Hicks v. Southcarolina, C/A No. 5:16-cv-01703-HMH-KDW
Decision Date | 17 June 2016 |
Docket Number | C/A No. 5:16-cv-01703-HMH-KDW |
Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina |
Parties | Dominic Hicks, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent. |
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was submitted to the court by a state prison inmate appearing pro se. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A ( ).
Dominic Hicks ("Petitioner") is a North Carolina state prison inmate seeking to challenge a simple assault conviction and sentence entered against him in abstentia on July 30, 2015 by the Municipal Court of Lyman, South Carolina, which is a city in Spartanburg County. Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. Petitioner has submitted a Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asking this court to vacate his conviction and sentence based on allegations that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the trial held in his absence. ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2. Petitioner acknowledges that he has not presented his current claim to any state court before submitting the § 2254 Petition now under review. ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Petitioner indicates he did not first present his claim to a state court because he attempted to appeal the conviction and sentence to the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions but was told that the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 2. There is no indication that Petitioner made any further attempts to appeal to a different court or that he filed a state post-conviction relief ("PCR") application in any state court before filing the Petition now under review.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review was made of the pro se Petition filed in this case. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).
This court is required to construe pro se petitions liberally. Such pro se petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se petition the petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630, 630 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, this court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled torelief in the district court." Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see Rule 1(b) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254). Following the required initial review, it is recommended that the Petition submitted in this case be summarily dismissed.
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in this case should be dismissed because Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies. With respect to his Lyman Municipal Court conviction and sentence, Petitioner's sole federal remedies are a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and possibly, but less commonly, a writ habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, either of which can be sought only after Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) ( ); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Moore v. De Young, 515 F.2d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir. 1975) (exhaustion required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Exhaustion Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 224 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Braden). Such considerations should not be dispensed with lightly. Section 2254's exhaustion requirement provides:
§ 2254(b), (c). This doctrine requires that before a federal court will review any allegations raised by a state prisoner, those allegations must first be presented to the state's highest court for consideration. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 276. Before a federal court may consider a habeas claim under § 2254, the petitioner must give the state court system "'one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's appellate review process . . . .'" Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 447-48 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting from O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). That "complete round" of appellate review also includes "discretionary review" such as the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking review of the dismissal of a PCR application. Id. at 448. In this regard, the South Carolina Supreme Court has specifically stated that a litigant "shall not be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error." In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (S.C. 1990) ( ). However, as noted above, it does not appear from the allegations contained in thePetition that Petitioner filed either a valid direct appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County, see S.C. Code Ann. § 14-25-95 ( ), or a PCR application directed to the conviction and sentence in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas. As a result, the ground for habeas relief raised in the Petition filed in this case has not yet been considered and addressed by courts of the State of South Carolina. This failure to exhaust available state remedies is fatal to this case.
If Petitioner failed to file a direct appeal within the time the permitted by South Carolina law, it is possible that he may be able to receive belated appellate review if a PCR court finds that the deprivation of the direct appeal was based on an attorney's failure to preserve the prisoner's right to an appeal. See, e.g., Sumpter v. State, 439 S.E.2d 842 (S.C. 1994); Sims v. State, 438 S.E.2d 253 (S.C. 1993); Gossett v. State, 388 S.E.2d 804, 805-07 (S.C. 1990); Davis v. State, 342 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1986); White v. State, 208 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1974). To seek a belated appeal, Petitioner should file a PCR application in the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County.1 Petitioner can obtain PCR forms from the Clerk of Court for Spartanburg County or from the South Carolina Attorney General's Office, whose mailing address is Post Office Box 11549, Columbia, South Carolina 29211.
If Petitioner files a PCR application which is later denied by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County, he must then seek state appellate review of that PCR denial before he can be said to have exhausted his available state remedies. Review of PCR denials is sought in state appellate courts by way of petition for writ of certiorari as provided under South CarolinaAppellate Court Rule 227 and Section 17-27-100 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. Such review must be sought and completed by a state prisoner or else federal collateral review (under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241) of the grounds raised in the PCR application will be barred by a procedural default. See Whitley v. B...
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