Hessen for Use and Benefit of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-5938,89-5938
• Citation: 915 F.2d 641
• Parties: 31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 755, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,632 Claudia HESSEN, Arnold Hessen, for Use and Benefit of ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JAGUAR CARS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 641

915 F.2d 641

31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 755, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,632

Claudia HESSEN, Arnold Hessen, for Use and Benefit of ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JAGUAR CARS, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-5938.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Oct. 24, 1990.

R. Benjamine Reid, Paul L. Nettleton, Kimbrell & Hamann, P.A., Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Christopher Lynch, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before FAY and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Jaguar Cars, Inc. ("Jaguar"), appeals a jury award of damages in favor of Allstate Insurance Co. ("Allstate"). Allstate sued Jaguar in a products liability action as subrogee of Arnold and Claudia Hessen, homeowners in Dade County, Florida. Jaguar argues that the district court erred in failing to direct a verdict or grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Jaguar, and asserts that Allstate did not offer any competent evidence of recoverable damages, or establish any evidence that the defect alleged was the factual cause of the damages claimed. Jaguar also argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of a Jaguar recall campaign, as well as evidence of complaints in vehicles other than the subrogors' car. Finally, Jaguar appeals the district court's refusal to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' expert based on plaintiffs' allegedly purposeful destruction of evidence. We AFFIRM the district court's rulings on all grounds.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal involves issues arising from a products liability action based on an allegedly defective 1980 Jaguar XJ6 automobile distributed by Jaguar and purchased by Arnold and Claudia Hessen, Allstate's insureds. On October 9, 1984, the vehicle caught fire while Claudia Hessen and her housekeeper were sitting in the car preparing to drive out of the Hessens' garage. The fire spread, resulting in extensive property damage to the Hessens' house, as well as the garage.

The Hessens were insured under a homeowner's policy issued by Allstate. Immediately following the fire, Arnold Hessen notified both Allstate and Jaguar. Allstate responded right away, sending two experts who conducted a detailed inspection of the vehicle, attempted to assess the extent of the damage, and determined that a "bad fuel hose" was the probable cause of the fire. Jaguar also responded, sending a district service manager to the Hessens' home who very briefly inspected the vehicle visually and recorded its mileage and identification number. ¹ Arnold Hessen testified that the district service manager told him that he wasn't concerned with what Hessen did with the vehicle. Subsequently, Hessen received a letter from Jaguar expressing sympathy over the accident, but advising him that on the basis of the district service manager's "investigation," as well as the car's mileage and service record, Jaguar did not consider itself in any way responsible for the fire.

Following apparently considerable negotiations between Hessen and Allstate, involving the submission of detailed lists regarding damaged items and their costs, Allstate paid Hessen the total sum of $385,654.19 to repair or replace damaged lost items, including the home, and to reimburse the Hessens for costs generated for a rental property pending the repairs. Allstate then brought a subrogation action against Jaguar based upon claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty. Allstate alleged that the fire to the Hessens' home was caused by a defective fuel line system in the Hessens' 1980 Jaguar XJ6 vehicle.

Jaguar filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a motion to exclude Allstate's evidence as to the alleged defective parts, claiming that plaintiffs had intentionally destroyed the fuel hoses and other components of the fuel injection system that plaintiffs claimed were defective, thereby precluding Jaguar from preparing an adequate defense. The district court denied the motion, finding it "wholly lacking in merit." Jaguar renewed the motion at trial in an attempt to exclude the testimony of Allstate's expert, but the motion was again denied.

Jaguar also filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of a recall campaign of 1980 Jaguar XJ6 Series III automobiles (the same model as the Hessens' car), arguing that any evidence of the recall was irrelevant because the recall pertained only to vehicles manufactured after the vehicle in question. ² Further, Jaguar argued that the Hessens' vehicle did not contain the potentially defective material in the fuel hoses which it claimed precipitated the recall. The district court denied Jaguar's motion "without prejudice." When the motion was renewed, the court again denied it "provisionally," but ruled that Allstate could make no reference to the recall campaign in front of the jury until it established in its case in chief, "through circumstantial evidence or otherwise, that the alleged defect in this case is the same as that giving rise to the recall." (R6-124 at 2).

At trial, Allstate attempted to establish that the manner of connection of the fuel hose to the fuel injector system in the Hessen vehicle was defectively designed, and that this defect was the proximate cause of the fire. Allstate's entire case on these issues was presented through its expert. During the expert's testimony, the district court permitted the introduction of Several other witnesses testified during the trial, including the Allstate adjuster, Barry Nedelman, who had handled the Hessens' claim. Nedelman testified that the total payout to the Hessens in compensation for the damages incurred as a result of the fire was $385,654.19. Asserting that this was the only evidence relied upon by Allstate to prove damages, Jaguar moved for a directed verdict both at the end of Allstate's case in chief and at the conclusion of all evidence, contending that Allstate had failed to present any evidence that established a proper measure of recoverable damages sufficient to support a jury verdict. The motions were denied.

evidence concerning the recall campaign, ³ as well as evidence of other complaints of leaks or fuel odors in Jaguar vehicles. This evidence was admitted over Jaguar's objections asserting a lack of substantial similarity to the Hessen vehicle in condition and alleged defect.

The case was ultimately submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Allstate. Curiously, although the jury found no comparative negligence on the part of Allstate or the Hessens, it nevertheless awarded only 75% of Allstate's total claim, or $289,240.64. The court entered final judgment in this amount on May 12, 1989. Jaguar's timely post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial on five separate grounds, largely reiterating objections made earlier in the proceeding, were denied by a district court order entered July 31, 1989. The court entered a final judgment awarding Allstate prejudgment interest on August 21, 1989. This appeal from both final judgments followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdicts test the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury verdict. Gregg v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 887 F.2d 1462, 1468 (11th Cir.1989) (citing J & H Auto Trim Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir.1982)). Because consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law subject to de novo review, we therefore apply the same standard as the district court applied in its initial rulings. Id. When evaluating the district court's denial of a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., the court

should consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the [c]ourt believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury.

Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969). ⁴

Motions for a new trial are within the sound discretion of the district court, McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984), and our review of a district court's denial of a new trial involves

determining whether the trial judge clearly abused his/her discretion. Gregg, 887 F.2d at 1469; Pate v. Seaboard R.R., 819 F.2d 1074, 1077 (11th Cir.1987). Similarly, a district court's evidentiary rulings are discretionary and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 941 (11th Cir.1988); Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.1986), reinstated after rehearing en banc, 827 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir.1987), rev'd in part on other grounds, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988).

DISCUSSION

I. Competent Evidence of Damages.

In this diversity case, the determination of damages constitutes a substantive issue. Complete Concepts, Ltd. v. General Handbag Corp., 880 F.2d 382, 389 (11th Cir.1989); McDermott v. Middle East Carpet Co., 811 F.2d 1422, 1426 (11th Cir.1987). Thus, our inquiry, in light of the standard of review set forth above, is whether, as a matter of Florida law (which controls the substantive claims in this case), the evidence considered in the light most favorable to...