Heyman v. Queens Village Comm.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 99-7321
• Citation: 198 F.3d 68
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 1999) ROBERT HEYMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUEENS VILLAGE COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HEALTH FOR JAMAICA COMMUNITY ADOLESCENT PROGRAM, INC., THOMAS WHITE, TYRONE PALMER, and RANDALL JOHNSON, Defendants- Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 68

198 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1999)

ROBERT HEYMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.QUEENS VILLAGE COMMITTEE FOR MENTAL HEALTH FOR JAMAICA COMMUNITY ADOLESCENT PROGRAM, INC., THOMAS WHITE, TYRONE PALMER, and RANDALL JOHNSON, Defendants- Appellees.

Docket No. 99-7321

August Term, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued: Oct. 19, 1999

Decided: Nov. 30, 1999

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York(Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge), granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act("ADA") and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under New York State and local law.The District Court held that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.We conclude that plaintiff has established a prima facie case that he was disabled under the statutory definition because he was "regarded as" impaired.

Vacated and remanded.

MITCHEL H. OCHS, Anderson & Rottenberg, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

ALAN C. BECKER, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Woodbury, NY (Kathryn J. Russo, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

The question presented is whether an employee who was known by his employer to have lymphoma, but who had not become symptomatic at the time he was fired, can proceed with a discriminatory discharge claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act,42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.("ADA").

PlaintiffRobert Heyman appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York(Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge), granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim under the ADA and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under New York State and local law.The District Court held that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case that he was "disabled" as the term is defined under the ADA.We conclude that plaintiff has established a prima facie case that defendants regarded him as impaired, thus satisfying one of the statutory definitions of "disabled."Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Plaintiff filed this discriminatory discharge action against defendants Queens Village Committee for Mental Health for Jamaica Community Adolescent Program Inc.("J-CAP"), Thomas White, Tyrone Palmer, and Randall Johnson on May 30, 1997.Heyman, a former J-CAP employee who worked under the supervision of the individual defendants, claims that his discharge from J-CAP violated the ADA; the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law,Admin. Code 8-101 et seq.In granting defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) on Heyman's ADA claim and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state and local claims, the District Court held that Heyman had not established a prima facie case that he suffered from a "disability" as that term is defined under the ADA.

The facts set forth below are drawn from the papers submitted to the District Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment and are undisputed unless otherwise stated.Heyman was employed on June 17, 1994 as a Medical Unit Administrator by J-CAP, a facility providing medical and health care services.He had primary responsibility for the administration and functioning of J-CAP's ambulatory services facility. ¹.In his J-CAP job application, Heyman acknowledged that if he were selected as Medical Unit Administrator he would serve as an at-will employee.

When Heyman initially began his job at J-CAP, his immediate supervisor was Gary McCormick, Associate Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of J-CAP.However, shortly after Heyman's arrival, McCormick was diagnosed with lymphoma; he died in or about April 1995.While McCormick often was absent from work during the ten months between his diagnosis and ultimate demise, J-CAP took no employment action against him.

When Heyman joined J-CAP, it had in place a written Personnel Policy and Procedure Manual.The Manual set forth J-CAP's policy of placing newly-hired employees on probationary status for their first six months on the job.At the conclusion of this period, each new staff member was supposed to receive a written evaluation from his supervisor before becoming a "regular employee."According to the Manual, J-CAP also required supervisors to complete annually an Employee Performance Evaluation Form for each employee, to review it with the evaluated employee, and to have him sign the form to acknowledge the review.The Manual provided also that it was J-CAP's policy that employees could be terminated for "[u]nsatisfactory work performance based upon supervisory evaluations."Heyman claims never to have been reviewed, and defendants have not brought to our attention any evidence of a review, annual or otherwise.

In September 1995, about five months after the death of McCormick, Heyman received from a J-CAP physician a preliminary diagnosis that he suffered from lymphoma.After this diagnosis was confirmed the following month, Heyman spoke about his condition with defendant Johnson, J-CAP's Director of Grants and Contracts.At his deposition, Johnson explained, "[H]e said could I keep it between us, he was going in for chemotherapy.He needed special accommodations in terms of leave and things like that.I said, don't worry about it."Heyman claims he subsequently informed defendant White, J-CAP's Executive Director, that Heyman suffered from lymphoma.

On October 27, 1995, Heyman notified Johnson and White that he planned to arrive late for work on November 2 due to a medical appointment.On November 7, 1995, Johnson informed Heyman by memorandum of the hiring of Paul Woodard to replace the deceased McCormick and requested that Heyman contact Johnson to set up a meeting, explaining:

As the person responsible for the oversight of the Article 28 Medical Unit, it is important that we meet to discuss your role and performance in furthering the operation and development of this unit.The level of time and commitment required to resolve the ongoing internal problems in the unit is an area of critical concern that must be addressed immediately.

(emphasis supplied).Johnson and Woodard met with Heyman the next day; Heyman claims that his illness was discussed at the meeting, a contention that defendants dispute.Johnson then sent Heyman a memorandum in which Johnson informed Heyman that "[b]ased upon our meeting today, and subsequent discussions with the Executive staff, it has been summarily decided to terminate your employment as Medical Unit Administrator effective the end of the work day."

Unsurprisingly, the parties vigorously dispute why Heyman was discharged.Defendants claim that Heyman was dismissed because: (1) the unit for which he was responsible was underperforming; (2)he was perceived by management, peers, and subordinates as abrasive and arrogant; (3)he was unwilling or unable to train and motivate his staff; (4) his conduct was believed to have been motivated by racial or ethnic prejudice; (5) a year earlier, he had not fired a nurse despite being directed to do so; and (6)he tailored his work schedule to avoid traffic during his daily commutation to J-CAP, rather than ensuring that he was present to supervise his staff properly.Heyman responds that these purported reasons are mere pretexts manufactured post hoc for litigation purposes and are not supported by contemporaneous evidence.

In support of his prima facie case that his discharge was discriminatory, Heyman notes that he never had received a negative performance evaluation during his tenure at J-CAP.He also points out that the sole contemporaneous document mentioning a possible reason for his termination, Johnson's November 7 memorandum, expresses only a concern over "the level of time and commitment" Heyman would be expected to devote to his job.Attempting to prove that this phrase concerned his health rather than other aspects of his job performance, Heyman has produced time sheets demonstrating that he worked 52 weeks the previous year and logged hours in excess of those required of him.Heyman also points to the temporal proximity between (1) J-CAP's experience with McCormick's lymphoma; (2) Heyman's own request for "special accommodations;" and (3) his notifying Johnson and White that he would miss work for a medical appointment on the morning on November 2, 1995 on the one hand, and the November 7 memorandum and his summary firing on the other, as evidence that defendants' proffered reasons are pretextual and are designed to obscure defendants' discriminatory intent in discharging him.

After the completion of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.Judge Johnson granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor on March 5, 1999.This appeal followed.

II.

A.Applicable Standards

1.Summary Judgment

We review de novo the District Court's decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.SeeGummo v. Village of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107(2d Cir.1996).We cannot uphold the Court's decision unless we determine that there exists no genuine issue of fact and that, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c);Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36(2d Cir.1994).In assessing the record, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255(1986).

2.Employment Discrimination

As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities, including...