Heyman v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 77-1802
| Citation | 6 B.C.D. 58,615 F.2d 1190 |
| Decision Date | 20 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1802,77-1802 |
| Parties | , Bankr. L. Rep. P 68,313 Glenn R. HEYMAN, Successor-Trustee of the Estates of Bertram R. Schwartz and Herbert Geist, Individually and as co-partners, trading as North Suburban Development Co., Bankrupt, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Herbert Geist, Petitioner for Intervention-Appellant, v. The EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Appellee, v. MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant, Counter- Plaintiff In Interpleader-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
James B. Sloan, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner for intervention-appellant.
Glenn R. Heyman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Robert W. Gettleman of D'ancona, Pflaum, Wyatt & Riskind, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, PELL, Circuit Judge, and ESCHBACH, Chief District Judge. *
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying Herbert Geist, bankrupt, leave to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) in a plenary action filed by the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
The appeal arises out of the involuntary bankruptcy of Herbert Geist, the petitioner for intervention and appellant here, his partner Bertram Schwartz and their real estate development partnership, North Suburban Development Company. 1
On September 7, 1973, Glenn R. Heyman, as successor trustee, sued to recover approximately $700,000 of assets of Geist from Exchange National Bank, defendant-appellee, on grounds of voidable preference, fraudulent transfers, and common law release of Geist from any indebtedness to Exchange, under sections 60(b), 67(e) and 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b), 107(e) and 110(e)(1)-(3). 2 Among the assets were accruing commissions on renewals of life insurance policies issued by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, for which Geist had been a general agent. Geist had assigned his right to these commissions to Exchange. Part had been paid to Exchange and part withheld by Massachusetts Mutual because of conflicting claims.
Exchange filed an answer substantially admitting application of the described assets to payment of obligations due it, but taking issue with the allegations that these receipts constituted voidable preferences and fraudulent transfers, and with the claim that it had released other obligors without Geist's consent.
On May 22, 1975, Geist first moved for intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The intervening complaint alleged that Geist, not the Trustee or Exchange, was entitled to life insurance renewal commissions accruing after bankruptcy on policies sold by Geist prior to the 1971 bankruptcy.
The district court permitted the intervention. Soon afterwards Exchange filed a motion for summary judgment, along with the necessary affidavits, against Geist's intervention, alleging that all renewal commissions at issue had been fully earned prior to the bankruptcy, became property of the Trustee, and were subject to claims of creditors such as Exchange. The district court ultimately granted Exchange's motion for summary judgment thereby dismissing Geist's first intervening complaint, holding that "the right to receive renewal commission was a part of the bankrupt's property that passed to the trustee upon adjudication of bankruptcy subject to the claims of creditors." Geist appealed, but prior to hearing voluntarily withdrew the appeal. All parties accept the determination of this issue.
Meanwhile, Exchange had filed a third-party complaint against Massachusetts Mutual seeking payment of all insurance commissions which Geist had assigned to Exchange as collateral prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Massachusetts Mutual answered the third-party complaint and counterclaimed by interpleader alleging that Geist, the Trustee in bankruptcy, and Exchange each claimed the same renewal commissions. Pursuant to the interpleader, as of July 22, 1977, Massachusetts Mutual had deposited with the Clerk of the District Court approximately $300,000.
On September 13, 1976, Geist, for a second time, had moved to intervene claiming that his pending petition in Bankruptcy Court to convert his straight bankruptcy to a Chapter XI reorganization created the possibility that title to the assets and estate might ultimately pass to Geist. The district court denied Geist's motion, holding that until confirmation of the Chapter XI plan by the creditors, Geist lacked the requisite "present substantial interest as distinguished from a contingent future interest or mere expectancy" for the purposes of Rule 24(a) intervention. Subsequently, the Chapter XI petition was dismissed by Bankruptcy Court. The issue raised by this second motion to intervene is also at rest.
On March 11, 1977, Geist again moved for intervention, this time alleging that the assets at issue in this action largely exceed the total claims and costs of administration. Geist asserted that the total value of the assets which are the subject of the action will exceed $1,160,261 and that the claims in bankruptcy (apparently including costs of administration) will not exceed $450,000, so that in the event of a "successful judgment" in this action, Geist would be entitled to at least $710,261 for his own benefit. One of the disputed claims in the lawsuit is that Exchange extinguished the obligations to it when it released some of the obligors. Thus the "successful judgment" assumed would not only restore assets to the bankruptcy estate, but would also avoid claims of Exchange. Geist claimed that his interest in the possible net recovery was not adequately represented by the Trustee in bankruptcy as plaintiff; that the Trustee's interest is in payment of claims and that the Trustee had announced his willingness to settle with Exchange for $45,000.
Geist's motion papers did not explain his delay in moving to intervene on this ground. In response to objection on the ground of untimeliness, he argued that he "could not have predicted that hundreds of thousands of dollars in unfounded claims would be reduced, denied and withdrawn."
On April 18, 1977 this third attempt at intervention was also denied by the district court citing five reasons:
(1) Herbert Geist has already intervened in this action previously and has had his claim denied; (2) he has not (appealed) the prior entry of judgment on his claim and has delayed four years in offering the present ground for his right to intervene; (3) prejudice will accrue to the present parties to this suit since they have litigated this cause for four years and are presently prepared to settle this cause; (4) this action has been vested in the trustee and, as Herbert Geist admits, he could not institute this action absent abandonment by the trustee, and (5) Mr. Geist's 'interest' in this suit can be protected by a timely request to Bankruptcy Court for either disapproval of any improper settlement or replacement of the trustee if his actions so warrant . . .
Geist filed a motion to vacate which largely challenged the court's reliance on prejudice based upon a proposed settlement. 3 The district court vacated point (3) of the previous order but still denied Geist's intervention. Geist now appeals from the orders of the district court denying him leave to intervene, and denying in part and granting in part his motion to vacate, modify, alter and amend the court's order denying intervention.
Our inquiry involves a bankrupt's right to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) 4 in plenary proceedings brought in district court by the trustee in bankruptcy against a third party to recover assets which are claimed to be a part of the estate. Intervenor-appellant Geist claims that he has a clear interest in the subject matter of the action below and that denial of intervention will, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect his interest. Additionally, Geist asserts that this interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties and that the motion for leave to intervene was timely filed.
Plaintiff-appellee Heyman and defendant-appellee Exchange National Bank oppose the bankrupt's intervention on several grounds: (1) the bankrupt has no direct substantial interest in the recovery of the assets, but merely a contingent interest in the surplus; (2) the bankrupt's interests are adequately protected by the trustee who has an obligation and incentive to collect all the assets of bankrupt's estate; (3) permitting intervention will prolong litigation by allowing the bankrupt to obstruct settlement negotiations; (4) Geist's failure to appeal previously appealable denials of intervention required denial of his motion to intervene; and (5) Geist's motion was untimely because Geist knew of the potential surplus long before filing this motion to intervene.
Denial of intervention on the grounds asserted in Geist's first two motions is part of the law of the case. Geist is not thus precluded, however, from moving to intervene on the newly asserted ground that the possibility of a surplus resulting from a favorable judgment shows an interest of Geist which may be impaired by an unfavorable judgment and which is not being adequately represented by the Trustee.
We are of the view, however, that...
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