Hewett Grocery Co. v. Biddle Purchasing Co.

CourtMichigan Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSHARPE
CitationHewett Grocery Co. v. Biddle Purchasing Co., 289 Mich. 225, 286 N.W. 221 (Mich. 1939)
Decision Date06 June 1939
Docket NumberNo. 43.,43.
PartiesHEWETT GROCERY CO. v. BIDDLE PURCHASING CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by Hewett Grocery Company, a copartnership, of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, against Biddle Purchasing Company, a foreign corporation, for breach of contract to assist plaintiff in disposal of amount of jelly shipped to plaintiff in excess of amount ordered by plaintiff through defendant. Judgment for plaintiff on a verdict in the sum of $1,732.50, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Chippewa County; Herbert W. Runnels, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

James J. Fenlon, of Sault Ste. Marie (John W. Shine, of Sault Ste. Marie, of counsel; George D. Haller, of Detroit, on the brief), for appellant.

Hudson & Coates, of Sault Ste. Marie, for appellee.

SHARPE, Justice.

This action involves an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in a law action tried before a jury. The facts appear to be as follows. In the spring of 1930, the Hewett Grocery Company of Sault Ste. Marie was a client of the Biddle Purchasing Company. Plaintiff company having a prospect of furnishing a considerable amount of food stuffs to the Pittsburg Supply Company communicated this prospect to the Biddle Company and received special quotations on various articles. Under date of April 10, 1930, plaintiff company instructed the Biddle Company to enter its order for ‘600 cases 5# tins, Pure Fruit Jelly, at $5.75 per case.’ When this order was received by the Biddle Company, plaintiff was notified that the order would have to be made up specially. On April 21, 1930, the order was placed by the Biddle Purchasing Company with Peter G. Slaughter Company, the maker, and was acknowledged by defendant company as follows: 600 cases 12-#5 tins Pure Fruit Jelly $5.75.

On May 5, 1930, plaintiff company received an invoice from the maker stating the amount which had been shipped. Upon receipt of this notice plaintiff company wired the shipper to stop the car en route. The next day plaintiff company wrote a letter to the Biddle Purchasing Company in which it admitted that the original order read: ‘600 cases #5 tins Pure Fruit Jelly,’ but claimed that: ‘This order was intended to read 600 only #5 tins. Plaintiff company also told the Biddle company that five-sixths of the order would have to be returned to the maker unless the latter had other customers to which part could be diverted, or unless the maker would make a special price, in which case plaintiff would undertake to re-sell it. In reply to this letter defendant offered to assist plaintiff in its efforts to re-sell the merchandise, also stating, ‘We, on our part, will be very glad to bring the matter to the attention of such clients as we have within a convenient radius of Saulte Ste. Marie.’ On June 24, 1930, the maker, Peter G. Slaughter Company, wrote plaintiff company threatening legal action for collection of the account. On June 30, 1930, defendant wrote plaintiff that the maker and agreed to accept deferred payments.

In the fall of 1936, defendant company sent a ‘statement of account’ to plaintiff company for service charges. In reply thereto plaintiff company wrote as follows: ‘The balance of the accounts does not seem to be in dispute,’ but also made claim that when the fruit jelly was ordered in 1930, it received 12 times its proper order; that it refused to accept the shipment until defendant company assured them that it would procure orders for most of the shipment, which it failed to do; that after selling 285 cases it had 315 cases on hand; and that defendant company was responsible for the loss, but proposed that if defendant company would waive its claim for $370.31, the amount which defendant claimed due it at that time, the plaintiff company would release its claim of $1,732.50 for damages on account of the jelly shipment. Defendant company refused to accept plaintiff's offer and took judgment for the amount of its claim, $425.80. The judgment was paid and plaintiff company immediately began the present action, garnisheeing the proceeds of the prior judgment in the hands of the attorney for Biddle Purchasing Company.

Subsequently, defendant company engaged the services of attorney Francis T. McDonald, who entered a general appearance, filed an answer and proceeded to the trial of the cause before a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $1,732.50. In August, 1937, defendnat company filed a motion to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial. This motion was based upon the claim that McDonald who appeared as attorney for defendant company was not authorized to enter a general appearance in the cause or have the defendant company submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court. This motion was denied and defendant appeals.

The retention of McDonald as attorney for defendant company was brought about by letter from the Wilber Mercantile Agency in which the letter of March 20, 1937, states: ‘We hope that you are in position to take this matter up for us at once. * * * In the event you are not in position to promptly handle this will you please return the matter to us.’

The next communication received by McDonald from this agency under date of March 30, 1937, reads as follows: ‘Will you please take the necessary steps to dispose of the suit brought against our client? In view of the enclosed copy of the order, we do not think you will have any difficulty in this respect.’ This letter also contained a postscript in ink reading as follows: ‘Please see debtor's attorneys and attempt to have this suit withdrawn in view of this order.’

On April 5, 1937, McDonald answered the above letter as follows: ‘I have prepared and filed an answer in the attachment suit and ought to be able to get a dismissal of the case at the May term of court. I enclose herewith a copy of the answer.’

It appears that in the letters received from the Wilbur Mercantile Agency by McDonald no instructions were given as to the procedure McDonald was to follow in handling the legal affairs of defendant company.

In August v. Collins, 265 Mich. 389, 251 N.W. 565, 568, we said: ‘It is a universal rule that an attorney at law is presumed to have authority to represent a party litigant for whom he appears. 6 C.J. [p.] 631, when a party denies the authority he must proceed promptly and unequivocally to repudiate the appearance and to permit no more acts thereunder.’ See, also, Corbitt v. Timmerman, 95 Mich. 581, 55 N.W. 437,35 Am.St.Rep. 586.

In Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Grevnin, i64 Mich. 358, 249 N.W. 889, we held that when an attorney entered a general appearance in a cause, he submitted his client to the jurisdiction of the court and that whether he intended to do so is of no importance. See, also, Najdowski v. Ransford, 248 Mich. 465, 227 N.W. 769;Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97, 86 A.L.R. 509.

In Brown v. Spiegel, 156 Mich. 138, 120 N.W. 579, 580, we said: ‘This stipulation comes within the general rule that the attorney has power, without express authroity, to bind his client by all acts necessary or incidental to the prosecution or management of the suit which affect the remedy only, and not the cause of action.’

The record shows that attorney McDonald in his amended answer to plaintiff's declaration defendant upon the theory that the matters involved in this suit are res judicata because of the former judgment rendered against the plaintiff in this suit and in favor of the defendant, and in which suit plaintiff failed to make any claim of offset against the claim of the defendant; and because there was no consideration for the voluntary offer of the defendant to help sell part of the jelly shipped to the plaintiff. These defenses were also raised by McDonald in his motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the trial.

From the authorities above cited, it is our opinion that defendant company is bound by the actions taken by its attorney. He was regularly employed and advised his client that a general appearance had been entered in its behalf.

Defendant company appeals from the order denying a new trial and contends that it never authorized McDonald to enter a general appearance; that plaintiff's pleadings and proof are defective upon the point of minimizing damages; that plaintiff is estopped from looking to defendant company upon the alleged disposal contract because of its subsequent dealings...

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