Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa
| Decision Date | 19 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 7:13-cv-02063-TMP |
| Parties | STEPHANIE HICKS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed November 14, 2014, by the defendant, City of Tuscaloosa ("City"). (Doc. 15). The City seeks dismissal of all of Stephanie Hicks' ("Plaintiff") claims arising from alleged discriminatory treatment she received during and after her pregnancy. This matter has been fully briefed, and the court has considered the evidence and arguments set forth by both parties. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absenceof a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court "shall" grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict:"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-252; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11 (1983).
However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The evidence supporting a claim must be "substantial," Marcus v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 379 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1981); a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004); Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-1250 (11th Cir. 2004). If the non-movant's evidence is so thoroughly discredited by the rest of the record evidence that no reasonable jury could accept it, the evidence fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact requiring a jury determination. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) ( ); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1988). Utilizingthese standards, the court undertakes the analysis of whether the defendant has shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party are as follows. The plaintiff, at all relevant times, worked for the Tuscaloosa Police Department ("TPD") as a patrol officer or on the West Alabama Narcotics Squad. Plaintiff was first hired as a patrol officer, eventually becoming a field training officer. In 2009, she worked temporarily as an undercover agent in the West Alabama Narcotics Squad ("WANS"). Her supervisor at that time was Captain Snyder ("Snyder"). Captain Wayne Robertson ("Robertson") also was assigned WANS at the time. He and the plaintiff got along without conflict. The plaintiff received an Officer Commendation award from Snyder and Robertson on November 10, 2009, in which they praised the plaintiff's job performance. After serving as an undercover agent in WANS, the plaintiff returned to patrol and became a field training officer. Later, Snyder and Sergeant Dortheen Richardson ("Richardson") informed the plaintiff that WANS was looking for a pharmacy diversion investigator, and suggested that she submit a letter of interest if she wanted the position. The plaintiff applied for the position and was selected. She was transferred to WANS on November 18, 2011, and the plaintiff reported for duty on November 21, 2011. At the time of her transfer, the plaintiff was not planning a family, and she did not expect a desk job or limited duties. The plaintiff's title was "investigator," and she primarily worked in pharmaceutical and prescription fraud. When the plaintiff began working for WANS, the only shift was a day shift from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and there were 10-15 agents, includingsupervisors, working in WANS. The agents rotated "on-call" duties after hours and on weekends.
WANS Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") requires agents to have both school and field training. Accordingly, new agents are assigned a field training officer to train new agents in the field. The field training officer checks off categories of training on a Field Training Agent form as the new agent completes training in each area. The WANS Unit Commander evaluates the new agent after three months and again after six months. After the six-month evaluation, the Unit Commander makes a determination as to whether the new agent's progress is acceptable and, if so, the new agent will be added to the on-call list. The new agent would be unable to perform the job without field training. Sgt. Richardson was assigned to be the plaintiff's field training agent from November 21, 2011, to December 13, 2011. During this period, Richardson was in rehabilitation three times per week to rehabilitate an on-the-job injury she had on November 4, 2011. Richardson did not return to work until March 2012. Contrary to procedure, on the plaintiff's first day in WANS, Richardson noted on the Field Training Agent form that the plaintiff was trained in numerous areas of field training. When the plaintiff inquired, Richardson assured her that she would be trained on all of the field training areas later. Some items eventually were covered, such as forms, but some were not, such as case format. The plaintiff already was certified to perform marijuana field tests, but she was not certified on methamphetamine or heroin field tests. She did not receive training on how to obtain a confidential informant, how to get an informant to work, and how to debrief an informant. Sgt. Richardson did not train the plaintiff on the remaining items listed on the Field Training Agent form and never trained the plaintiff on prescription fraud. The Field Training Agent form is the only documentation recording the plaintiff's training.
Later, Sergeant Spencer ("Spencer") was assigned to the plaintiff as her field training agent. Spencer served as the plaintiff's field training agent until he was promoted on December 30, 2011. The plaintiff remembers spending only one day with Spencer before he was promoted. The plaintiff requested to be assigned another field training agent, but never was. The other agents in WANS received training pursuant to the SOP, and kept the same field training officer for the duration...
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