Hews v. Evans

Decision Date03 March 1983
Docket NumberNos. 48452-0,48501-1,s. 48452-0
PartiesIn the Personal Restraint Petitions of Iain Christopher HEWS, Petitioner, v. Samuel Pietro EVANS, Petitioner. *
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Browne, Ressler & Foster, Seattle, for petitioner.

Samuel P. Evans, pro se.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, C.J. Rabideau, Franklin County Prosecutor, Pamela Cameron, Deputy Pros. Atty., Pasco, for the State.

Law Office of Public Defender, Wayne Lieb, Olympia, Wash., amicus curiae.

STAFFORD, Justice.

Petitioner Iain C. Hews seeks review of a Court of Appeals opinion which held a Personal Restraint Petition collaterally attacking the validity of his guilty plea was procedurally barred by In re Haynes, 95 Wash.2d 648, 628 P.2d 809 (1981).

The State seeks review of a Court of Appeals opinion which granted a Personal Restraint Petition and vacated the guilty plea of Samuel P. Evans, relying on In re Keene, 95 Wash.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980).

Since two Divisions of the Court of Appeals have reached inconsistent results on similar issues, we granted review. We reverse the Court of Appeals in both instances.

I Petitioner Hews

Hews was charged with first degree felony murder stemming from an unsuccessful robbery attempt which ended in the death of the victim. As the result of a plea bargain the information was amended to charge second degree murder. On March 13, 1970, Hews entered a plea of guilty to the amended charge.

The following colloquy between the judge and Hews constitutes the factual basis upon which the trial court accepted the guilty plea.

The Court: Mr. Hews, how old are you now?

The Defendant: Seventeen, Your Honor.

The Court: You have conferred with Mr. Guterson, your attorney, have you?

The Defendant: Uh-huh

The Court: I guess you know the charge against you is Murder in the First Degree and the attorney and the prosecutor are offering to me that I sign an order which would allow them to change the charges against you to Murder in the Second Degree. Have you discussed that with your attorney?

The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: And you are aware that if you are charged with Murder in the Second Degree that means that intending to kill someone you did in fact take their life. You understand that?

The Defendant: Does that mean I intended to kill somebody?

The Court: Yes, that means you did an intentional act that you intended to kill them but that you didn't premeditate it, hadn't planned it.

The Defendant: I can't say that--I didn't intend to kill anybody.

The Court: Tell me what happened, young man.

The Defendant: I came in out of the alley and they were coming up the street and I hold [sic] them up. One of them went down and one came up the hill with me. He didn't come up the hill with me, he forced me up the hill about ten paces in front of me. And then I ran up this little hill. He waited until I got to the top and ran up. I started running and he chased me and I was sick. I knew I couldn't escape.

The Court: You said you had tried to hold him up?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: I think this young man knows what he is charged with and I think that those facts as he has recited them to me legally constitute Murder in the Second Degree. Counsel thinks so?

Mr. Guterson: I do in every respect, Your Honor, and I am satisfied that the Defendant legally appreciates his peril and understands the original charge and amended charge, and that as an attorney and officer of the court I can assure the Court that I feel that the best advice that I am capable of giving him, I am satisfied is doing what is in his best interests.

The Court: From the statement he has made and from the testimony that I have heard from the doctor I am satisfied that he knows what he is charged with and that he knows what took place and that what took place did in fact amount to Murder in the Second Degree, so that if he chose to plead guilty to it it is because he is guilty of it as a matter of fact and this is what I must insist upon in order to do my job.

I will allow the filing of an Amended Information.

You may arraign him on the Amended Information.

Mr. Guterson: We have already acknowledged receipt thereof, Your Honor, of a certified copy of the Amended Information and are prepared to waive the reading thereof, inasmuch as the Court has already indicated the subject matter thereof and I am satisfied that the Defendant understands the substance of the charge and I believe as his attorney that he is fully prepared and equipped at this time to enter a plea to the Amended Information charging Second Degree Murder.

(Italics ours.)

The court then informed Hews of the rights he would be waiving by entering a plea of guilty.

The Court: Mr. Hews, it is important that you understand, and I think you do because you have a good lawyer, but I want to make sure you do, that you have a right to a jury trial on any of these charges. You know that, don't you?

The Defendant: Uh-huh.

The Court: If you tell me you want a jury trial I would order the matter tried and a jury would determine what the facts are, and I want to make sure you understand that you have a right to have a trial by a jury. Do you?

The Defendant: I do.

The Court: And if you enter a plea then you don't have a right to appeal from what I do and you have to accept the penalty that I impose and so after a trial one has a right to appeal; after a plea one does not have a right to appeal, one has to accept then what the Judge does. And in a case of this nature the judge may decide that you go to the penitentiary and, if so, you have to accept that. You understand that?

The Defendant: Uh-huh.

The Court: From this young man's conduct I agree with the psychiatrist that he knows what is happening, he understands it and he knows the gravity of it.

What is your plea, Mr. Hews, to the charge of Murder in the Second Degree?

The Defendant: I plead guilty, Your Honor.

The Court: I will accept that plea. I am confident that he is receiving justice and knows what he is doing.

We note the trial court informed Hews he was charged with second degree murder which meant he "intended" to kill someone and did in fact take a life. At that juncture Hews exclaimed "I can't say that--I didn't intend to kill anybody". Although he admitted attempting to "hold up" the victim the foregoing recitation of the facts reveals considerable confusion on Hews' part. Hews was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On October 27, 1981, the present Personal Restraint Petition was filed with Division One of the Court of Appeals. It appears to have been the first challenge of the guilty plea. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because the issues could have been raised on appeal, but were not. Accordingly, the petition was deemed a collateral attack on the judgment, contrary to the dictate of In re Haynes, supra.

Without question, Hews failed to appeal the issues now raised in his Personal Restraint Petition. It is equally clear the petition's challenge of the guilty plea is a collateral attack thereon. These factors standing alone, however, do not prevent appellate review if the interest in finality of judgments is outweighed by claims of constitutional error actually prejudicing the petitioner.

Beginning with In re Myers, 91 Wash.2d 120, 587 P.2d 532 (1978), and continuing through In re Lee, 95 Wash.2d 357, 623 P.2d 687 (1980) and In re Haynes, 95 Wash.2d 648, 628 P.2d 809 (1981), this court adhered strictly to the principle that issues, constitutional or non-constitutional, which were known or could have been known but were not raised at trial or on appeal, may not be raised in a collateral attack by a Personal Restraint Petition. The Myers-Haynes line of cases recognize a strong policy interest in the finality of judgments.

A dilemma arises when this interest must be weighed against a constitutional error that actually prejudices one who resorts to a Personal Restraint Petition. The need for reaching a balance in such cases was recognized in part in In re Keene, supra, and In re James, 96 Wash.2d 847, 640 P.2d 18 (1982). Unfortunately, these cases when combined with the Myers-Haynes line of cases appear to have confused the issue, as illustrated by the conflicting views reached in these consolidated cases.

We recently addressed the dilemma in In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 650 P.2d 1103 (1982). It was recognized therein that a Personal Restraint Petition is not a substitute for an appeal. We observed that collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders. These are significant costs which require that collateral relief be limited. Hagler, at 824, 650 P.2d 1103. Nevertheless, without abandoning the Myers-Haynes line of cases, we concluded their rule was "too blunt an instrument for the delicate operation of determining claims which should be given collateral review". Hagler, at 826, 650 P.2d 1103. The rule had caused inconsistent application in cases where the interest in finality of judgments was outweighed by constitutional errors actually prejudicing the petitioner. As pointed out in Hagler, at 826, 650 P.2d 1103, under such circumstances we have in fact reviewed constitutional issues not raised on appeal. See In re James, supra; In re Keene, supra and In re Schellong, 94 Wash.2d 314, 616 P.2d 1233 (1980).

In In re Hagler, at page 826, 650 P.2d 1103, we recognized that the Myers-Haynes rule is out of step with the federal courts. As was pointed out, it has created the possibility that " 'our state's personal restraint procedure will come to be viewed as a necessary exhaustion of state remedies, rather than as a method by which serious constitutional claims may be heard' ". In re Hagler, at 826, 650 P.2d 1103 quoting from In re James, supra at 856, 640...

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