Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, No. 1963
Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Writing for the Court | CROSS |
Citation | 210 So.2d 750 |
Decision Date | 23 May 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 1963 |
Parties | HIALEAH RACE COURSE, INC., and Tropical Park, Inc., Appellants, v. GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees. |
Page 750
v.
GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.
Page 751
William C. Lantaff and John H. Wahl, Jr., of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Carson & Wahl, Miami, for appellant, Hialeah Race Course, Inc.
Robert G. Worley and Lee M. Worley, of Worley, Gautier & Patterson, Miami, for appellant, Tropical Park, Inc.
Leonard Romanik, of Landefeld & Romanik, Hollywood, and Ford L. Thompson, of Starry & Thompson, Tallahassee, for appellee, Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc.
CROSS, Judge.
Appellants-defendants, Hialeah Race Course, Inc., and Tropical Park, Inc., by interlocutory appeal seek review of an order denying their motion to dismiss appellee-plaintiff's, Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., complaint in a declaratory judgment action. We affirm.
In its declaratory action the plaintiff seeks a determination of its rights as to racing dates allocated to horse tracks and to have Section 550.081(3), Florida Statutes 1947, F.S.A., declared unconstitutional.
The defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a cause of action in that the
Page 752
complaint on its face sets forth and alleges affirmatively that the matters sought in the present suit have been previously litigated and are now res judicata, 1 and further assert the complaint reflects no change of condition that would permit the trial court to disregard the prior decision of the Florida Supreme Court.In April of 1948 Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., filed suit for declaratory decree challenging the Act's constitutionality and praying a declaration of rights under the aforesaid statute. Hialeah moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion. Hialeah then sought review of the order by petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the Florida Supreme Court. The court granted the writ and quashed the order and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.
In the legislative session of 1947 the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 23728, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, Section 550.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. There were then three horse tracks in the State of Florida located within a radius of one hundred air miles of each other. The annual period of operating such horse tracks was to begin on December first of each year and continue for a period of 120 consecutive days, exclusive of Sundays, and each of the said tracks was permitted to race 40 consecutive racing days, exclusive of Sundays, without any of the said racing periods overlapping each other. The act further provided that the horse track having produced the largest amount of tax revenue during the preceding year of its operation would be granted its choice of the three established racing periods. The horse track having produced the second largest amount of tax revenue during the preceding year would be granted its choice of the remaining two established racing periods and the third track would receive the remaining racing period not selected by the other two.
In the year preceding the enactment of Section 550.081, Florida Statutes 1947, F.S.A., and up to the present date, Hialeah Race Course, Inc., has conducted its racing meet during the so-called 'middle dates,' which dates historically have produced the largest total amount of wagering or largest handle, and the largest amount of tax revenue for the state.
The Declaratory Judgments Act, as stated in Chapter 87, Florida Statutes 1965 (now...
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Bradsheer v. Dept. of Highway Safety, No. 1D07-6610.
...(citing Cyn-co, Inc. v. Lancto, 677 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). See also Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) ("The test of sufficiency of a complaint in such a proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the pla......
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Bondu v. Gurvich, Nos. 81-968
...in the first action. Florida is in accord with this viewpoint." Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), quoted with approval in Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Racing Ass'n, 245 So.2d 625 (Fla.1971) (emphasis supplie......
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AMEC CIVIL LLC. v. State of Fla., No. 1D09-1211.
...of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action. 210 So.2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), aff'd 245 So.2d 625, 628 (Fla.1971). DOT's breaches of contract are not "based on a single group of operative f......
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AMEC Civil, LLC v. State Department of Transportation, Case No. 1D09-1211 (Fla. App. 4/20/2010), Case No. 1D09-1211.
...of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action. 210 So. 2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), aff'd 245 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1971). DOT's breaches of contract are not "based on a single group of operativ......
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Bradsheer v. Dept. of Highway Safety, No. 1D07-6610.
...(citing Cyn-co, Inc. v. Lancto, 677 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). See also Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) ("The test of sufficiency of a complaint in such a proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintif......
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Bondu v. Gurvich, Nos. 81-968
...allegations in the first action. Florida is in accord with this viewpoint." Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, 210 So.2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), quoted with approval in Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Racing Ass'n, 245 So.2d 625 (Fla.1971) (emphasis ......
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AMEC CIVIL LLC. v. State of Fla., No. 1D09-1211.
...of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action. 210 So.2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), aff'd 245 So.2d 625, 628 (Fla.1971). DOT's breaches of contract are not "based on a single group of operative facts,......
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AMEC Civil, LLC v. State Department of Transportation, Case No. 1D09-1211 (Fla. App. 4/20/2010), Case No. 1D09-1211.
...of the respective parties, the issues are no longer the same and the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of the second action. 210 So. 2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), aff'd 245 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1971). DOT's breaches of contract are not "based on a single group of operative fac......