Hewlette-Bullard ex rel. J.H-B. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist.

Decision Date22 February 2021
Docket NumberCivil No. 3:19-CV-00076
Citation522 F.Supp.3d 78
Parties Tanya HEWLETTE-BULLARD, ON BEHALF OF her minor child, J.H-B., Plaintiff, v. POCONO MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Adrianna A. Cherkas, Michael D. Raffaele, Raffaele & Associates, LLC, Bryn Mawr, PA, for Plaintiff.

Brian J. Taylor, John E. Freund, III, King Spry Herman Freund & Faul LLC, Bethlehem, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON, United States District Court Judge

This is a civil rights case arising from a school district's decision to exclude a high school student from classes based on the student's speech. The case is presently before the court on Defendantsmotion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Tanya Hewlette-Bullard ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Hewlette-Bullard"), who brings suit on behalf of her son, J.H-B.,1 initiated this suit through the filing of a complaint on January 11, 2019. (Doc. 1.) The complaint named as Defendants Pocono Mountain School District ("District"), Superintendent Dr. Elizabeth Robison ("Robison"), and Assistant Superintendent for Special Education Dr. Mary Beth Gustafson ("Gustafson"). (Id. ¶¶ 7–9.) The complaint alleged generally that J.H-B., who has been diagnosed with Autism

Spectrum Disorder and Tourette's Syndrome, was a student in East High School in the Pocono Mountain School District in 2017 when he posted several memes2 on Instagram3 that were considered offensive by people who had observed them. (Id. ¶¶ 10–14.) Defendants allegedly suspended J.H-B. as a result of the Instagram posts and did not allow him to return to school for over three months. (Id. ¶¶ 21–40.) The complaint alleged that the suspension and related actions violated J.H-B.’s civil rights and raised several claims for violation of the First Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 52–90.)

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on March 18, 2019, and Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on April 17, 2019. (Docs. 8, 15.) The amended complaint raises causes of action for violation of J.H-B.’s right to free speech under the First Amendment, enforcement of a facially overbroad and vague speech restriction in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, enforcement of an overbroad and vague content restriction in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, discrimination in violation of the RA, discrimination in violation of the ADA, violation of J.H-B.’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 15.) Defendants answered the amended complaint on May 1, 2019. (Doc. 16.)

Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment along with a statement of material facts and a supporting brief on March 2, 2020. (Docs. 34, 34-1, 35.) Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the motion, a response to Defendants’ statement of material facts, and a separate statement of material facts on April 6, 2020. (Docs. 43, 43-2, 43-3.) Defendants filed a reply brief in support of the motion on April 20, 2020, making the motion ripe for the court's disposition. (Doc. 44.)

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which allows a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which gives district courts supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are so closely related to federal claims as to be part of the same case or controversy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of the dispute "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not precluded by "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary." Id. " ‘A dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.’ " Thomas v. Tice , 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. , 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) ).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale , 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ. , 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006) ). The court may not "weigh the evidence" or "determine the truth of the matter." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Instead, the court's role in reviewing the facts of the case is "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.

The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). The non-moving party must then oppose the motion, and in doing so " ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings’ but instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.’ " Jutrowski , 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. , 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014) ).

Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

MATERIAL FACTS

Although some of the material facts of this case are undisputed, the parties present starkly different versions of the circumstances surrounding J.H-B.’s exclusion from school. Accordingly, the court will indicate when a fact is disputed and will view any disputed issues of fact in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party. The facts in this section are derived from Plaintiff's amended complaint, Defendants’ answer, Defendants’ statement of material facts, Plaintiff's response to that statement, and Plaintiff's separate statement of material facts. (See Docs. 15, 16, 34-1, 43-2, 43-3.)

At all times relevant to this lawsuit, J.H-B. was a student in Pocono Mountain School District enrolled in East High School and the welding program at Monroe Career & Technical Institute ("MCTI"). (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 1; Doc. 43-3, ¶ 1.) J.H-B. has been diagnosed with Autism

Spectrum Disorder and Tourette's Syndrome, and has previously received special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 11–12; Doc. 16, ¶ 11–12.)

The District began investigating J.H-B.’s Instagram account during his sophomore year in 2017. (Doc. 15, ¶ 21; Doc. 16, ¶ 21.) During that investigation, the District found memes that J.H-B. had posted, which included images of the Las Vegas mass shooting, images of people using automatic weapons, images of black people captioned with racist language, references to school shootings, and references to ethnic cleansing. (See Doc. 15, ¶ 25; Doc. 16, ¶ 25; Doc. 34-1, ¶ 10; Doc. 43-3, ¶ 10.)

After investigating J.H-B.’s Instagram account, the District convened a meeting with Ms. Hewlette-Bullard, during which it was agreed that J.H-B. would undergo a mental health assessment and a psychological evaluation. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 22–23; Doc. 16, ¶¶ 22–23.) The District also required J.H-B. to regularly check in with District guidance counselors, which continued until Ms. Hewlette-Bullard requested that the district stop requiring such check-ins. (Doc. 15, ¶ 24; Doc. 16, ¶ 24.)

Beginning on October 2, 2017, the District excluded J.H-B. from his regularly scheduled classes.4 (Doc. 15, ¶ 28; Doc. 16, ¶ 28.) The parties provide different explanations as to why the exclusion from classes began. According to Defendants’ version of events, the District received statements from seven students at East High School representing that J.H-B. had made troubling statements to them during school hours and on school property indicating that he had a list of thirteen other students that he planned to kill and that he had weapons that he planned to use to carry out a mass shooting at the school. (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 13.) J.H-B. also purportedly made comments about committing statutory rape, indicated that he could easily hide a shank or other weapon in his shoe so as to evade detection by school security, and made comments to the other students about "chaining up black people and whipping them." (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) Students who had heard the statements reportedly told the District that they thought the statements should be taken...

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