Heuser v. Rothenberg, 3.

• Decision Date: 22 September 1939
• Docket Number: No. 3.,3.
• Citation: 8 A.2d 391,123 N.J.L. 319
• Parties: HEUSER v. ROTHENBERG et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

8 A.2d 391

123 N.J.L. 319

HEUSER

v. ROTHENBERG et al.

No. 3.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Sept. 22, 1939.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Christian Heuser against Herbert R. Rothenberg and another for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. From a judgment of the Supreme Court, 121 N.J.L. 14, 1 A.2d 328, affirming a judgment discharging a rule to show cause why a verdict of no cause of action should not be set aside, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Quinn & Doremus, of Red Bank, for appellant.

Lester C. Leonard, of Red Bank, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court which affirmed a judgment of no cause of action against the appellant and in favor of the respondent entered in the Monmouth County Court of Common Pleas on the verdict of a jury. The action was in negligence to recover damages to appellant's car and for personal injuries resulting from a collision between his car and the car of the respondent Rothenberg, and driven by the respondent Van Buskirk.

The appellant obtained a rule to show cause, with no exceptions reserved, and assigned among other reasons that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court discharged the rule to show cause.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in discharging the rule to show cause. The grounds of appeal in the Supreme Court were generally the same as the reasons argued before the trial court on the return of the rule. The Supreme Court considered each of the reasons urged there, and, in particular, the ground that there was no evidence to support the verdict of the jury, and stated that it could perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the discharge of the rule to show cause.

The appellant asserts before this court only one ground for reversal and that is the trial court and the Supreme Court both committed an abuse of discretion, but he confines his argument to an attack on the weight of the evidence. This court cannot concern itself with the weight of the evidence.

The fundamental rule is that in granting or refusing a new trial the trial court exercises a discretionary power and that its discretion is not ordinarily reviewable on appeal. The appellant, disregarding this well settled rule, attempts by this appeal to have this court substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. But this may not be.

The trial court heard...