Hester v. Dwivedi

• Decision Date: 06 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-683.,99-683.
• Citation: 89 Ohio St.3d 575,733 NE 2d 1161
• Parties: HESTER, NATURAL FATHER & NEXT FRIEND OF HESTER, A MINOR, APPELLANT, v. DWIVEDI ET AL., APPELLEES.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

89 Ohio St.3d 575

733 NE 2d 1161

HESTER, NATURAL FATHER & NEXT FRIEND OF HESTER, A MINOR, APPELLANT, v. DWIVEDI ET AL., APPELLEES.

No. 99-683.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 26, 2000.

Decided September 6, 2000.

Santen & Hughes and John D. Holschuh, Jr.; Gehrig, Gelwicks & Eynon and Thomas A. Gelwicks, for appellant.

Roetzel & Andress, Ann Ruley Combs and Karen A. Caroll, for appellee Leela Dwivedi, M.D.

Lindhorst & Dreidame and Michael F. Lyon, for appellee Luis Saldana, M.D.

Mark Stephen Lally, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Right to Life Society, Inc.

Lancione & Lancione, P.L.L., and John A. Lancione, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

MOYER, C.J.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether Alicia's wrongful life claims are sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). We hold that they are not.

Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), Alicia is entitled to have all the material allegations in her complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, construed in her favor as true. Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165-166, 63 O.O.2d 262, 264, 297 N.E.2d 113, 117, citing 2A Moore's Federal Practice (1965) 2342, Paragraph 12.15; 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1969), Section 1368. Moreover, although significant discovery had taken place prior to the time appellees filed their Civ.R. 12(C) motions, the trial court could not properly consider any evidentiary material tending to disprove the complaint's allegations in deciding the motions. Rather, entry of judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is only appropriate "where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931, 936.

In her complaint, Alicia alleges that appellees Drs. Dwivedi and Suldana received test results while her mother was pregnant that indicated a possibility that the fetus she was carrying was not developing normally, so that, if the pregnancy continued, the child (Alicia) would be born with congenital abnormalities. Alicia asserts that, because the pregnancy was not terminated, she was in fact born, and born with severe physical and neurological deficits. She claims that she will be "forced to incur extraordinary medical and educational expenses throughout the course of her life," for which the appellees should be held liable. She suggests that her mother would have terminated the pregnancy had her parents been advised of the test results, so that she, Alicia, would not have been born and would never incur extraordinary medical and other costs. These allegations are either alleged in the complaint or are reasonable inferences from it. We accept them as true for purposes of reviewing appellees' motions for judgment on the pleadings.

This court has previously disposed of cases bearing factual similarities to the one at bar. While these types of cases are commonly labeled "wrongful life," "wrongful pregnancy," "wrongful birth," or "wrongful living" actions, they are not governed by statutory law as are wrongful death actions. They remain, at their core, medical negligence actions, and are determined by application of commonlaw tort principles.

As have other courts and commentators, we recognize that overreliance on terms such as "wrongful life" or "wrongful birth" creates the risk of confusion in applying principles of tort law to actual cases, and may compound or complicate resolution of the case. See Greco v. United States (1995), 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 348, fn. 5, citing Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling (1979), 79 Col.L.Rev. 618, 634, fn. 62. Designating cases in this manner does serve a purpose in providing a shorthand description of the kinds of facts asserted by the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, determining that the instant case presents a "wrongful life" claim does not confer a special legal status on it, nor change the traditional legal analysis used to determine its merits.

Rather, such cases are properly decided by applying the same legal analysis employed in any medical negligence claim. As in negligence claims in general, liability based on the alleged negligence of a professional requires proof of the following elements: duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff, breach of duty by that defendant, damages suffered by the plaintiff, and a proximate cause relationship between the breach of duty and the damages.

In Bowman v. Davis (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 2 O.O.3d 133, 356 N.E.2d 496, we first recognized a right for parents to recover where medical negligence resulted in the birth of children. Our holding was confined to a determination that public policy did not preclude parents from bringing an action in tort against medical providers following a negligently performed and unsuccessful sterilization procedure. Such an action is generally characterized as presenting a "wrongful pregnancy" claim.

Similarly, in Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 49, 540 N.E.2d 1370, the plaintiff, a mother, alleged that her doctors negligently performed a tubal ligation, which she had undergone in order to avoid future pregnancies. When she nevertheless became pregnant and delivered a healthy baby girl, she sought damages for pain and suffering arising out of the pregnancy and birth, for injury to her person caused by the increased care, responsibility, and work involved in raising the child, and for the expenses of raising the child.

In Johnson we held that Ohio does not allow the award of damages for child-rearing expenses in a wrongful pregnancy action brought by parents. "[I]n a `wrongful pregnancy' action, Ohio recognizes the `limited damages' rule which limits the damages to the pregnancy itself and does not include child-rearing expenses. The extent of recoverable damages is limited by Ohio's public policy that the birth of a normal, healthy child cannot be an injury to her parents." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

Today we are presented with an action presenting the legal issue of whether an individual who was not born as a normal, healthy child, but rather as a child with birth defects, has herself suffered legally compensable injury in that she was born rather than aborted. In short, we are asked to hold that such a child may recover damages for the "injury" of having been born.

In both Bowman and Johnson, the plaintiffs were parents seeking damages after failed sterilizations. In neither case did the children who were born in spite of the failed sterilization procedures make claims themselves. In Bowman we did, however, distinguish between wrongful pregnancy cases, brought by parents, and wrongful life cases, brought by children. We noted that "[b]ecause [wrongful life] claims force courts to weigh the value of being versus nonbeing, courts have been reluctant to recognize this cause of action." Bowman, 48 Ohio St.2d at 45, 2 O.O.3d at 135, 356 N.E.2d at 499, fn. 3.

In 1993 the Court of Appeals for Washington County affirmed judgment on the pleadings against a minor child born with spina bifida who asserted a wrongful life claim similar to Alicia's. After considering existing Ohio precedent, the court determined that it was "not prepared to say that life, even with severe disabilities, constitutes an actionable injury." Flanagan v. Williams (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 768, 776, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191. As a result, the child's claim failed, under traditional negligence analysis, for failure to allege legally cognizable damages. More recently, in Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 82, 671 N.E.2d 225, we considered a medical negligence case characterized as a "wrongful living" case. In Anderson, an elderly patient was resuscitated by a hospital nurse during a ventricular tachycardia event. The nurse defibrillated the patient, despite his having previously directed his physicians not to perform extraordinary efforts to preserve his life, and the resultant entry of "No Code Blue" instructions on his chart. After his revival, the patient suffered a stroke, rendering him partially paralyzed until his death nearly a year later. We held that the medical professionals sued by the patient's administrator were entitled to summary judgment.

In Anderson we recognized that a medical professional has a legal duty to respect the expressed wishes of a patient to refuse unwanted medical treatment. We also accepted, for purposes of our review of a summary judgment, that Anderson had demonstrated a genuine issue as to whether the medical defendants had breached that duty. However, Anderson's claim failed for lack of demonstrating a genuine issue as to the remaining negligence components: damages and causation.

The crux of Anderson's claim was the assertion that patient Wilson had suffered injury in that the length of his life had been prolonged against his will as a result of a breach of professional duty. We held that the law does not sanction an award of damages based on the relative merits of "`being versus nonbeing.'" Anderson at 85, 671 N.E.2d at 228, quoting Bowman, 48 Ohio St.2d at 45, 2 O.O.3d at 135, 356 N.E.2d at 499, fn. 3. We cited with favor the opinions of other courts that human life cannot be a compensable harm, as the benefits of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it; that courts are not equipped to assume the tasks of comparing the value of life in an impaired state and nonexistence; and that life, however impaired and regardless of any attendant expenses, cannot rationally be said to be a detriment when compared to the alternative of nonexistence. Id., c...