Hickman v. The City of New York
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19 Civ. 5292 (KPF) |
| Parties | QUANDELL HICKMAN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Quandell Hickman (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his confinement in the New York City Department of Correction's Manhattan Detention Center (“MDC”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of New York (“Defendant” or the “City”) violated his constitutional rights by installing cameras that point directly into the showers in the housing areas of the MDC. The City has moved, unopposed for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND[1]
At the time the Complaint was filed in this action, Plaintiff was a convicted and sentenced inmate held in the MDC. (Compl. ¶ III). Plaintiff alleges that, throughout his period of confinement, a camera pointed directly towards and into the shower in his MDC housing unit. (Id. at ¶ V). Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result, staff could watch the video recordings “as many times as they want” without inmates' consent. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, every housing unit in the MDC had a similar camera in the shower area. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that, by maintaining cameras in the shower areas of the MDC, the City invaded Plaintiff's right to privacy and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks $500, 000 in damages for his pain and suffering, as well as injunctive relief in the form of immediate removal of the cameras. (Id. at ¶ VI).
Plaintiff filed his request to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. #1) and his pro se Complaint (Dkt. # 2) on June 4, 2019, in which Complaint he named as defendants both the City and the MDC. In its Order of Service issued on July 16, 2019, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the MDC. (Dkt. #5). On October 15, 2019, the City filed its Answer to the Complaint, denying Plaintiff's allegations and asserting, inter alia, that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Dkt. #11). The Court held an initial pretrial conference on February 3, 2020 (Minute Entry for February 3, 2020), and issued a Civil Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order the same day (Dkt. #17).
After several extensions, the parties completed fact discovery on October 15, 2020. (Dkt. #39). The Court held a second pretrial conference on October 29, 2020. (Minute Entry for October 29, 2020). On December 16, 2020, the City filed a request for leave to submit a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Dkt. #43), which request Plaintiff declined to oppose. On January 15, 2021, the Court granted the City's request for leave to file its motion. (Dkt. #48).
The City filed its motion and supporting memorandum of law on February 16, 2021. (Dkt. #49-50). Plaintiff's opposition to the City's motion was due on April 1, 2021. (Dkt. #48). However, to date, Plaintiff has not submitted an opposition and has not responded to the Court's several inquiries regarding his intent to oppose to such motion. (See Dkt. #52). Accordingly, the Court deems the motion fully briefed and ripe for resolution.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Courts evaluate motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) using the same standard as for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 786 F.3d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, courts are to “draw all reasonable inferences in [the non-movant's] favor, ‘assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)). The non-movant is entitled to relief if he or she alleges “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) .
On a Rule 12(c) motion, the court considers “the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). “A complaint is [also] deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are ‘integral' to the complaint.” Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002)).
“‘Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.'” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)). Additionally, the “Twombly plausibility standard ... does not prevent a plaintiff from pleading facts alleged ‘upon information and belief' where the facts are peculiarly within the possession and control of the defendant, or where the belief is based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Lefkowitz v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, 23 F.Supp.3d 344, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has instructed that “[a] district court should not dismiss a claim ‘unless it is satisfied that the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.'” Id. () ).
“A plaintiff's failure to respond to a motion for judgment on the pleadings does not dictate dismissal of a complaint.” Ismael v. City of New York, No. 17 Civ. 1825 (AJN), 2018 WL 4757950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018). “Rather, ‘if the pleadings are themselves sufficient to withstand dismissal, a pro se complaint will not be dismissed simply because the complainant failed to respond to a Rule 12(c) motion.'” Id. (quoting Nauss v. Barnhart, 155 Fed.Appx. 539, 540 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order)).
“[Section 1983] creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: “[i] the defendant acted under color of state law; and [ii] as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of her federal statutory rights, or her constitutional rights or privileges.” Annis v. Cty. of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998).
There are particular pleading requirements occasioned by Plaintiff's request for damages under this statute. “As a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations.” Vassallo v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 7125 (KPF), 2016 WL 6902478, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (citing Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010)). To show personal involvement, a plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Plaintiff alleges that the City's installation of cameras pointed towards the shower area in the MDC violated his right to privacy and inflicted emotional distress. (Compl. ¶ V). The City argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for (i) any violation of his constitutional rights, including his right to privacy; (ii) municipal liability against the City; and (iii) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Def. Br. 1). The Court addresses each in turn.
Plaintiff first claims that the placement of cameras in the shower area of his housing unit was an “invasion of his privacy.” (Compl. ¶ V). The Court construes this as a claim that the alleged video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches. This Court and others faced with similar challenges have concluded that such surveillance generally does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and the Court sees no reason to depart from that position in this case. The Court therefore agrees with the City that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable constitutional claim.
“The Fourth Amendment guarantees ‘the right of the...
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