Hicks v. City of Vallejo

• Decision Date: 30 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2:14-cv-0669 DB PS,2:14-cv-0669 DB PS
• Parties: TYRONE EDWARD HICKS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

TYRONE EDWARD HICKS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF VALLEJO, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-0669 DB PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

January 30, 2017

ORDER

This matter came before the court on July 13, 2016, for the hearing of defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.¹ (ECF No. 106.) Plaintiff's third amended complaint alleges, generally, that plaintiff was subjected to unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, excessive force, and the unlawful impoundment of his vehicle. Assistant City Attorney Kelly Trujillo appeared on behalf of the defendants. Plaintiff Tyrone Hicks appeared on his own behalf. After hearing oral argument, defendants' motion was taken under submission.²

Having reviewed defendants' motion, the documents filed in support and opposition, and the arguments made at the July 13, 2016 hearing, defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part. In this regard, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

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PARTIES' UNDISPUTED FACTS

On March 30, 2012, the vehicle plaintiff was driving was stopped by Vallejo Police Department officer Sean Kenney and Cpl. Postolaki, ("defendant officers"), in the city of Vallejo. The defendant officers spoke with plaintiff and his passenger. Plaintiff was arrested for possession of cocaine base for sale, in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 1131.5, and transportation of a controlled substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code § 11352. Those charges, however, were dismissed after plaintiff agreed to a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754 (Cal. 1979), as part of separate criminal case.³ (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' SUDF (ECF No. 102) 1, 5, 15, 16, 17.⁴)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 12, 2014, by filing a complaint along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 3.) Plaintiff is proceeding on the third amended complaint filed May 21, 2015. (ECF No. 33.) Therein, plaintiff alleges that defendants Kenney and Postolaki subjected plaintiff to unlawful seizure, unlawful search, unlawful arrest, excessive force, and the unlawful impoundment of his vehicle. (3rd Am. Compl. (ECF No. 27) at 5.⁵) The Third amended complaint also alleges that defendant "City of Vallejo has a longstanding, practice, policy or custom of allowing police officers to use excessive force." (Id. at 6.)

On June 26, 2015, defendants' answer filed May 6, 2015, was deemed the answer to plaintiff's third amended complaint. (ECF No. 33.) On June 8, 2016, defendants filed the pending motion for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 96.) On June 29, 2016 plaintiff filed an unsigned opposition and a response to defendants' statement of undisputed facts. (ECF Nos. 101& 102.) Plaintiff filed a signed opposition on July 5, 2016. (ECF No. 104.) Defendants filed a reply on July 6, 2016. (ECF No. 105.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party "initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by showing that such materials "do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, "the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment . . . is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish theexistence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citations omitted).

"In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact," the court draws "all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party." Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). It is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

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ANALYSIS

I. Unlawful Seizure

The third amended complaint alleges that the defendant officers stopped plaintiff "without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a . . . traffic violation." (ECF No. 27 at 7.) A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). The Constitution protects individuals "against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 810. "[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. "The fact that the alleged traffic violation is a pretext for the stop is irrelevant, so long as the objective circumstances justify the stop." United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Here, defendants have offered evidence that plaintiff's vehicle was stopped because it "was traveling in the opposition traffic lane" and because plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt. (Kenney Decl. (ECF No. 96-4) at 2.) Plaintiff, however, has provided a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, stating that he was not driving "in a manner that would violate any California traffic laws," and was in fact wearing his seatbelt. (Pl.'s Decl. (ECF No. 104) at 9.)

Accordingly, as defense counsel conceded at the July 13, 2016 hearing, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff was stopped without probable cause. See generally Glair v. City of Santa Monica, 649 Fed. Appx. 411, 412-13 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment not appropriate where "while the district court concluded that it was undisputed that Glair placed his hands in his pockets during the stop, Glair stated in his declaration that he never placed his hands in his pockets and that he was not aggressive toward Wilkening").

Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is, therefore, denied as to the third amended complaint's claim of unlawful seizure.

II. Unlawful Search

The third amended complaint alleges that defendant Postolaki "pat searched" plaintiff and that the defendant officers searched plaintiff's vehicle without his consent. (3rd Am. Compl. (ECF No. 27) at 7-8.) Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment asserts that whendefendant "Postolaki first approached plaintiff, plaintiff advised Cpl. Postolaki that he was on parole for possession of cocaine." (Defs.' MSJ (ECF No. 96-1) at 10.) In this regard, defendants note that, in California, parolees of the state prison are subject to search without cause. (Id.) Moreover, defendants...