Hewitt v. Hollahan

Decision Date01 July 1959
Docket NumberNo. A--414,A--414
Citation56 N.J.Super. 372,153 A.2d 371
PartiesJohn J. HEWITT, Director of Welfare and Overseer, Town of Belleville, Essex County, New Jersey, Complainant-Respondent, v. Albert HOLLAHAN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Emil Oxfeld, Newark, argued the cause for appellant (Rothbard, Harris & Oxfeld, Newark, attorneys).

Thomas C. D'Avella, Newark, argued the cause for respondent.

Before Judges PRICE, GAULKIN and FOLEY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GAULKIN, J.A.D.

In this action, instituted by the Director of Welfare of the Town of Belleville in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, defendant Albert Hollahan was ordered to pay his wife $106.40 per month, and he appeals.

From time to time we have been compelled to point out that imprecise pleadings often lead to error. Cf. State v. Arbus, 54 N.J.Super. 76, 148 A.2d 184 (App.Div.1959); Board of Education, Woodbridge Tp. v. Kane Acoustical Co., 51 N.J.Super. 319, 143 A.2d 853 (App.Div.1958). The reason for this must be fairly obvious. A vague complaint, full of generalities, frequently indicates that the pleader has not thought through his cause of action, and does not yet know precisely upon what theory he will present his case. Consequently, unless he learns more about his case before he comes to trial, he may come without the evidence necessary to support the only theory upon which he can prevail.

A vague pleading in turn tends to confuse the adversary and the court. The defendant may understand plaintiff's pleading differently than the plaintiff does himself, while the court may make even a third interpretation of it.

We regret that we are unable to decide this appeal without pointing out that this case is an example of the foregoing. The complaint is by 'Mr. John J. Hewett (Director) * * * residing at Dept. of Welfare * * *,' who 'being duly sworn on her (sic) oath deposes and says' (emphasis ours):

'* * * that Mr. Albert Hollahan defendant in this action * * * altho capable to do so has for the past several weeks refused and failed to provide adequate support and maintenance of his family consisting of wife--Catherine * * * contrary to 'An Act concerning the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,' Revised Statutes, 1951 Title 44:1--1 to 44:1--160 Approved December 20, 1947 and the supplements thereto and amendments thereof.

'Deponent therefore prays that the said defendant may be summoned to appear Or that a warrant issue to answer said complaint; and that the defendant And all parties within the jurisdiction of the Court be dealt with as law and justice and the best interests of the wife may require.'

We do not know what is meant by the reference to 'Revised Statutes, 1951' in this context, nor does any part of Title 44:1--1 to 44:1--160 appear to have been approved December 20, 1947. More important, no defendant should be required to go through 160 sections of a statute plus all 'the supplements thereto and amendments thereof,' to find out what he is charged with, especially when the 160 sections and 'the supplements thereto and amendments thereof' contain various and differing bases of liability. If by the reference to 'An Act concerning the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Revised Statutes 1951,' and to a 'warrant' as well as a summons, it is intended to include those provisions of Title 2A which come within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the confusion becomes really confounded. Cf. State v. Monroe, 30 N.J. 160 152 A.2d 362 (1959). No defendant should be called upon at his peril to guess correctly whether he is being charged with civil or criminal liability, and why. Due process means more than mere notice to a person that he is a defendant--he is entitled to a complaint which informs him of the legal and factual basis of the charge which hs is called upon to face. If it be intended to charge him under more than one statute or section, and different facts are required to prove each charge, the complaint should be in separate counts. R.R. 6:4--1; 6:6--3.

It has been pointed out that our Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, as well as our municipal courts, have come of age; and that they possess far greater powers of fine, imprisonment, and the imposition of money judgments than in days gone by. State v. Monroe, supra; Slocum v. Krupy, 11 N.J.Super. 81, 77 A.2d 871 (App.Div.1951). Cf. State v. Mull, 30 N.J. 231, 152 A.2d 572 (1959); State v. Schrier, 30 N.J. 241, 152 A.2d 578 (1959); Krieger v. Jersey City, 27 N.J. 535, 143 A.2d 564 (1958). With that maturity, and with those powers, there has come to these courts the correlative responsibility to see to it that their pleadings and their procedures comport with the highest standards of due process. Cf. State v. Monroe, supra.

The appellant says in his brief that 'objection was made to the complaint on the ground that it was too broad.' This is not denied in respondent's brief. However, no stenographic record was made of the trial. Therefore, the trial court made what is captioned in the appendix before us as 'Order Settling Facts, Findings and Order to Pay', hereafter called 'Findings.' In it the trial court makes no mention of any motion directed to the complaint, so we do not have official knowledge that one was actually made. In any event, no change or narrowing was made of the complaint. On the contrary the trial court says in said 'Findings' (emphasis ours):

'The complaint was brought under N.J.S.A. 44:1--1 to 44:1--160 and supplements thereto and amendments thereof. It is assumed that the particular sections involved includes Article 17, covering sections 44:1--139 to 143 and Article 18, covering sections 44:1--143 et seq.'

In said 'Findings' the trial court did not report upon what sections of the statutes it based the judgment. Apparently it was never clear to the litigants, throughout the trial, which sections they were litigating. Consequently, even before us the appellant argued that the trial court had based the judgment on N.J.S.A. 44:1--141, while the respondent was just as positive that it was based on N.J.S.A. 44:1--143. It therefore became necessary for this court, with the consent of counsel, to inquire of the trial court, which replied by letter that:

'From the facts and circumstances in the case I felt that Section 143, Chapter 1 of Title 44, Poor (N.J.S.A. 44:1--143) did not apply. Hence the court's decision was based under Sections 139, 140, and 141 as amended, of said Title and Chapter (44:1--139, 140 and 141).'

R.S. 44:1--140, N.J.S.A. provides that:

'The father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, children, grandchildren, and husband or wife * * * of a poor, old, blind, lame or impotent person or other poor person or child not able to work, shall, if of sufficient ability, at his or their charge and expense, relieve and maintain the poor person or child in such manner as the overseer of the poor shall order, or the court * * * may * * * order.'

R.S. 44:1--141, as amended by L.1940, c. 55 and L.1953, c. 42, N.J.S.A., provides:

'If any of the relatives mentioned in section 44:1--140 of this Title shall fail to perform the order or directions of the director of welfare of a municipality with regard to the support of the poor person, or if the poor person is supported at public expense, the County Court of the county wherein the poor person has a legal settlement, or the municipal court of the municipality wherein the person has a legal settlement, upon the complaint of the director of welfare or two residents of the municipality or county may summon the persons chargeable before it as in other actions, summon witnesses, and adjudge that the able relatives pay such sum for each poor person as the circumstances may require in the discretion of the court, and as will maintain him or them and relieve the public of that burden. * * *'

On the other hand, R.S. 44:1--143, as amended by L.1953, c. 42, N.J.S.A., provides as follows:

'When a husband or father shall desert his wife, child or children or a woman shall desert her child or children and leave them or any of them as public charges, the director of welfare of a municipality may apply to the juvenile and domestic relations court; and the court may order and adjudge suitable support and maintenance to be paid and provided by the husband or wife, or either of them, to be made out of his property, and for such time as the nature of the case and circumstances of the parties render suitable and proper in the opinion of the court * * *.'

Appellant's first ground of appeal is that Mrs. Hollahan deserted him in 1954, and therefore he is under no obligation to support her under any of the above quoted sections. The trial court found as a fact 'That the wife Catherine Hollahan left the home of her husband on November 14, 1954, being satisfied at that time that she wanted nothing more to do with her husband.' In addition, in 1955 Mrs. Hollahan had filed a complaint against appellant for support, which was dismissed. In February 1958 Mr. Hewitt himself, as director, filed a complaint against defendant in the Municipal Court of Belleville under N.J.S.A. 44:1--147, charging defendant with desertion, and defendant was found not guilty.

In a proceeding against a husband under N.J.S.A. 44:1--143, the fact that the wife was the deserter is a complete defense. We assume this is the reason the trial court 'felt that Section 143 * * * did not apply' here. However, under N.J.S.A. 44:1--141 the wife's desertion or other wrongful conduct is no defense at all. Proceedings under the latter statute are not designed to establish any personal or private right in the pauper to maintenance from the relatives, but are intended for the indemnity of the public against the maintenance of the poor. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 55 N.J.L. 422, 424, 27 A. 807 (Sup.Ct.1893). Consequently, the misbehavior of the...

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