Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n

Decision Date23 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 1963,1963
Citation210 So.2d 750
PartiesHIALEAH RACE COURSE, INC., and Tropical Park, Inc., Appellants, v. GULFSTREAM PARK RACING ASSOCIATION, Inc., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

William C. Lantaff and John H. Wahl, Jr., of Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Carson & Wahl, Miami, for appellant, Hialeah Race Course, Inc.

Robert G. Worley and Lee M. Worley, of Worley, Gautier & Patterson, Miami, for appellant, Tropical Park, Inc.

Leonard Romanik, of Landefeld & Romanik, Hollywood, and Ford L. Thompson, of Starry & Thompson, Tallahassee, for appellee, Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n, Inc.

CROSS, Judge.

Appellants-defendants, Hialeah Race Course, Inc., and Tropical Park, Inc., by interlocutory appeal seek review of an order denying their motion to dismiss appellee-plaintiff's, Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., complaint in a declaratory judgment action. We affirm.

In its declaratory action the plaintiff seeks a determination of its rights as to racing dates allocated to horse tracks and to have Section 550.081(3), Florida Statutes 1947, F.S.A., declared unconstitutional.

The defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a cause of action in that the complaint on its face sets forth and alleges affirmatively that the matters sought in the present suit have been previously litigated and are now res judicata, 1 and further assert the complaint reflects no change of condition that would permit the trial court to disregard the prior decision of the Florida Supreme Court.

In April of 1948 Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., filed suit for declaratory decree challenging the Act's constitutionality and praying a declaration of rights under the aforesaid statute. Hialeah moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion. Hialeah then sought review of the order by petition for a writ of certiorari filed in the Florida Supreme Court. The court granted the writ and quashed the order and upheld the constitutionality of the Act.

In the legislative session of 1947 the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 23728, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, Section 550.081, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. There were then three horse tracks in the State of Florida located within a radius of one hundred air miles of each other. The annual period of operating such horse tracks was to begin on December first of each year and continue for a period of 120 consecutive days, exclusive of Sundays, and each of the said tracks was permitted to race 40 consecutive racing days, exclusive of Sundays, without any of the said racing periods overlapping each other. The act further provided that the horse track having produced the largest amount of tax revenue during the preceding year of its operation would be granted its choice of the three established racing periods. The horse track having produced the second largest amount of tax revenue during the preceding year would be granted its choice of the remaining two established racing periods and the third track would receive the remaining racing period not selected by the other two.

In the year preceding the enactment of Section 550.081, Florida Statutes 1947, F.S.A., and up to the present date, Hialeah Race Course, Inc., has conducted its racing meet during the so-called 'middle dates,' which dates historically have produced the largest total amount of wagering or largest handle, and the largest amount of tax revenue for the state.

The Declaratory Judgments Act, as stated in Chapter 87, Florida Statutes 1965 (now Chapter 86, F.S.1967, F.S.A.) is to settle and to afford relief from insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status and other equitable or legal relations; and the Act itself is to be 'liberally administered and construed.' Upon a motion to dismiss, predicated upon insufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action entitling the pleader to declaratory relief, all well pleaded allegations must be taken as true. The test of sufficiency of a complaint in such a proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. 9 Fla.Jur., Declaratory Actions, § 47. Thus, sustaining of the adequacy of the complaint only lays the foundation for the case to be heard upon its merits and does not connote a determination as to who should prevail.

The test recognized in this state of whether or not a complaint will give rise to a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Act inquires whether or not the party seeking a declaration shows that he is in doubt or is uncertain as to existence or non-existence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege and has an actual, practical and present need for a declaration. There must be a bona fide controversy, justiciable in the sense that it flows out of some definite and concrete assertion of right, and there should be involved the legal or equitable relations of parties having adverse interests with respect to which the declaration is sought. Colby v. Colby, Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 797; May v. Holley, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 636; Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 1946, 157 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808; 9 Fla.Jur., Declaratory Actions, §§ 8 and 9.

We now turn to examine the complaint for the purpose of determining the correctness of the chancellor's order. From the complaint it appears that Gulfstream Park, Hialeah Park, Inc., and Tropical Park, Inc., are each holders of permits and licenses authorized to conduct horse racing with parimutuel wagering, at the respective locations of each in Dade and Broward Counties. The complaint goes on to allege the history of F.S. Section 550.081, F.S.A., and further alleges that in the year preceding the enactment of F.S. § 550.081, F.S.A., and thereafter, Hialeah conducted its racing meets during the so-called 'middle dates,' which dates historically have produced the largest amount of wagering or the 'largest handle' and therefore the largest amount of tax revenue for the...

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