Hicks v. Sec'y, DOC, Case No. 3:11-cv-352-J-39JBT
| Decision Date | 21 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:11-cv-352-J-39JBT |
| Parties | JOSEPH E. HICKS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Joseph E. Hicks filed a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 By a Person in Custody Pursuant to a State Court Judgment (Petition) (Doc. 1) and a Memorandum of Law (Memorandum) (Doc. 3). The Petition challenges a 2003 state court (Duval County) conviction and sentence for burglary of a dwelling. Id. at 2. Petitioner raises one ground for habeas relief:
The trial court committed a procedural defect by failing to orally pronounce or provide written notice of both standard and special conditions of probation during sentencing, where the court, during revocation proceedings, subsequently violated Hicks' probation and imposed an extended term of incarceration for failing to comply with the standard and special conditions thus omitted, contrary to Hicks 14th, Amendment Right under the United Staters [sic] Constitution and Art. 1. § 9 of the Florida Constitution.
Petition at 6 (italics omitted).
The Court will thoroughly address this ground for habeas relief. Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992),Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2013). Upon review of the record, no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.
Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. 18)1 and Exhibits (Appendix) (Doc. 19).2 In response, Petitioner filed a Reply to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 22). See Order (Doc. 13).
This Court will analyze Petitioner's sole claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). "By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to th[re]e exceptions." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). The exceptions are: (1) the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; or (2) there was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. at 785.
There is a presumption of correctness of state courts' factual findings unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption applies to the factual determinations of both trial and appellate courts. See Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
Of import, there are prerequisites to a federal habeas review. The Court must be mindful of the doctrine of procedural default:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, supra, at 747-748, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Sykes, supra, at 84-85, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation offederal law. SeeColeman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
In addition, in addressing the question of exhaustion, the Court must ask whether the claim was raised in the state court proceedings and whether the state court was alerted to the federal nature of the claim:
Before seeking § 2254 habeas relief in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies available for challenging his conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). For a federal claim to be exhausted, the petitioner must have "fairly presented [it] to the state courts." McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has suggested that a litigant could do so by including in his claim before the state appellate court "the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'" Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). The Court's guidance in Baldwin "must be applied with common sense and in light of the purpose underlying the exhaustion requirement"—namely, giving the state courts "a meaningful opportunity" to address the federal claim. McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302. Thus, a petitioner could not satisfy the exhaustion requirement merely by presenting the state court with "all the facts necessary to support the claim," or by making a "somewhat similar state-law claim." Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1343-44. Rather, he must make his claims in a manner that provides the state courts with "the opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon (his) [federal] constitutional claim." Id. at 1344 (quotation omitted).
Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 875 (2013).
Procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances. Indeed, "[a] petitioner who fails to exhaust his claim is procedurally barred from pursuing that claim on habeas review in federal court unless he shows either cause for and actual prejudice from the default or a fundamental miscarriage of justice from applying the default." Id. at 1353 (citing Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is only available in extraordinary cases upon a showing of "'actual' innocence" rather than mere "'legal' innocence." Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 926 (2002).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934 (1999). Of note, "[i]nadequate assistance of counsel atinitial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315.
The record shows the following transpired. Petitioner was charged by information with burglary of a dwelling. Ex. A at 12-13. The state filed a Notice of Intent to Classify Defendant as a Habitual Felony Offender. Id. at 16. The jury trial began on January 29, 2003, before the Honorable Charles Arnold. Ex. C. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged, with a finding that the structure was a dwelling. Ex. D at 330; Ex. A at 43.
On February 4, 2003, Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial. Ex. A at 44-45. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 46, 92. The court conducted a sentencing proceeding on February 20, 2003. Id. at 89-122. At the proceeding, Petitioner's sisters, Roselyn Hicks Kimbro and Viola Hicks McGriff; Petitioner's employer, Wayne Norman; and Petitioner's cousin/minister, Arthur Wilcox, spoke on Petitioner's behalf. Id. at 98-109. In addition, Petitioner testified. Id. at 109-14. Defense counsel argued that Petitioner is a worker, has good skills, helps his family and others, and his offenses are not egregious. Id. at 114-15. Defense counsel stated Petitioner has a drug problem and needs help. Id. at 115. The prosecutor asked the court to sentence Petitioner to fifteen years in prison. Id. at 118.
The court announced the following:
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