Heyne v. Hgi-Lakeside, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 4:06-cv-0346.
• Citation: 589 F.Supp.2d 1119
• Parties: Clayton HEYNE, Plaintiff, v. HGI-LAKESIDE, INC., d/b/a, Lakeside Casino Resort, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

589 F.Supp.2d 1119

Clayton HEYNE, Plaintiff, v. HGI-LAKESIDE, INC., d/b/a, Lakeside Casino Resort, Defendant.

Civil No. 4:06-cv-0346.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa.

March 7, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James L. Sayre, James L. Sayre, PC, Clive, IA, for Plaintiff.

Greg A. Naylor, Whitfield & Eddy PLC, West Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

RONALD E. LONGSTAFF, Senior District Judge.

THE COURT HAS BEFORE IT Defendant HGI-Lakeside, Inc.'s ("HGI") motion for summary judgment filed November 15, 2007. Plaintiff Clayton Heyne ("Heyne") filed a response on December 26, 2007, which was supplemented on January 11, 2008. HGI filed a reply on January 8, 2008, which was supplemented on January 24, 2008. The motion is now considered fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts either are not in dispute or are viewed in a light most favorable to Heyne.

Clayton Heyne was originally hired by the Grace Companies ("Grace") as a table games dealer at Lakeside Casino Resort on January 1, 2000. HGI-Lakeside, Inc. ("HGI") purchased the casino and resort on February 1, 2005, on which date Heyne began working for the new corporation. Throughout his employment with Grace and HGI, Heyne preferred to deal cards at a sit-down table, due to the fact that his chronic back pain become progressively worse the longer he stood.¹ During this time, Heyne would usually be assigned to a sit-down table. Occasionally, however, he was assigned to a stand-up table, and was able to stand for three to five hours at a time.

After HGI took over ownership of the casino, Heyne began to be assigned to stand-up tables on a regular basis. At some point in the spring of 2005, Heyne was instructed by Table Games Supervisor Brian Rowdybush that he needed to bring a medical note if he wanted to continue to be assigned to a sit-down table for each shift.² On June 20, 2005, Heyne gave Rowdybush a medical note written by Wilson Rigler, M.D. The note recommended that Heyne be restricted to standing for two hours at a time with a period of one hour of sitting or resting in between periods of standing. After he delivered the note from Dr. Rigler, Heyne was permitted to deal from a sit-down table until a meeting could be arranged with human resources and his manager to discuss the impact of Dr. Rigler's note on his work assignments.

On July 8, 2005, Heyne met with Human Resources Manager Carol Eckles and Table Games Manager Kevin Ryan to discuss Heyne's medical restrictions. It is undisputed that Heyne was placed on leave shortly after this meeting, and has not returned to work at HGI. Heyne was taken off the active employment payroll on August 3, 2005.

During the course of the meeting, after discussing Heyne's back problems and Dr. Rigler's note, HGI informed him that it was unwilling to accommodate the standing restrictions recommended by Dr. Rigler,³ and told him that he needed to be able to stand for an entire eight-hour shift. HGI placed him on a forced, unrequested medical leave,⁴ and was told that he would have three months to be in a position to stand up and deal as required. Heyne viewed this action by HGI as a termination of his employment because he knew that he could never be in a position to stand and deal for an entire shift.⁵

Heyne filed his present complaint against HGI-Lakeside on July 24, 2006, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").⁶ In the present motion, HGI argues that (1) Heyne is not "disabled" under the ADA, and therefore, cannot succeed on his disability discrimination claim under the ADA; (2) Heyne was not a victim of a retaliatory discharge under the ADA; and (3) Heyne was not a victim of a retaliatory discharge under the FMLA.

II. ANALYSIS AND APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994). The moving party must establish its right to judgment with such clarity there is no room for controversy. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir.1982). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

B. Discrimination under the ADA

Heyne first argues that HGI discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in violation of the ADA.⁷ To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) The employee is disabled within the meaning of the ADA;

(2) The employee is qualified (with or without reasonable accommodation) to perform the essential functions of a job; and

(3) The employee suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability.

Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403 F.3d 1026, 1034 (8th Cir.2005). The initial burden of establishing these elements rests with the plaintiff. Id. For the reasons discussed below, Heyne cannot establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and therefore, his claim for discrimination under the ADA fails as a matter of law.

Under the ADA, the term "disability" is defined as:

(A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;

(B) A record of such an impairment; or

(C) Being regarded as having such an impairment.

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Heyne alleges that he can establish a disability under the first and third prongs of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).⁸

1. A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity

As an initial matter, there appears to be no dispute that Heyne's chronic back pain constitutes a "physical impairment" under the ADA. The "major life activity" which Heyne claims is substantially limited by his back pain, however, is not entirely clear. At one point, Heyne appears to claim that he is referencing standing, arguing that his back problems "limit[] his ability to stand for any extended period of time." Plaintiff's Br. at 13. However, Heyne also cites case law which suggests he is referring to the "major life activity" of working. See Plaintiffs Br. at 13 (citing Cooper v. Olin Corp., 246 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir.2001)). In either case, both standing and working have been recognized as major life activities under the terms of the ADA. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that the proposition that standing and working constitute major life activities "is consistent with controlling precedent.").

Regardless of the major life activity asserted, however, Heyne cannot establish that such activity is "substantially limited" by his chronic back pain. A physical or mental impairment is "`substantially limiting' if it renders an individual unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or if it significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population." Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948-49 (8th Cir.1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). Courts consider such factors as "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term impact." Id. at 949 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).

Heyne makes no allegation that he is "unable" to stand. To the contrary, the record before this Court establishes that, at the very least, Heyne could stand for two hours at a time, provided that he was permitted to sit or rest between periods of standing. Therefore, the only question is whether the ability to stand for only two hours at a time without significant pain constitutes a "substantial limitation" on the major life activity of standing under the terms of the ADA.

Several circuits have addressed the general question before the Court—that is, at what point a time limit on the ability to stand without pain constitutes a "substantial limitation" on the major life activity of standing. In Williams v. Excel Foundry & Mach., Inc., 489 F.3d 309 (7th Cir.2007), the plaintiff argued that "his inability to stand for more than thirty to forty minutes at a time without briefly sitting or lying down to alleviate discomfort, and his inability to balance on one leg, constitute significant restrictions on the activity of standing." Id. at 311. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the Seventh Circuit held that "[b]ecause we also believe that thirty to forty minutes is not a `very brief period, we find that Williams's inability to stand for longer periods does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of standing." Id. at 312.⁹

In Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001), the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the case of a plaintiff suffering from degenerative disc disease who argued that the limitation on her ability to sit and stand for long periods of time constituted a substantial limitation of a major life activity. According to ...