Hickory Grill v. Admiral Trading Corp.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr.
• Citation: Hickory Grill v. Admiral Trading Corp., 14 N.J.Super. 1, 81 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1951)
• Decision Date: 16 May 1951
• Docket Number: A--159,Nos. A--143,s. A--143
• Parties: HICKORY GRILL, Inc. v. ADMIRAL TRADING CORP. ADMIRAL TRADING CORP. v. HICKORY GRILL, Inc.

Page 1

14 N.J.Super. 1

81 A.2d 187

HICKORY GRILL, Inc. v. ADMIRAL TRADING CORP.

ADMIRAL TRADING CORP. v. HICKORY GRILL, Inc.

Nos. A--143, A--159.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued May 7, 1951.

Decided May 16, 1951.

Max L. Rosenstein, Newark, argued the cause for appellant.

William Harris, Newark, argued the cause for respondent; and Alexander Krauss, Newark, argued the cause for Merritt Lane, Jr., receiver in bankruptcy of respondent.

Before Judges McGEEHAN, JAYNE and WM. J. BRENNAN, Jr.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., J.A.D.

Admiral Trading Corp. entered judgment in the Law Division on September 23, 1950, by bond and warrant for confession of judgment, against Hickory Grill, Inc., in the amount of $45,660.43 plus interest, from July 18, 1950. Hickory Grill, Inc., brought proceedings to vacate the judgment. The proceedings were initiated by complaint filed in the Chancery Division, but after transfer of that cause to the Law Division, Hickory Grill, Inc. made a motion in the original cause, under Rule 3:60--2, for relief from the judgment. The Law Division entered an order in the original cause on November 21, 1950, that the judgment and a levy made thereunder stand, but that further proceedings to complete execution thereon be stayed, 'All pending a determination, after trial of the issue, of the amount, if any, that is owing from Hickory Grill, Inc., to Admiral Trading Corporation and whether there is sufficient cause to open the judgment obtained in this cause and upon such determination the judgment and execution shall be amended or opened to conform therewith.' Admiral Trading Corp. appeals from that order.

A few days before the oral argument was originally scheduled in this court, Hickory Grill, Inc., filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. A receiver in bankruptcy has been appointed. We have entered a consent order adding the receiver as a party, and permitted the receiver's attorney to argue the appeal in association with the attorney of record for Hickory Grill, Inc.

The bond was given May 31, 1949, to evidence an obligation of $59,750 of Hickory Grill, Inc., to Admiral Trading Corp. payable: '$500.00 on June 6th, 1949, and $500.00 each week thereafter for a period of 93 weeks; $150.00 on June 7th, 1949, and $150.00 each week thereafter for a period of 52 weeks; and $150.00 on June 8th, 1949, and $150.00 each week thereafter for a period of 31 weeks (said installments being evidenced by promissory notes dated May 16th, 1949) * * *.'

The attack in the Law Division upon the judgment centered upon the affidavit for judgment sworn to by the secretary of Admiral Trading Corp. and filed in purported compliance with R.S. 2:27--275, N.J.S.A. That affidavit stated that Hickory Grill, Inc., had defaulted in the terms and conditions of the bond and owed, as of the date of the affidavit, a total of $45,660.43, with interest; and that the debt or demand is justly and honestly due and owing to Admiral Trading Corp., in whose favor the judgment is confessed.'

Judgments such as this by bond and warrant of attorney, without institution of suit, derive all their efficacy from statutory law and strict compliance with statutory requirements is necessary. Modern Security Co. of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 142 A. 649, 6 N.J.Misc. 730 (Sup.Ct.1928). If the affidavit upon which a confessed judgment is entered fails in any respect substantially to comply with the requirements of R.S. 2:27--275, N.J.S.A., the judgment, being entered against the prohibition of the statute, 'is, Prima facie, wholly fraudulent, and the burden of rebutting and overcoming the inference of fraud lies upon the party who seeks to uphold the transaction.' Warwick v. Petty, 44 N.J.L. 542 (Sup.Ct.1882). Relief from the judgment may be allowed not alone on the application of creditors of the defendant but 'at the instance even of the defendant.' Fortune B. & L. Ass'n v. Codomo, 122 N.J.L. 565, 7 A.2d 880, 881 (Sup.Ct.1938). Our courts of law have always exercised an equitable jurisdiction over judgments entered by warrants of attorney, Barrow v. Bispham, 11 N.J.L. 110 (Sup.Ct.1828). '* * * These judgments entered upon bonds and warrants of attorney should, upon proper application, be very readily and widely opened, for the method in which they are entered is the loosest way of binding a man's property that ever was devised in any civilized country,' Chief Justice Kirkpatrick in Diament v. Alderman, 7 N.J.L. 197 (Sup.Ct.1824).

The matter was argued in the Law Division on affidavits and counter-affidavits. The gist of the affidavits on the part of Hickory Grill, Inc., was that at the time of the making of the affidavit for judgment there was not owing to Admiral Trading Corp. an amount of $45,660.43, because payments on account of the $59,750 obligation under the bond had been made in the amount of $37,543.43, and the sum of $2,000 was not owing Admiral Trading Corp. but was owing to another to whom Admiral had assigned some of the notes; thus, that the maximum owing in any circumstances was not in excess of the sum of $20,206.57,...