Hicks v. Hatem
Decision Date | 06 April 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 269,269 |
Citation | 289 A.2d 325,265 Md. 260 |
Parties | Georgia I. Bishop HICKS v. Thomas J. HATEM, Receiver for The National Guild Insurance Company. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
William B. Evans, Elkton, for appellant.
C. M. Zacharski, Jr., Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.
This appeal requires us once again to construe the 'household exclusion' clause in an automobile liability insurance policy. The policy in question was issued by The National Guild Insurance Company (Company) to Mr. Charles A. Swanson (the insured), and contained the following familiar exceptions to its coverage:
'* * * This policy does not apply: * * * (b) to bodily injury to (1) the spouse or any parent, son, or daughter of the insured or (2) the named insured, or (3) any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.' (Emphasis Supplied).
Thomas J. Hatem, appellee, as the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland and the appointed receiver of the Company, and Mrs. Georgia I. Bishop, appellant, submitted by way of a request for a declaratory judgment (Code, 1971 Repl. Vol., Art. 31A) the question of whether Mrs. Bishop was eligible for coverage under the policy to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (DuFour, J.) upon the following stipulated statement of facts:
'Charles A. Swanson, RD #5, Elkton, Maryland was insured under National Guild Insurance Company policy No. ACM 29751 an automobile liability policy. On July 5, 1965, while the policy was in effect, Swanson was driving a 1950 Willys station wagon, the insured vehicle. With him as a passenger was one Georgia I. Bishop. The auto driven by Swanson went out of control and struck a bridge abutment. Mrs. Bishop suffered injuries to her right hip and right knee for which she has filed a liquidation claim in the amount of $30,000.
The lower court, in arriving at the conclusion that the 'household exclusion' clause barred a recovery under the policy by the appellant, stated:
'* * * this court finds that irrespective of the absence of consanguinal ties, Georgia Bishop was indeed a member of the family of the insured residing in his household. Their living together ostensibly as man and wife under one head for a period of time exceeding nine years was conducive to cozy and collusive claims; the very object and purpose of the exclusionary provision.
The issue presented on appeal is the interpretation to be given to the word 'family' as used in the 'household exclusion' clause, and, more specifically, whether or not Mrs. Bishop should be considered a 'member of the family' of the insured. The appellant suggests that the word 'family' connotes a blood relationship, and perhaps a marital relationship, existing among individuals, while the appellee would define the term as 'a sociological entity consisting of persons habitually residing under one roof, forming one domestic circle and having a permanent domestic character.' For the purposes of this case, we are not inclined to adopt either definition verbatim. However, for the reasons to be stated we hold that Mrs. Bishop was not a 'member of the family' of the insured.
We initiate the discussion of the question presented with the observation that this Court has long recognized that the word 'family' has a variety of meanings, depending on the manner in which it is employed. See Krug v. Mills, 159 Md. 670, 673, 152 A. 493 (1930); and Pearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 531, 534, 73 A. 141 (1909). Additionally, Judge McWilliams, speaking for the Court in Peninsula Insurance Company v. Knight, 254 Md. 461, 255 A.2d 55 (1969), stated as a general rule for the construction of contracts:
"In the construction of contracts, even more than in the construction of statutes, words which are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage, rather than a restrictive meaning which they may have acquired in legal usage. * * *" 254 Md. at 472-473, 255 A.2d at 61.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged 1966 ed.) defines 'family' as:
* * *.'
It is not until we come upon the seventh meaning attributed to the word 'family' that the interpretation urged by the appellee appears:
'* * * 7. a group of persons who form a household under one head, including parents, children, servants, etc. * * *'
An excerpt from Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged 1961 ed.) discloses a similar definition of 'family':
'* * * 2a: a group of persons of common ancestry. b: a people or group of peoples regarded as deriving from a common stock. 3a: a group of individuals living under one roof....
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