Hickam v. Segars

• Decision Date: 27 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3:12–cv–00964.
• Citation: 905 F.Supp.2d 835
• Parties: Wade HICKAM, as Owner of the 2004 See–Doo, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, Plaintiff, v. Terry SEGARS, Jr. and All Other Potential Parties, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

905 F.Supp.2d 835

Wade HICKAM, as Owner of the 2004 See–Doo, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, Plaintiff,

v.Terry SEGARS, Jr. and All Other Potential Parties, Defendants.

Civil No. 3:12–cv–00964.

United States District Court,

M.D. Tennessee,

Nashville Division.

Nov. 27, 2012.

John Thomas Feeney, III, Feeney & Murray, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Clinton L. Kelly, Kelly, Kelly & Allman, Hendersonville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, District Judge.

Defendant Terry Segars, Jr. has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (Docket No. 18), to which the plaintiff, Wade Hickam, has filed a Response in opposition (Docket No. 20). Segars has also filed a Motion to Dissolve Injunction (Docket No. 19), to which Hickam has filed a Response in opposition (Docket No. 21). Hickam has also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 23), which Segars has not opposed.

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted, this case will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Motion to Dissolve Injunction will be granted, and the Motion to Amend will be denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

This case relates to an incident that occurred on May 20, 2012, in which Segars was injured in an accident involving a “Sea Doo” brand jet ski (“Sea Doo”) owned by Hickam. As a result of injuries sustained in that accident, Segars filed an action against Hickam (among others) in Tennessee state court. See Terry S. Segars, Jr. v. Jon Daniel Burchfield, et al., Docket No. 2012–CV–1054 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 3, 2012).

After Segars filed the state court action, Hickam filed this lawsuit to seek the protections afforded to vessel owners under the Limitation of Liability Act (“Limitation Act”), 46 U.S.C. § 30505 et seq. (2012), which, under certain conditions, limits a claimant's recovery against a vessel owner to the value of the vessel. Hickam alleged that this court had jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1333 ( i.e., traditional admiralty jurisdiction), and/or (2) the Limitation Act itself. Pursuant to the Limitation Act and Supplemental Admiralty Rule F, Hickam posted a deposit reflecting the asserted value of the jet ski (Docket No. 8) and the court, upon Hickam's motion, issued a Notice to Potential Claimants (Docket No. 14) and issued an injunction staying the state court action (Docket No. 16).¹

Segars has moved the court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the case, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, Segars argues that (1) the case does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and (2) the Limitation Act does not provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In response, Hickam argues that the Limitation Act provides an independent basis for jurisdiction and that, even if it does not, the case satisfies the traditional requirements for admiralty jurisdiction.

Hickam has also filed a Motion for Leave to file a First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint simply appears to add Victoria Hickam—Hickam's daughter—as a party plaintiff, on the basis that she, along with Hickam, “qualifies as an owner of the [jet ski]” for purposes of this action. ( See Docket No. 23, Ex. A, First Am. Compl. at ¶ 2.) These amended allegations do not impact the court's analysis of the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs dismissals of lawsuits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss ... generally come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack.” Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin–Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir.2007). A “facial attack” challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations, in which all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true; and a “factual attack” challenges the actual fact of subject matter jurisdiction, which is analyzed under summary judgment standards. Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir.2007). When considering a factual attack upon the court's jurisdiction, the court may weigh the evidence, and no presumption of truth applies to the plaintiff's factual allegations. Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330. “When a factual attack, also known as a ‘speaking motion,’ raises a factual controversy, the district court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter [jurisdiction] does or does not exist.” Id. “In its review, the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve jurisdictional facts.” Id.

When subject matter jurisdiction has been challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion. Wisecarver v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747, 749 (6th Cir.2007). Here, Segars characterizes his challenge as a “factual attack” ( see Docket No. 18 at p. 3), in support of which he has filed an uncontroverted affidavit on his own behalf (Docket No. 18, Ex. A). By contrast, notwithstanding his burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction, Hickam has not filed any evidentiary materials on his own behalf. Neither party has sought leave to conduct discovery or to have a hearing on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the court will rule on the evidentiary record before it, which consists solely of the uncontroverted facts stated in the Segars Affidavit.

I. Background Facts

On May 20, 2012, Hickam's daughter and several other “young adults,” including Jon Daniel Burchfield, Christopher Luke Wilson, and Tristan Lane, gathered on the shore of Old Hickory Lake in Gallatin, Tennessee. In an area between Burchfield's home and the shore of the lake, the Burchfield family had constructed an “earthen ramp” that rose towards the lake shore. The young adults were using the ramp as a take-off point for an inner tube that they had tethered to the Sea Doo, which was acting as a tow for the inner tube. One or more individuals would sit in the inner tube on the shore ( i.e., on land) while an individual operating the Sea Doo (located in the water) would pull the inner tube up the ramp towards the lake shore. The individuals using the inner tube were then projected airborne off the ramp and would land in the water near the shoreline. The area near the shoreline was shallow enough that, after landing, individuals launched up the ramp in the inner tube could stand up.

One of these “launch” attempts resulted in an unfortunate accident. While Lane and Segars sat on the inner tube, Wilson began driving the Sea Doo to pull the tether, thereby pulling the tether taut. However, suddenly and without warning, the tether snapped at the end closest to the Sea Doo and sprang back at high tension toward the inner tube, which was still located on land. The high tension tether struck Segars across the face and caused him significant injuries, including the loss of one eye and partial loss of vision in the other eye, facial fractures, and a fractured clavicle.

Segars sued the Burchfields (Jon Daniel Burchfield and his parents), Hickam, and Wilson in Tennessee state court, asserting negligence-based theories of liability. According to the state court complaint filed by Segars and the Complaint filed by Hickam here, Hickam was the record owner of the jet ski at the time of the incident.²

ANALYSIS

I. Two Potential Bases for Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution vests federal courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Pursuant to this grant of authority, Congress has granted federal district courts original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2012).³ To determine whether a case is subject to a federal court's admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333, the court must find that (1) the alleged tort occurred on or over “navigable waters” (commonly referred to as the “location test”); and (2) the activity giving rise to the incident had a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity, such that the incident had a potentially disruptive influence on maritime commerce (commonly referred to as the “connection test”). Jerome Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 538–540, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995).

Admiralty and maritime law includes provisions setting forth a host of special rights, duties, and procedures. Lewis & Clark Marine, 531 U.S. at 446, 121 S.Ct. 993. Among these provisions is the Limitation Act, which allows a vessel owner “to limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the owner's privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the owner's interest in the vessel.” Id.; see also In re Muer, 146 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.1998). Hickam argues that, regardless of whether admiralty jurisdiction exists under § 1333, the Limitation Act provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.

II. Limitation Act as an Independent Basis for Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court has expressly declined to address whether the Limitation Act provides an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 359, n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990). In Sisson v. Ruby, the owner of a boat had argued—as does Hickam here—that federal courts retained admiralty jurisdiction over his case both under § 1333 and under the Limitation Act independently. The Court ultimately held that the case was subject to admiralty jurisdiction under § 1333. With respect to the Limitation Act issue, the Court stated the following in Footnote 1 to the opinion:

Sisson has also argued throughout this litigation that the [Limitation Act] provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Respondents contend that...