Heuring v. State

Decision Date24 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 69609,69609
Citation513 So.2d 122,12 Fla. L. Weekly 486
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly 486 Frederick A.R. HEURING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Larry D. Simpson of Davis, Judkins & Simpson, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and John M. Koenig, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review Heuring v. State, 495 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

IN A PROSECUTION FOR SEXUAL BATTERY UNDER SECTION 794.011(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1977-1983), WHERE DEATH IS NOT A POSSIBLE PENALTY BECAUSE OF THE HOLDING IN BUFORD V. STATE, 403 So.2d 943 (FLA.1981), MAY THE STATE PROCEED BY INFORMATION INSTEAD OF INDICTMENT?

495 So.2d at 894. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

A capital felony is one that is punishable by death. Rusaw v. State, 451 So.2d 469 (Fla.1984). Sexual battery is not punishable by death. Buford. Further, we held in Rowe v. State, 417 So.2d 981 (Fla.1982), that murder in the first-degree is the only existing capital felony in Florida. We answer the certified question in the affirmative. Sexual battery is not a capital offense, and, therefore, it may be charged by information. See also State v. Hogan, 451 So.2d 844 (Fla.1984) (sexual battery is not punishable by death, and therefore, it may be tried by a six-member jury).

Having answered the certified question, we turn to the merits of this cause. Frederick A.R. Heuring was convicted and sentenced for the sexual battery of his stepdaughter, Melody, when she was between the ages of seven and twelve, in violation of sections 794.011(2) and (4)(e), Florida Statutes (1977-1983). Pursuant to section 90.404(2) and (4)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), the state filed a notice of intent to offer similar fact evidence that Heuring sexually battered his daughter, Anita, when she was between the ages of seven and fifteen. The batteries allegedly occurred approximately twenty years before the charged offenses.

The district court rejected Heuring's argument that the prior batteries were too remote to be relevant, reasoning that

[i]n determining whether evidence is too remote to be relevant, and therefore admissible, [sic] the court must consider not the passage of time alone, but the effect of the passage of time on the evidence. Remoteness in terms of the passage of time precludes the use of evidence that has become unverifiable through loss of memory, unavailability of witnesses and the like.

495 So.2d at 894. Further, the court recognized that the absence of similar conduct for an extensive period of time might suggest that the conduct is no longer characteristic of the defendant. We agree with the court that, nevertheless, the evidence of the prior batteries was admissible. As the court noted, the opportunity to sexually batter young children in the familial setting often occurs only generationally. Heuring sexually battered the young female members of his family when the opportunity arose. Heuring does not dispute the court's finding that the passage of time had no effect on the witness's memory. We agree with the district court that the passage of time in this instance did not affect the reliability of the evidence.

Heuring next argues that the evidence of the prior battery was not proper Williams rule evidence. Similar fact evidence that the defendant committed a collateral offense is inherently prejudicial. Introduction of such evidence creates the risk that a conviction will be based on the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof that he committed the charged offense. Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396 (Fla.1987); Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 556, 70 L.Ed.2d 418 (1981). Such evidence is, therefore, inadmissible if solely relevant to bad character or propensity to commit the crime. Peek v. State, 488 So.2d 52 (Fla.1986); Coler v. State, 418 So.2d 238 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 763, 74 L.Ed.2d 978 (1983); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). To minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the similar fact evidence must meet a strict standard of relevance. The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses. See Thompson v. State, 494 So.2d 203 (Fla.1986); Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1981). The California Supreme Court aptly illustrated this point in People v. Haston, 69 Cal.2d 233, 444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 (1968). The court stated

[i]t is apparent that the indicated inference does not arise ... from the mere fact that the charged and uncharged offenses share certain marks of similarity, for it may be that the marks in question are of such common occurrence that they are shared not only by the charged crime and defendant's prior offenses, but also by numerous other crimes committed by persons other than defendant. On the other hand, the inference need not depend upon one or more unique or nearly unique features common to the charged and uncharged offenses, for features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness, although insufficient to raise the inference if considered separately, may yield a distinctive combination if considered together. Thus it may be said that the inference of identity arises when the marks common to the charged and uncharged offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the charged and uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the uncharged offenses was the perpetrator of the charged offenses.

Id. at 245-46, 444 P.2d at 99-100, 70 Cal.Rptr. at 427-28 (footnotes omitted). In addition to the above requirements, the evidence must be relevant to a material fact in issue such as identity, intent, motive, opportunity, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or...

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137 cases
  • Thomas v. State, 89-449
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 1992
    ...fail to "share some unique characteristics or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses," Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987), and such evidence is not relevant to prove any material fact in issue. Sec. 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). In view of th......
  • State v. Edward Charles L.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • July 27, 1990
    ...App.1986); People v. Tassell, 36 Cal.3d 77, 201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1 (1984); Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del.1988); Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.App.1987), decision quashed on other grounds, 559 So.2d 207 (Fla.1990); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky.1985); People ......
  • Robertson v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 28, 2001
    ...crime is one aspect of its relevance, its tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue." 741 So.2d at 1197. In Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987), the Florida Supreme Court stated that when faced with the claim that prior crimes are too remote to be relevant, the trial mus......
  • Flanagan v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 19, 1991
    ...of characteristics. Likewise, we do not agree with appellant's argument regarding the Supreme Court's holding in Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987). In Heuring, the court reversed the defendant's conviction because evidence of the defendant's molestations of children other than his ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • "A dangerous bend in an ancient road": the use of similar fact evidence for corroboration.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 74 No. 2, February 2000
    • February 1, 2000
    ...than by proving propensity.(8) Huering, Rawls, and Saffor In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this problem in Huering v. State, 513 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1987). The court first asserted that similar fact evidence "must meet a strict standard of relevance[:] The charged and collateral of......
  • Letters.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 74 No. 4, April 2000
    • April 1, 2000
    ...light of the possible unfair prejudice the defendant may suffer when the jury is informed of the uncharged act(s). In Heuring v. State, 513 So. 2d 122 (1987), the court set a high standard for the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a prosecution involving sexual molestation in a fami......

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