Hewlett-Woodmere Public Library v. Rothman

• Decision Date: 01 May 1981
• Docket Number: HEWLETT-WOODMERE
• Citation: 438 N.Y.S.2d 730,108 Misc.2d 715
• Parties: PUBLIC LIBRARY, A Municipal Corporation chartered for the public benefit, Plaintiff, v. Phyllis ROTHMAN, Defendant.
• Court: New York District Court

Page 730

438 N.Y.S.2d 730

108 Misc.2d 715

HEWLETT-WOODMERE PUBLIC LIBRARY, A Municipal Corporation chartered for the public benefit, Plaintiff, v. Phyllis ROTHMAN, Defendant.

District Court, Nassau County Second District, Lynbrook Part.

May 1, 1981.

Paul Kantrowitz, Woodmere, for plaintiff.

Phyllis Rothman defendant, pro se.

DECISION AFTER SMALL CLAIMS TRIAL

RALPH YACHNIN, Judge.

In this small claims action, plaintiff seeks reimbursement for loss suffered from a film which it loaned to the defendant and which was returned in an alleged damaged condition.

Based upon the credible evidence presented at the trial of this action the Court finds the relevant facts to be as follows: In March of 1980 the defendant school teacher borrowed from the plaintiff library a copy of the film known as "The General." The copy loaned was relatively new. It had been in circulation for approximately one year and loaned about 26 times prior to being borrowed by the defendant. The film was not owned by the plaintiff but was the property of the Nassau Library System and after every loan the film was electronically inspected by that "System" for damage. At the time this film was loaned to the defendant it was undamaged and free from any repairs or splices. After the defendant returned the film, the Nassau Library System found it to have extensive damage of the sprocket holes. This damage was of such a nature that the film could not be repaired. It was, therefore, replaced with a new copy of the film at a cost of $154.00. The Nassau Library System, however, charged the plaintiff only $130.00 for the damaged film and the plaintiff seeks this amount from defendant.

At the trial the defendant raised the fact that improper splicing of a film may cause a film to sustain sprocket hole damage. However, other evidence clearly established that the film had never been spliced. The defendant also presented testimony regarding her ability to pay for the damaged film. Such testimony, however, is totally irrelevant to the questions of liability and damages which are the only issues before this Court.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to prove that the film was defective when she borrowed it, that the film testing equipment was unreliable, that the damage to the film was caused by anyone other than herself, or, most importantly that a film with extensive sprocket hole damage results from anything other than negligent handling. Thus, the Court concludes that liability for the damaged film falls upon the defendant. Accordingly, the Court awards judgment to the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $130.00 less depreciation of $24.00 for a net amount of $106.00.

The second part of this action involves a counterclaim interposed by the defendant against the plaintiff in the amount of $200.00 for damages allegedly resulting from the harassment of the defendant by the plaintiff or its agents.

It should be noted that the law does not give a remedy to every interference with another's interests, even though the wrongdoer is clearly at fault. Prosser, Law of Torts, 2nd Ed., pg. 4. A relevant example of this fact is found in Flamm v. Van Nierop, 56 Misc.2d 1059, 291 N.Y.S.2d 189, in which the court held that offenses of a minor nature, such as name-calling or angry looks, are not actionable though they may wound the feelings of the victim and cause some degree of emotional upset.

The defendant testified at trial that "unproven accusations" were made to her by employees of the plaintiff. However, without further facts such an incident is not actionable under the law. The defendant also testified that she was treated like a criminal before she had an opportunity to present her case. Such a statement lacks specific factual allegations and is, therefore, conclusory. Moreover, the defendant again has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a legally cognizable cause of action. With respect to the defendant's allegations of harassment, it might be best to conclude by restating what the Court of Appeals said in Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54 at 60:

"It would be highly impolitic to hold all language, wounding the feelings and affecting unfavorably the health and ability to labor, of another, a ground of action; for that would be to make the right of action depend often upon whether the sensibilities of a person spoken of are easily excited or otherwise; his strength of mind to disregard abusive, insulting remarks concerning him; and his physical strength and ability to bear them."

The Court now turns to the final issue raised by the defendant's counterclaim which is whether or not the plaintiff violated the defendant's Constitutional rights. The Court notes that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which was raised by the defendant at the trial, is totally inapposite under the facts in this case. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures of their person, houses, papers and effects. This case involves no such issues. The defendant contends that her right to due process under the Fifth Amendment was also violated and, therefore, she is entitled to recover money damages. However, the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution does not apply directly to the states. It is the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution which protects citizens against due process violations under color of state law. Accordingly, in this small claims case, this Court must assume that the defendant, who is not a lawyer, is also asserting her right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

For a violation of the right to due process the United States Congress has provided a civil remedy by way of Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983, which states, in part, that:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

Deprivation of the right...