Hewlett v. Berryhill

• Decision Date: 12 February 2018
• Docket Number: 1:16CV1443
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: PAULA JEANNE HEWLETT, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

PAULA JEANNE HEWLETT, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,¹Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

1:16CV1443

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

February 12, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Paula Hewlett ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under, respectively, Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits on March 6, 2013 and March 20, 2013, respectively,alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2011 in both applications. (Tr. at 26, 256-66.)² Her applications were denied initially (Tr. at 105-34, 170-87) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 135-66, 190-208). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 209-10.) Plaintiff, along with her attorneys, attended the subsequent hearing on December 9, 2015. (Tr. at 26.) The ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act from her alleged onset date through August 29, 2016, the date of his decision. (Tr. at 39.) On December 2, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the decision, thereby making the ALJ's conclusion the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. (Tr. at 1-5.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits." Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the scope of review of such a decision is "extremely limited." Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). "The courts are not to try the case de novo." Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, "a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted).

"Substantial evidence means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence." Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. "The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability." Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). In this context, "disability" means the "'inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).³

"The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). "Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy." Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in 'substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is 'severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied." Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if the claimant's impairment meets or equals a "listed impairment" at step three, "the claimant is disabled." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but falters at step three, i.e., "[i]f a claimant's impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment," then "the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity ('RFC')." Id. at 179.⁴ Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based onthat RFC, the claimant can "perform past relevant work"; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which "requires the [Government] to prove that a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite the claimant's impairments." Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide "whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant's RFC] and [the claimant's] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job." Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its "evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the community," the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

III. DISCUSSION

In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since her amended alleged onset date. Plaintiff therefore met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. At step two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

cervical degenerative disc disease (DDD); carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS); monocular vision (left eye blind); and a bipolar disorder.

(Tr. at 28.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments met or equaled a disability listing. (Tr. at 29-30.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that Plaintiff

has the residual functional capacity to perform work at the light exertional level. She can perform work that is consistent with monocular vision. She can perform work that does not require exposure to moving mechanical parts and high, exposed places (as defined by the Selected Characteristics of Occupations). She can perform goal-oriented rather than production-oriented work (e.g., the performance of work tasks in allotted time is more important than the pace at which the work tasks are performed.)

(Tr. at 31.) Based on the RFC determination, the ALJ found under step four of the analysis that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work. (Tr. at 36.) However, the ALJ found at step five that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these factors, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy. (Tr. at 36-38.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 38-39.)

Plaintiff now raises two challenges to the ALJ's decision. First, she contends that the ALJ erred by failing to include additional severe impairments at step two of the sequential analysis. Second, she argues that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff capable of performing a reduced range of light work, "thereby misapplying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines." (Pl.'s Br. [Doc. #13] at 3.) Having considered Plaintiff's contentions, the Court concludes that remand is necessary in this case because the ALJ failed to provide any analysis of Plaintiff's alleged lower back impairment, whether at step two or later in formulating the RFC, and the ALJ's determination is therefore insufficient to allow for meaningful judicial review.

A. Severe Impairments at Step Two

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential analysis by "completely failing to address multiple medically determinable impairments in the record, including chronic headaches and lumbago." (Pl.'s Br. at 10.)

Step two is a threshold determination of whether claimants have a severe impairment (or combination of impairments) that meets the twelve-month duration requirement and significantly limits their ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii) (2010). If the Commissioner finds no severe impairments, the claimant is not disabled and the analysis does not proceed to the other steps. Id.

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