Hester v. Allgeier

• Decision Date: 13 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-508.,82-508.
• Citation: 687 F.2d 464
• Parties: Jackson B. HESTER, Jr. v. Hans ALLGEIER and Andre Gagneux.
• Court: U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)

687 F.2d 464

Jackson B. HESTER, Jr. v. Hans ALLGEIER and Andre Gagneux.

No. 82-508.

United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.

September 2, 1982.

Rehearing Denied October 13, 1982.

Sidney W. Russell, Peter J. Georges, Arlington, Va., and John T. Reynolds, John Kekich, Kalamazoo, Mich., for appellant.

Joseph G. Kolodny, New York City, and Karl F. Jorda, Ardsley, N.Y., for appellees.

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, MILLER and NIES, Judges.

MILLER, Judge.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Interferences ("board") awarding priority of the subject matter of count 2 to the party Allgeier and Gagneux ("Allgeier") based on its holding that counts 1 and 2, the only counts in interference, are patentably distinct. (Hester has been awarded priority on count 1.) We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case is before the court for the second time.¹ The interference² was originally declared on one count drawn to a chemical genus having central nervous system tranquilizing properties. During the motion period, based on comparative tests set forth in the declaration of Delini-Stula which was introduced by Allgeier, the primary examiner on his own motion added count 2 to the interference, stating that counts 1 and 2 were patentably distinct. Count 2 is drawn to the methanol species of the genus set forth in count 1. Hester submitted counter-affidavits setting forth comparative tests conducted by the employees of his assignee and unsuccessfully contested the examiner's holding of patentable distinctness.

In its original decision, the board awarded priority to Hester on count 1 and to Allgeier on count 2. It also held that Allgeier had satisfied the "best mode" requirement, assuming, arguendo, that "best mode" was ancillary to priority. However, the board expressly declined to consider whether counts 1 and 2 were patentably distinct, holding that patentable distinctness was not ancillary to priority. On appeal, this court held that whether counts 1 and 2 were patentably distinct was ancillary to priority, the board's decision was vacated, and the case was remanded for consideration of the patentable distinctness issue.

On remand, the board vacated the portions of its opinion dealing with patentable distinctness and best mode and said:

Insofar as the issue of patentable distinctness of the counts is concerned, it is our view that as the proponent of the proposition that count 2 should not have been included in the interference, Hester bears the burden of persuasion. Cf. Weil v. Fritz, 601 F.2d 551, 202 USPQ 447 (CCPA 1979). Acting pursuant to 35 USC 135(a), the primary examiner, the Commissioner's delegate, from the evidence before him at the time, concluded that the count should be added; in his opinion a second interference existed as to the species of count 2, the methanol compound. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we are not inclined to disturb the finding of the examiner in a situation such as we have here. Citations omitted. We find no such clear evidence in the record before us.

There appears to be no dispute here that the methanol compound, when administered orally, has a higher initial potency that sic the ether, and it was this fact that convinced the examiner that count 2 was patentably distinct from count 1, i.e., that the methanol compound was unobvious over the genus of count 1 because it had the unexpected property of higher initial potency. Cf. In re Albrecht, 579 F.2d 92, 198 USPQ 208 (CCPA 1978). In reaching this conclusion, the examiner had before him not only the affidavits submitted by Allgeier et al., but those submitted by Hester, i.e., the Von Voigtlander, Reineke and Eberts affidavits. We find no subsequent evidence adduced by Hester under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.271 et seq. of sufficient probative value to establish that the examiner was either misled in reaching his conclusion or erroneous in his judgment that, from the evidence before him, count 2 was patentably distinct.

Indeed, Hester has adduced no evidence to the effect that the higher initial potency is other than an unexpected result....

....

We disagree with Hester that in contrariety to the holding in In re Stewart, 42 CCPA 937, 222 F.2d 747, 106 USPQ 115 (1955), Allgeier et al. inconsistently assert that count 2 has an "advantage" in order to support inventiveness while simultaneously relying on an application that does not disclose the advantage. We are of the view that both the Allgeier et al. benefit (Swiss) and involved applications are in accordance with In re Slocombe, 510 F.2d 1398, 184 USPQ 740 (CCPA 1975) which held (184 USPQ at 743):

There is no requirement that superiority over prior art be disclosed in the application; it is enough if the basic property or utility in which the advantage resides is disclosed. In re Lorenz, 51 CCPA 1522, 333 F.2d 908, 142 USPQ 101 (1964).

Footnotes omitted.

OPINION

In deciding whether the board's award of priority of the subject matter of count 2 was correct, it is necessary to determine whether the board properly held that the counts are patentably distinct.

Hester argues that the board improperly considered the affidavit and declaration evidence before the primary examiner to sustain the examiner's holding of patentable distinctness and that evidence in an interference must be in the form of depositions, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. 37 CFR 1.271, 1.272. We agree that the board should not review the inadmissible ex parte evidence before the examiner, but, rather, should rely on evidence introduced during the testimony period to determine whether the counts are patentably distinct.

Motions before the primary examiner are governed by 37 CFR 1.231. Of the various motions enumerated, it is only in the case of motions to dissolve, where one party is a patentee, that "facts sought to be established by affidavits, declarations or evidence outside of official records and printed publications will not normally be considered...." There is no such prohibition against affidavit or declaration evidence in 37 CFR 1.231(a)(2), providing for motions to amend by addition or substitution of new counts. Therefore, the primary examiner properly considered the affidavits and declarations which formed the basis of his decision.

With respect to evidence reviewable by the board, in Stoudt v. Guggenheim, 651 F.2d 760, 764 n.8, 210 USPQ 359, 364 n.10 (Cust.&Pat.App.1981), this court indicated that the board should consider the question of patentable distinctness de novo, thus: "An appropriate procedure to preserve the issue of patentable distinctness would be to adduce evidence on that issue during the evidentiary period and to then argue the issue before the board which then renders its independent...