Hewitt v. Magic City Furniture & Mfg. Co.

• Citation: 107 So. 745,214 Ala. 265
• Decision Date: 18 March 1926
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 602
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: HEWITT v. MAGIC CITY FURNITURE & MFG. CO.

107 So. 745

214 Ala. 265

HEWITT v. MAGIC CITY FURNITURE & MFG. CO.

6 Div. 602

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 18, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; William M. Walker Judge.

Bill for injunction by R.D. Hewitt against the Magic City Furniture & Manufacturing Company. From a decree for respondent, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Mullins & Jenkins, of Birmingham, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

The parties entered into the contract shown in the statement of facts. In the bill it is averred that within the stipulated term of the contract, on, to wit, December 9, 1925, defendant appellee discharged complainant from his employment without just cause or excuse. An injunction was prayed to restrain defendant from discharging complainant or interfering with his performance of his duties under the contract. The chancellor, judge of the circuit sitting in equity, sustained defendant's general demurrer, and denied complainant's prayer for a temporary injunction. The bill, in substance, is one to enforce specific performance of the contract alleged.

We are clear to the conclusion that for the wrong and injury complained of appellant must seek his remedy in a court of law. Appellant insists that he could have no adequate remedy at law, because, in the performance of his part of the contract, he would have the opportunity to make a reputation for efficiency in the superintendence of appellee's business that would have been of great future advantage to him in the business world--an advantage that may not be estimated in terms of dollars and cents--and, therefore, that any judgment recoverable in a court of law would fall short of compensating him adequately for appellee's alleged breach of the contract between them. This inestimable element of value in appellant's contract may be conceded. Differing in degree only, the same consideration would obtain in the case of every contract for personal services; but we do not find that its sufficiency as a ground of equity has ever been allowed by any court of first-rate authority. The fundamental trouble with appellant's case is that his contract is for the performance of continuous personal services on his part. Whether as superintendent, employee, or servant, his services are merely personal, no matter how dignified or responsible they may be, and the court of equity cannot undertake to enforce the performance of such services. The result is that the case presented discloses a lack of mutuality of equitable remedy. If appellant were reinstated in his place, he might abandon his duties on the next day and appellee would be remediless. The court of equity will not undertake to enforce...