Hicks v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14-193 C,14-193 C
• Parties: ANTHONY R. HICKS, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

ANTHONY R. HICKS, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 14-193 C

United States Court of Federal Claims

August 29, 2014

ORIGINAL

Pro Se; Rule 12(b)(1); Lack of Jurisdiction; Rule 12(b)(6); Failure to State a Claim; Tort Claims; Punitive Damages; Informant Reward; Criminal Penalties; Impeachment; Fifth & Sixth Amendments; Taking; Frivolousness, 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Interest; Attorneys' Fees; Travel Expenses; Costs

Anthony R. Hicks, Embudo, New Mexico, pro se.

Douglas G. Edelschick, Trial Attorney, with whom were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, District of Columbia, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

CAMPBELL-SMITH, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Anthony R. Hicks, pro se, has filed a 128-page Complaint against the federal government comprised of allegations interspersed with copies of correspondence, federal statutes, and other papers. Compl., Mar. 7, 2014, Dkt. No. 1 (pagination added). Mr. Hicks complains that the government has not paid his seventeen million dollar ($17M) demand, id. at 2, 5, 8, 55-56, 76, 102, 122, 124, that he previously sought in an earlier case before this court, Hicks v. United States, No. 10-793C (Block, J.), for tort-based injuries allegedly sustained in an altercation with a South Carolina police detective, see Compl. at 87-88, 90-91, 96-97.

Mr. Hicks also accuses the government—particularly, the President, the Attorney General, and the Acting Associate Attorney General—of violating a myriad of federal criminal laws based on the government's: (i) refusal to recognize any merit in Mr. Hicks' claims; and (ii) supposed role in convincing earlier courts to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 5-7, 67, 84, 94, 121-128 (alleging, inter alia, obstruction of justice, improperly influencing official proceedings, fraud, deceit, false statements, and perjury). He further asserts that the government's failure to pay hisoriginal demand amounts to a failure to enforce the law, embezzlement, theft, receipt of stolen property, property destruction and other criminal offenses. See id. at 2, 7-8, 64, 67, 84, 121-128. Plaintiff variously demands the officials' impeachment, arrest, jail time, and capital punishment, id. at 1-2, 4-6, 58, 61, 64, 67, 126-28, and up to $157 million ($157M) as an "informant reward" or for other unspecified reasons, id. at 2, 8, 55. Lastly, he seeks interest on his $17M demand, id. at 56-57, 76, 80, 122, plus anticipated travel expenses between $7,000-$ 10,000 and attorneys' fees for the present litigation, id. at 8-9, 55, 80.

The government has moved to dismiss Mr. Hicks' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state claims under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC or Rule), as well as for frivolity under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2012). Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, Apr. 4, 2014, Dkt. No. 5. The court permitted Mr. Hicks to file a late response to the motion, see Order, Aug. 18, 2014, Dkt. No. 11 (lodging Pl.'s Resp., Aug. 14, 2014, Dkt. No. 8), to which defendant has replied, see Def.'s Reply, Aug. 15, 2014, Dkt. No. 10.

The court now considers the parties' motion, response, and reply, plaintiff's Complaint and its exhibits, as well as—where noted—a dispositive opinion written by Judge Block, which is set forth in Hicks v. United States, No. 10-793C, 2011 WL 3319563 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 1, 2011) (Hicks I).

For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety.

I. Discussion

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Almost All of Plaintiff's Claims

"Jurisdiction must be established as a threshold matter before the court may proceed with the merits of this or any other action." OTI America, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 108, 113 (2005) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1009-10 (1998)): accord PODS. Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Tucker Act is the primary source of jurisdiction for this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (Tucker Act); Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It vests the court with jurisdiction over any suit against the United States for money damages "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States . . . in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, does not create any substantive rights and, therefore, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on its own. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). A plaintiff must identify aseparate source of law that creates a right to money damages for his or her claim. Id.; Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the Tucker Act "is a jurisdictional provision 'that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims [against the United States] premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts'") (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290, 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2009)). "Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216, 103 S. Ct. 2961, 2967-68 (1983). The test is whether the independent source of law "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the [f]ederal [g]overnment for [the particular harm] sustained [by the particular plaintiff]." Id. at 216-17 (citation omitted); see also Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172 ("[The] source must be 'money-mandating.'"); Contreras v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 583, 588-92 (2005).

When faced with a jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the court will generally "accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff."¹ Goel v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 804, 806 (2004) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); accord Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Courts hold pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972); accord Vaizburd v. United States, 384 F.3d 1278, 1285 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)). "'As [is] often done with pro se plaintiffs, the court searches the record to see if a plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed.'" Goel, 62 Fed. Cl. at 86 (quoting Boyle v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 60, 62 (1999)); accord Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285, 1292 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

While the court may excuse ambiguities or the lack of formalities in a pro se plaintiff's complaint, Henke, 60 F.3d at 799, "[t]his latitude . . . does not relieve a pro se plaintiff from meeting jurisdictional requirements," Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499, aff'd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004). If jurisdiction is lacking, the court must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3); Thoen v. United States, 765 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Alternatively, the court may transfer the action to another federal court that would have jurisdiction, if the transfer would be in the interest of justice. Gray v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 95, 98 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631; Telcomm Techn. Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc'ns, 295 F.3d 1249, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

A liberal reading of Mr. Hicks' Complaint fails to implicate any money-mandating constitutional provision, federal statute, federal regulation or contract under which this court may exercise jurisdiction, with the exception of his possible takings claim addressed in Section I.C., infra.

1. Plaintiff's Claim for $ 17M in Tort Damages

Plaintiff's demand for $17M falls outside this court's jurisdiction for multiple reasons. First, the demand is based on allegations of personal injury resulting from conduct that sounds in negligence, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional dismiss, or other wrongful activity. See Compl. at 87-88, 90-91, 96-97. These are all torts. Seals-Bey v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 120, 122 (2014) (citing Dupre v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 706, 706 (1981) (per curiam)); Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998); accord Curry v. United States, 609 F.2d 980, 983 (Ct. Cl. 1979). However, the Tucker Act plainly excludes tort claims from the court's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2043 (1993); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Second, plaintiff's multi-million dollar demand reflects not only the alleged sum of actual damages he seeks but a request for punitive damages as well. This court has no authority to award punitive damages. Garner v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl, 941, 941 (1982). Nor are such damages available in tort suits against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012); Vincin v. United States, 468 F.2d 930, 932 (1972) (per curiam).

Third, although Mr. Hicks names the United States as a party defendant, his tort claim concerns the conduct of a South Carolina police detective, not the actions or inactions of the federal government. This court has no authority to hear claims against private individuals or state entities, including (as in this case) a state police detective or perhaps his police department. See Cottrell, 42 Fed. Cl. at 148 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588, 61 S. Ct. 767,...