Hey v. City of Philadelphia

Decision Date13 March 1876
Citation81 Pa. 44
PartiesHey v. Philadelphia.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

February 4, 1876

1. Roads and bridges are made for ordinary travel; if they fulfil such purpose they are sufficient and those in charge of them are not responsible for extraordinary accidents occurring on them.

2. If a road is so dangerous by reason of its proximity to a precipice, or any other cause, tat common prudence requires extra precaution in order to insure safety to travellers, the municipal authorities are bound to use such precaution.

3. If the immediate cause of damage from an imperfect highway be the effect of a precedent cause arising from a neglect of duty by a municipality, it is liable for it.

4. In this case the plaintiff was driving on a road in the city park; his horse became frightened by a locomotive and turned and upset the carriage, and there being no barrier on the road, fell with the carriage into the river and was drowned. The circumstances in this case evidence of negligence in the city in not putting up a barrier.

5. Lower Macungie v. Merkhoffer, 21 P. F. Smith 276; Newlin v. Davis, 27 P. F. Smith 317; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Harris 54; Scott v. Hunter, 10 Wright 194, compared.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD JJ.

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: Of January Term 1874, No. 267.

This was an action on the case by Michael Hey, against the city of Philadelphia, brought to March Term 1872 of the court below for negligence in not sufficiently guarding one of the roads in the park, by reason of which the plaintiff's horse fell into the river Schuylkill and was drowned, and the carriage and harness injured.

The case was tried before Hare, P. J.

The plaintiff testified that he was driving home through Fairmount Park with two daughters; he proceeded: " I crossed the Reading Railroad, and was approaching the Connecting Railroad bridge. Just as I came around the bend a train on the other side approached the bridge. The bridge is very high overhead where it crosses the road. My horse began to get restive. There were high rocks on one side of the road; on the other side there was a steep bank faced with rough stones, at the bottom of which was the river. A horse could not get to the left because of the high rocks, and if he went to the right there was nothing but this bank and the river. I was afraid on account of my daughters. I got out and held my horse facing the rocks. I held him by the head facing the rocks. I got out because I was afraid my horse might back over the bank. There was no fence, and I was afraid for my daughters. My horse backed me, and my foot slipped on a rock at the side of the road, and I fell. The horse got away from me; he turned short round and upset the wagon, and when I got up the horse and wagon were in the river. I saw only the wheel. I did not see them go over, but when I got up they were in the river. * * * There was no fence and no barrier between the road and the river. * * * The road was a good smooth road, about as wide as Sixth street. There was a footway between road-bed and the river. It was raised about usual height and curbed. It was about six inches higher than the middle part of the road. My horse was very gentle. He was not afraid of trains or locomotives. I was in the habit of driving close by railroads; could drive him close up to a train in motion, and he never shyed. Train on bridge was high overhead; would be likely to frighten any horse."

Caroline Hey, a daughter, testified: " When we came round the bend of the road the horse became restive and uneasy. A train was just coming on the bridge. We could not see until we came round the turn, because of the rocks. My father got out and held the horse by the head. He turned him away from the bank, and faced him close up to the rocks on other side. The horse pushed my father backwards. He got upon a large stone or rock and slipped and fell. Then the horse turned short, the wagon upset, and my sister and I were thrown out, and when we got up the horse and wagon were in the river, and my father was halloaing. * * * The rocks on one side were very high, so that there was no passage in that direction. On the other side the bank was very steep down to the river. The face was rough, covered with rough stone. If a horse and carriage got over it could not stop until it got into the river. I drove often with my father. The horse was very quiet and gentle, never shyed at locomotives; have often seen him driven close to trains and locomotives, both standing still and when in motion; he never showed any fear or uneasiness."

Other witnesses testified substantially in the same manner and also to the value of the horse, & c.

Another witness testified: " I know place where accident happened; approaching it you can't see bridge till you come round curve; the trains run very high over head, and it is a place where even quiet horses are apt to shy and back. A great many pleasure carriages pass there all the time. Horses do frighten there; my own has taken fright and shyed and backed there, and he is a very quiet horse and fearless of locomotives. Under such circumstances some drivers would think it best to get out and hold the horse, and some would sit in wagon and trust to reins. If I was alone I would risk it; if I had women in the carriage I would get out. I knew Mr. Hey's horse; he was very gentle and quiet; not apt to shy at locomotives."

The court submitted the question of negligence to the jury reserving the following points:--

1. Was there any evidence of negligence on the part of the city in the construction of the road?

2. Was there any evidence that the damage to the plaintiff was the result of negligence on the part of the city?

The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $505; subject to the reserved points. The court subsequently entered a verdict for the defendant non obstante veredicto, Judge Hare delivering the following opinion:--

" The plaintiff was returning to the city from a drive in the East Park. A turn in the road brought him to the margin of the Schuylkill, and in full view of the bridge of the connecting railway. He had the stream on one side, and a high bank of rocks or earth on the other. The road was wide and level, but there was a sharp declivity towards the river with no guard or protection except a sidewalk raised some six inches above the road. A train was passing over the bridge and the plaintiff's horse took fright. He got out, took the animal by the head and turned it towards the bank. The horse continuing restive, the plaintiff got on a rock to obtain a better hold, but lost his footing and fell between the fore feet of the horse. The animal, freed from all restraint, turned short round, overset the wagon, sprang across the sidewalk into the river, and was drowned. The plaintiff contended that the city was guilty of negligence in not erecting a guard between the road and the stream, and that the accident was attributable to that cause. The question was left as one of fact to the jury, and the law reserved for the consideration of the court.

The question may be considered under two heads: First, is there evidence of negligence in the construction of the road; and next, did that negligence occasion the loss. I have found it exceedingly difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on either point. That the city is responsible for maintaining her highways in a safe condition, and that the question whether a particular highway is safe, must ordinarily be left to the jury, are propositions which no one is likely to dispute. It is also clear under the authorities, that when the road is steep or narrow, with a river, ravine or ditch at the side, a fence or barrier should be erected of sufficient height to prevent vehicles from being forced off the road by any sudden or ungovernable movement of the animals by which they are drawn. But I am not prepared to admit that this precaution must be observed where the way is level, and there is no reason to suppose that an accident will occur with horses that are obedient to the whip and rein. One who drives a horse which cannot be controlled under ordinary circumstances, and where there is no peculiar cause of alarm, takes the risk, and cannot justly ask compensation if an accident occurs. If this were the whole case, I should incline to think that the question should have been withdrawn from the jury. But there are other circumstances which require consideration. At the point where the accident occurred, the road crosses one railroad track at grade, and then passes almost immediately under another. There are sights and sounds which may excite or alarm a horse that is ordinarily quiet and well broken. There is no other convenient means of access to a park which has been laid out for the health and recreation of the citizens. It was, therefore, the duty of the Park Commissioners to anticipate the danger arising from the proximity of the tracks, and take more than ordinary precautions against the accidents which the situation was calculated to produce.

We have still to consider whether the negligence of the defendant was a proximate and efficient cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks to recover. The accident originated in causes over which the city had no control, and for which she is not answerable. These were: first, the passage of the railway train; next, the ungovernable temper of the horse; and finally, the plaintiff's fall, which left the animal without a master. Up to this point there is certainly nothing for which the city can justly be held answerable.

Does any responsibility attach for what ensued? A horse which breaks loose from its driver and runs away, under the impulse of fear,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Hey v. Philadelphia
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 13 d1 Março d1 1876
    ... ... 396. Whether fence is necessary is a question for the jury: Booker v. Anderson, 35 Ill. 65; ... Hyatt v. Rondout, 44 Barb. 385; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271; Macungie Township v. Merkhoffer, 21 P. F. Smith 476. This was one of the ordinary incidents and dangers of travel which the city was bound to guard against by every reasonable means in their power: Scott v. Hunter, 10 Wright 194; Lund v. Tyngsboro', 11 Cush. 563; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Harris 54. It was a question of fact for the jury whether the want of a safeguard was an efficient and concurrent cause of the injury, and ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT