Hey v. City of Philadelphia
Decision Date | 13 March 1876 |
Citation | 81 Pa. 44 |
Parties | Hey v. Philadelphia. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
February 4, 1876
1. Roads and bridges are made for ordinary travel; if they fulfil such purpose they are sufficient and those in charge of them are not responsible for extraordinary accidents occurring on them.
2. If a road is so dangerous by reason of its proximity to a precipice, or any other cause, tat common prudence requires extra precaution in order to insure safety to travellers, the municipal authorities are bound to use such precaution.
3. If the immediate cause of damage from an imperfect highway be the effect of a precedent cause arising from a neglect of duty by a municipality, it is liable for it.
4. In this case the plaintiff was driving on a road in the city park; his horse became frightened by a locomotive and turned and upset the carriage, and there being no barrier on the road, fell with the carriage into the river and was drowned. The circumstances in this case evidence of negligence in the city in not putting up a barrier.
5. Lower Macungie v. Merkhoffer, 21 P. F. Smith 276; Newlin v. Davis, 27 P. F. Smith 317; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Harris 54; Scott v. Hunter, 10 Wright 194, compared.
Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD JJ.
Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: Of January Term 1874, No. 267.
This was an action on the case by Michael Hey, against the city of Philadelphia, brought to March Term 1872 of the court below for negligence in not sufficiently guarding one of the roads in the park, by reason of which the plaintiff's horse fell into the river Schuylkill and was drowned, and the carriage and harness injured.
The case was tried before Hare, P. J.
The plaintiff testified that he was driving home through Fairmount Park with two daughters; he proceeded:
Caroline Hey, a daughter, testified:
Other witnesses testified substantially in the same manner and also to the value of the horse, & c.
Another witness testified:
The court submitted the question of negligence to the jury reserving the following points:--
1. Was there any evidence of negligence on the part of the city in the construction of the road?
2. Was there any evidence that the damage to the plaintiff was the result of negligence on the part of the city?
The question may be considered under two heads: First, is there evidence of negligence in the construction of the road; and next, did that negligence occasion the loss. I have found it exceedingly difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on either point. That the city is responsible for maintaining her highways in a safe condition, and that the question whether a particular highway is safe, must ordinarily be left to the jury, are propositions which no one is likely to dispute. It is also clear under the authorities, that when the road is steep or narrow, with a river, ravine or ditch at the side, a fence or barrier should be erected of sufficient height to prevent vehicles from being forced off the road by any sudden or ungovernable movement of the animals by which they are drawn. But I am not prepared to admit that this precaution must be observed where the way is level, and there is no reason to suppose that an accident will occur with horses that are obedient to the whip and rein. One who drives a horse which cannot be controlled under ordinary circumstances, and where there is no peculiar cause of alarm, takes the risk, and cannot justly ask compensation if an accident occurs. If this were the whole case, I should incline to think that the question should have been withdrawn from the jury. But there are other circumstances which require consideration. At the point where the accident occurred, the road crosses one railroad track at grade, and then passes almost immediately under another. There are sights and sounds which may excite or alarm a horse that is ordinarily quiet and well broken. There is no other convenient means of access to a park which has been laid out for the health and recreation of the citizens. It was, therefore, the duty of the Park Commissioners to anticipate the danger arising from the proximity of the tracks, and take more than ordinary precautions against the accidents which the situation was calculated to produce.
We have still to consider whether the negligence of the defendant was a proximate and efficient cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks to recover. The accident originated in causes over which the city had no control, and for which she is not answerable. These were: first, the passage of the railway train; next, the ungovernable temper of the horse; and finally, the plaintiff's fall, which left the animal without a master. Up to this point there is certainly nothing for which the city can justly be held answerable.
Does any responsibility attach for what ensued? A horse which breaks loose from its driver and runs away, under the impulse of fear,...
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Hey v. Philadelphia
... ... 396. Whether fence is necessary is a question for the jury: Booker v. Anderson, 35 Ill. 65; ... Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271; Macungie Township v. Merkhoffer, 21 P. F. Smith 476. This was one of the ordinary incidents and dangers of travel which the city was bound to guard against by every reasonable means in their power: Scott v. Hunter, 10 Wright 194; Lund v. Tyngsboro', 11 Cush. 563; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Harris 54. It was a question of fact for the jury whether the want of a safeguard was an efficient and concurrent cause of the injury, and ... ...