Hiatt v. Trucking, Inc., 18231
Decision Date | 28 February 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 18231,18231 |
Citation | 103 N.E.2d 915,122 Ind.App. 411 |
Parties | HIATT v. TRUCKING, Inc. et al. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert L. Smith, Portland, John A. Resler, Portland, John D. Wilson, Winchester, E. Earl Robbins, Centerville, (Keith Fraser, Portland, of counsel), for appellant.
Harlan, Brubaker & Harlan, Richmond, Livengood & Livengood, Richmond, Brown & Edwards, New Castle, Bowen, Mendenhall & Hunter, Winchester (Harlan, Brubaker & Harlan and Russell H. Schussler, all of Richmond, of counsel), for appellees.
Appellant brought this action to recover damages for alleged property damage resulting from a collision between a car owned and operated by appellant and a truck owned by Trucking, Incorporated, and Ralph Winters, which truck was being operated by appellee, Charles Rey Hull. The truck driver filed his counter-claim against appellant, alleging damages for personal injuries.
The complaint and counter-claim were put at issue by answers. There was a trial by a jury which resulted in a verdict of $6,000 for personal injuries on appellee Hull's counter-claim. From a judgment on this verdict an appeal was taken.
Appellee's counter-claim alleges in part as follows:
'1. That on May 18, 1944, at about 9:30 o'clock, p. m., this defendant was engaged in the operation of a White tractor-trailer motor truck, going in a westerly direction along and upon U. S. Highway No. 40, a public highway in said county and state, approaching a point in said highway where the same is intersected by Third Street in the town of Centerville, said county and state; that at said time the plaintiff was upon said highway driving and operating his 1937 Ford Tudor Sedan automobile going west and in front of the motor truck so driven by this defendant; that the motor vehicles so driven by the respective parties were being driven at approximately fifteen to eighteen miles per hour; that immediately before the plaintiff reached said intersection, without warning or signal of any kind, he drove his said automobile to the left so that the left wheels were across and south of the middle dividing line of said street at a point and in which position the plaintiff, without warning or signal of any kind, suddenly, negligently, carelessly, unlawfully, abruptly and sharply turned his automobile to the right and in front of and into the path of the said tractor-trailer then being driven by this defendant; the plaintiff then intended to go north on said Third Street from said intersection, although from his manner of driving his automobile it appeared to this defendant, and would appear to any prudent person, that the plaintiff was about to turn south in said intersection and to his left. That the instant this defendant observed plaintiff turning his automobile into the path of defendant's truck this defendant turned to the right in an effort to avoid a collision; that plaintiff then and there ran his automobile into said tractor-trailer of defendant, causing defendant to lose control thereof, which tractor-trailer ran up, against and over the curbing at the north west corner of said intersection striking and breaking off a utility pole there located and causing said tractor-trailer to continue and strike a large tree approximately six feet to the west of said utility pole, all of said acts of collision being continuous in character and all due to the carelessness and negligence of plaintiff as aforesaid.
'2. That as a result of the aforementioned collision between plaintiff's said automobile and said tractor-trailer driven by this defendant said tractor-trailer unit was entirely and completely demolished and the cab portion of said tractor-trailer wrecked in such a manner that this defendant was helplessly pinned in and under said wreckage for a period of approximately forty-five minutes before he could be extricated therefrom.
The assignment of error questions the court's ruling in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. The grounds in said motion were: The verdict of the jury is contrary to law; the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and, the court erred in admitting evidence over the objection of the plaintiff, in that the witness Lewis Bond, a witness produced by the defendant, Hull, upon the direct examination of the said Lewis Bond, and after he had testified that he was the first person to arrive at the scene of the collision, that other people came up almost instantly; that he learned that the defendant, Hull, was in the cab of the truck. The witness, Bond, was then asked by the counsel for the defendants--'What did he (Hull) say?' to which question counsel for the plaintiff objected as follows, 'I object; it is hearsay evidence and no part of the res gestae', which objection was overruled by the court, and the said Lewis Bond answered as follows, 'He wanted to let his wife and children know and as also he said 'Why did that man turn in front of me.'' Thereupon counsel for the plaintiff moved to strike out the answer, which was also overruled by the court.
On appeal, when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned, we do not weigh the evidence, but we examine the record to see if there is any evidence, or any reasonable or logical inference which may be drawn from the evidence, which if believed by the jury would sustain the verdict. Kempf v. Himsel, 1951, 121 Ind.App. 488, 98 N.E.2d 200; Gamble v. Lewis, 1949, 227 Ind. 455, 85 N.E.2d 629.
Hull testified in substance as follows:
Cross-Ex...
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