Hickingbottom v. Dugan
| Decision Date | 20 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21A-CT-2085 |
| Parties | Michael D. Hickingbottom, Appellant-Defendant, v. Charles Dugan, et al., Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court The Honorable Robert E Hunley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-1904-CT-204
APPELLANT PRO SE Michael D. Hickingbottom Carlisle, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Aaron T. Craft Deputy Attorney General Frances Barrow Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] Michael D. Hickingbottom, an inmate at the Wabash Correctional Facility, filed a pro se complaint against six Indiana Department of Correction employees (collectively, the DOC), alleging various violations of federal and state law. After the trial court denied his third request for an extension of time to respond to the DOC's motion for summary judgment and granted the summary judgment motion, Hickingbottom filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. He appeals, pro se, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting him an extension of time.
[¶2] We affirm.
[¶3] Hickingbottom filed his complaint against the DOC on April 3, 2019. The complaint alleged that he had been in administrative restrictive status housing[1]for six months and that he was not given required periodic meaningful review to determine whether the reasons for his placement in segregation still existed, which he asserted violated the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Articles 11 and 13 of the Indiana Constitution. The DOC filed a motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2021.
[¶4] On March 8, 2021, Hickingbottom filed a "Motion to Deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Until Plaintiff Is Done With Deposing the Defendant Witnesses." Appellees' Appendix at 37. And on March 15, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment," asking for an additional ninety days and stating that he "can have his Response . . . filed on or before June 10, 2021." Id. at 40-41. On March 18, the trial court granted Hickingbottom an extension of time Id. at 42.
[¶5] On June 10, Hickingbottom filed "Plaintiff's Second Request for An Extension of Time to Reply," explaining that he needed additional time due to pending discovery requests and motions, and he requested an additional forty-five to ninety days. Id. at 75. On June 18, the trial court granted Hickingbottom's request for additional time, giving him thirty days from the date of the order - that is, by July 18 - to file his response (the June 18 Order).
[¶6] On June 23, Hickingbottom filed "Plaintiff's Motion to Respond to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgement Until After Plaintiff Take [sic] The Deposition of the Defendants," in which he explained various issues he was encountering with hiring a court reporter. Id. at 84.
[¶7] On July 21, Hickingbottom filed Plaintiff's Final Motion for a 10 Day Extension to Reply to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Third Request), explaining that the prison toilet had overflowed and his exhibits and other legal documents that were in a box on the floor were soaked with urine and fecal material, and he asked the court to "to extend his deadline to 7/28/21." Appellant's Appendix at 25.
[¶8] On July 27, the trial court issued an order denying Hickingbottom's Third Request. That same day, the trial court summarily granted the DOC's motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, on July 29, Hickingbottom filed a "Reply to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and [] Cross-Mo[tion] for Summary Judgement on All Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims." Appellees' Appendix at 99.
[¶9] On August 4, Hickingbottom filed a motion to correct error. His motion asserted that the court's July 27 order denying his request for a ten-day extension of time was in error. Hickingbottom's motion claimed, incorrectly, that on March 18, 2021, the court gave him until "7/20/21 to depose the witnesses and respond to defendant's summary judgement motion" [2] and that, based on various trial rules, he timely filed his Third Request before the July 20 deadline.[3] Id. at 29.
[¶10] On August 16, Hickingbottom filed a second motion to correct error to which he attached forms reflecting that he had submitted grievances to DOC personnel in June 2021 about the overflowing toilets and destroyed documents, as well as requests to case managers in July 2021 to allow him to repurchase classification hearing forms and review forms that were necessary for his response to the DOC's summary judgment motion.
[¶11] On August 19, 2021, the court issued an order regarding Hickingbottom's Reply and Cross-Motion:
This Court granted [Hickingbottom] an Extension of time in which to Respond to [the DOC's] Motion for Summary Judgment on June 18, 2021 that allowed him 30 days in which to respond, making the deadline July 18, 2021. The Court notes that [Hickingbottom] did not respond in a timely matter and the [DOC]'s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on July 27, 2021 making [Hickingbottom]'s . . . Reply . . . and [Cross-Motion] moot.
Id. at 23 (emphases added). On September 22, 2021, the trial court denied Hickingbottom's August 16 motion to correct error.
[¶12] Hickingbottom now appeals.[4]
[¶13] Initially, we observe that Hickingbottom is proceeding pro se. Basic v Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
[¶14] Hickingbottom appeals after a denial of a motion correct error. A trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[5] Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.
[¶15] Hickingbottom's motion to correct error alleged that the trial court should have granted his Third Request, which sought an additional ten days to file a response to the DOC's motion for summary judgment. A trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a request for extension of time, and its decision will not be overturned absent clear abuse of that discretion. Scott v. Corcoran, 135 N.E.3d 931, 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
[¶16] As is relevant to this appeal, Hickingbottom filed his second request for extension of time on June 10, 2021. The court issued the June 18 Order granting Hickingbottom an additional thirty days, until July 18, to respond. Hickingbottom's Third Request was filed on July 21, which was three days after the deadline set by the court.
[¶17] Hickingbottom claims that the trial court's determination that his Third Request was untimely was contrary to Ind. Trial Rule 56(I), which states:
[¶18] Our courts have considered the various provisions of T.R. 56 and have established the following "bright-line rule":
[W]here a nonmoving party fails to respond within thirty days by either (1) filing affidavits showing issues of material fact, (2) filing his own affidavit under Rule 56(F) indicating why the facts necessary to justify his opposition are unavailable, or (3) requesting an extension of time in which to file his response under 56(I), the trial court lacks discretion to permit the party to thereafter file a response. In other words, a trial court may exercise discretion and alter time limits under 56(I) only if the nonmoving party has responded or sought an extension of time within thirty days from the date the moving party filed for summary judgment.
Desai v. Croy, 805 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied; see also HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 2008) (quoting and applying Desai); Handy v. P.C. Building Materials, Inc., 22 N.E.3d 603, 606-07 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (same), trans. denied.
[¶19] Our court has further explained:
The rationale behind the rule requiring a nonmoving party to respond to a motion for summary judgment-by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F)-within thirty days does not vanish because the trial court has happened to grant one extension of time. That is, the nonmoving party should not be rewarded and relieved from the restriction of responding within the time limit set by the court because he or she has had the good fortune of one enlargement of time. Therefore, any response, including a subsequent motion for enlargement of time, must be made within the additional period granted by the trial court. The rationale of HomEq and the cases leading up to it are not restricted to the initial thirty-day period following the filing of a motion for summary judgment.
Miller v. Yedlowski, 916 N.E.2d 246, 251-52 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied (...
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