriffs and deputy sheriffs and provide that sheriffs shall be liable for the negligence "and misconduct" of their jailers and other deputies.¹

The Civil Rights Act does not itself specifically establish a basis for liability, vicarious or otherwise, against persons who do not participate in a civil rights violation. The applicable section, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, speaks only of "(e)very person who * * * subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen * * * to the deprivation of any rights * * *." Thus if one who did not participate in such violation is to be held liable for the civil rights violation of another on principles of vicarious liability, or by reason of statutory responsibility, it must be because: (1) the Civil Rights Act gives recognition to the laws of the states pertaining to such liability and, (2) the laws of the particular state where the action arose create such liability.

We think the Civil Rights Act does authorize the application, under appropriate circumstances, of state laws pertaining to vicarious liability and liability created by statute. Under 42 U. S.C. § 1988, quoted in the margin, where the laws of the United States are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the state wherein the case arose, shall govern the trial and disposition of civil rights actions, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.² State statutes making sheriffs liable for the misconduct of their deputies, if applied to civil rights deprivations by deputies, are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

But the prime issue here is whether the laws of the particular state where this action arose, namely Washington, make county sheriffs liable for the civil rights violations perpetrated by their deputies while serving as jailers.

The Washington statutes quoted in note 1 would seem to establish such liability. But the sheriff and his surety point out that these statutes were first enacted in 1871, and that in 1958, a merit system, analogous to a civil service system, was established for deputy sheriffs. (Wash.Rev.Code § 41.14.010 et seq.) They urge that, under the rule announced in Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 605, 611-614, 225 P. 633, 635-636 (1924), a sheriff is not liable for the torts of his civil service deputies.

Pavish pertained to the liability of a chief of police for the torts of his civil service policemen. While recognizing that, under state statutes, a sheriff is liable for the misconduct of his deputies, the Pavish court held that, under the police civil service system, the chief did not have sufficient control over the appointment of the policemen to warrant similar liability. Since, in 1958, deputy sheriffs were brought under a form of civil service, the sheriff and his bond argue that the Pavish principle should now apply to county sheriffs, relieving them from such liability.

One difficulty with this argument is that, subsequent to the 1958 enactment of Wash.Rev.Code § 41.14.010 et seq., which established the deputy sheriff merit system, Washington reenacted, in the form quoted in note 1, the statutes making sheriffs liable for the misconduct of their deputies.³...