Heyse v. Case
Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 29289.,29289. |
Parties | Lauren HEYSE et al. v. William CASE et al. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Jonathan M. Starble, for the appellant (named plaintiff).
Kerry R. Callahan, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company).
BISHOP, ROBINSON and PETERS, Js.
An insurance company's duty to provide its insured with indemnity, or to undertake a defense on the insured's behalf, depends on whether the terms of the insurance policy provide coverage for the dispute in which the insured is engaged. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 457, 463, 876 A.2d 1139 (2005). In this case, the principal issue is whether a title insurance policy provided coverage for a dispute about subdivision rights between the insured and another member of a planned community organized under General Statutes § 47-220.1 Concluding that two exclusions in the insured's policy establish that she has no coverage for this dispute, the trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The insured has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In a multicount complaint filed on August 21, 2006, the plaintiff Lauren Heyse and others challenged the right of the defendants William Case and Tria Case to subdivide a lot within a common interest community in New Hartford known as West Hill Estates. In count four of the complaint, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a title insurance policy issued by the defendant Connecticut Attorneys Title Insurance Company2 obligated the defendant to defend and to indemnify her in her pursuit of her alleged right to enforce a limitation on subdivisions allegedly established in the documents creating the common interest community. In count five, the plaintiff sought monetary compensation for the defendant's alleged failure to honor the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in her title insurance policy. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, challenging the merits of both of the plaintiff's claims. The court granted the motion, and the plaintiff has appealed from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant.
During the pendency of this appeal, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend her complaint by adding a sixth count against the defendant. The merits of that count have not yet been addressed by the court. Regardless of its merits, however, the filing of this belated amendment requires us to decide whether we continue to have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's appeal from the existing judgment on counts four and five. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Although (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rino Gnesi Co. v. Sbriglio, 98 Conn.App. 1, 7-8, 908 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 945, 912 A.2d 480 (2006); Practice Book § 61-3. Pursuant to this rule of practice, this court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's appeal at the time that it was filed because the only counts in her complaint that were addressed to the defendant had been decided by the judgment rendered on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Our assessment of the jurisdictional consequence of the plaintiff's amendment of her complaint is governed by the decision of our Supreme Court in RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 899 A.2d 586 (2006). In RAL Management, Inc., the court held: (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, at 691-92, 899 A.2d 586.
In light of RAL Management, Inc., we are persuaded that the plaintiff's addition of a sixth count to her complaint setting forth a new cause of action against the defendant, whatever its merit s, does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to hear her appeal from the court's judgment on counts four and five. Significantly, RAL Management, Inc., did not hold that the filing of a motion to open a judgment per se had immediate jurisdictional consequences for a pending appeal. We are persuaded that the filing of an additional count likewise should not be deemed to require dismissal of a pending appeal. In either case, resolution of a new claim at some time in the future might make some part of the existing trial court judgment moot, and might make some part of an appellate judgment moot. We will not, however, presume mootness because, as our Supreme Court has noted, mootness is fact sensitive. Id., at 692, 899 A.2d 586. There is no such thing as anticipatory mootness.
Although the plaintiff cites Mazurek v. Great American Insurance Co., 284 Conn. 16, 930 A.2d 682 (2007), for a contrary holding, we are not persuaded of the applicability of that case. In Mazurek, at the time the appeal was filed, the court had not resolved all the claims against a party to the appeal. Id., at 34, 930 A.2d 682. The parties had engaged in procedural manipulation to create "an artificial final judgment," which our Supreme Court refused to countenance. Id., at 33, 930 A.2d 682. In this case, there was nothing artificial about the judgment at the time that it was rendered. We are persuaded, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to address the merits of the plaintiff's appeal.
The plaintiff's principal claim on appeal is that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the coverage afforded to her by the terms of the title insurance contract that she purchased when she bought her property in West Hill Estates. The standard of review governing this claim is well established. Practice Book § 17-49 directs a court to render summary judgment (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazurek v. Great American Ins. Co., supra, 284 Conn. at 26-27, 930 A.2d 682.
The relevant facts underlying the court's decision to render summary judgment on count four of the plaintiff's complaint are undisputed. West Hill Estates was created in 1991 as a common interest community by the filing and recording of a declaration. One of the eight initial units in West Hill Estates was lot 9, which the plaintiff purchased in 1993. Pursuant to General Statutes § 47-36l3 the plaintiff's purchase of lot 9 entitled her to enforce § 13.4 of the declaration, which stated that "[e]xcept to the extent expressly permitted ... by other provisions of ... this Declaration, no amendment may ... increase the number of Lots [or] change the boundaries of any Lot ... in the absence of unanimous consent of the Lot Owners."
In 2005, the Cases, the owners of lot 1C, initiated proceedings for subdivision approval of their property without having obtained the plaintiff's consent. The Cases claim that they do not need the plaintiff's consent because they have acquired special development rights under "other provisions" of the declaration. The plaintiff disputes the Cases' claim for two reasons. She disagrees with the Cases' contention that the declaration contained a reservation for the special development rights that the Cases are purporting to exercise. In the alternative, she argues that, even if such rights once existed, they were never validly conveyed to the Cases.
The defendant maintains that the title insurance policy that it issued to the plaintiff in 1993 does not require it to defend the plaintiff or to indemnify her in her dispute with the Cases about their rights to subdivide lot 1C. In its motion for summary judgment, it relied on two provisions in the insurance policy that the court found to be applicable and dispositive.
The first provision cited by the defendant is an exclusion in the part of the plaintiff's title insurance policy that defines the coverage provided by the policy. The clause begins by...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., SC 18886
...the plaintiffs cannot argue thatPage 19they reasonably expected an investigation for every claim submitted.35 Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 652, 971 A.2d 699 (no bad faith liability when defendant did not "[impair the plaintiff's] right to enforce any benefits to which she was entitled......
-
Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co.
...to investigate, the plaintiffs cannot argue that they reasonably expected an investigation for every claim submitted.35Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn.App. 640, 652, 971 A.2d 699 (no bad faith liability when defendant did not “[impair the plaintiff's] right to enforce any benefits to which she was ......
-
Southport Congregational Church—United Church of Christ v. Hadley
...in accordance with the contract, albeit at a lower price. We agreed with Cheekwood and denied the church's motion. See Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn.App. 640, 644, 971 A.2d 699 ("[t]here is no such thing as anticipatory mootness"), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 905, 976 A.2d 705 (2009).4 We note that t......
-
Southport Congregational Church-United Church of Christ v. Hadley
...in accordance with the contract, albeit at a lower price. We agreed with Cheekwood and denied the church's motion. See Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 644, 971 A.2d 699 ("[t]here is no such thing as anticipatory mootness"), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 905, 976 A.2d 705 (2009). 4. We note tha......
-
Chapter 3
...Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 148 P.3d 470 (Colo. App. 2006). Connecticut: Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 971 A.2d 699 (2009). Georgia: ALEA London Ltd. v. Woodcock, 286 Ga. App. 572, 649 S.E.2d 740 (2007); Coregis Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 6......
-
CHAPTER 3 The Insurance Contract
...Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 148 P.3d 470 (Colo. App. 2006). Connecticut: Heyse v. Case, 114 Conn. App. 640, 971 A.2d 699 (2009). Georgia: ALEA London Ltd. v. Woodcock, 286 Ga. App. 572, 649 S.E.2d 740 (2007); Coregis Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 6......
-
2009 Appellate Review
...granted, 293 Conn. 905, 976 A.2d706 (2009). 49. 114 Conn. App. 13, 968 A.2d 946 (2009). 50. 115 Conn. App. 696, 975 A.2d 85 (2009). 51. 114 Conn. App. 640, 971 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 905, 976 A.2d 705 (2009) 52. When a party is granted summary judgment, it is no longer in the cas......