Hicks v. Walker, No. A04A0740.

CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtELDRIDGE.
Citation265 Ga. App. 495,594 S.E.2d 710
Docket NumberNo. A04A0740.
Decision Date10 February 2004
PartiesHICKS v. WALKER et al.

594 S.E.2d 710
265 Ga.
App. 495

HICKS
v.
WALKER et al

No. A04A0740.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 10, 2004.


Eason, Kennedy & Associates, Richard B. Eason, Jr., Atlanta, for Appellant.

Kirby G. Bailey, Decatur, for Appellees.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in the revival action brought on January 21, 1999, to revive the consent judgment entered on March 28, 1989, with sums due. The defendant Richard D. Hicks contends that he had satisfied the 24,600 consent judgment by paying 15,800, and there should be a credit for the 10,000 liability limits paid by Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company into court under a consent order in an interpleader action on July 23, 1983. The trial court determined that 8,600 in principal remained due, that 5,372 in interest was due, and that no credit [265 Ga. App. 496] was due from the prior insurance proceeds payment. Finding no error, we affirm.

On May 9, 1982, Hicks was involved in a collision on I-285, which killed Clifford Walker. On August 22, 1983, in the interpleader action, a consent judgment determined that Russell Walker, Kenneth Walker, Carolyn Walker Stewart, and Clifton Walker, a minor, were the children of Clifford Walker, who had been killed in the wreck and that they would receive the 10,000 proceeds of the Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company liability policy on Hicks but that there was expressly no release of Hicks from any liability for the wrongful death action in Fulton Superior Court in C-97632. Subsequently, on March 28, 1989, in C-97632, Hicks entered into a consent judgment with the four children to settle the wrongful death

594 S.E.2d 711
action. The "Settlement by Consent Judgment" read
The parties settle all issues and claims in the above case on the following terms: Defendant shall pay the total sum of 24,600 to Tyson Baisden, Jr., attorney for the above 4 children of Clifford Walker, Deceased. Payments shall be made as follows: Initial payment of 200 today and 122 subsequent payments of 200 each on the 1st day of each month beginning with May 1, 1989. Defendant expressly agrees that this debt outlined above is not dischargeable in any Bankruptcy proceeding either past or future. Court costs to be paid by Defendant. This 28th day of March, 1989. [signed] Russell B. Walker, Richard H. Hicks, R[illegible] B. Lamb, Atty for Def., T.E. Baisden, Jr. Attorney for above 4 parties plaintiffs. The above styled agreement and settlement is
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5 practice notes
  • Langley v. State, S21G0783
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 1, 2022
    ...of the defendant's sentence for his second conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.3 See 868 S.E.2d 761 Jones , 265 Ga. App. at 495, 594 S.E.2d 706. The Court of Appeals vacated Langley's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See Langley ......
  • State v. Jones, No. A03A2320.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • February 10, 2004
    ...It is well settled that OCGA § 16-13-30(d) gives the sentencing judge discretion to impose either a sentence between ten and forty [265 Ga. App. 495] years or life imprisonment for a second or subsequent conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.5 Therefore, 594 S.E.2d 7......
  • Langley v. State, S21G0783
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 1, 2022
    ...ten years of the defendant's sentence for his second conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.[3] See Jones, 265 Ga.App. at 495. The Court of Appeals vacated Langley's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See Langley, 358 Ga.App. at 345. ......
  • Strategic Law LLC v. Pain Mgmt. & Wellness Ctrs. of Ga., LLC, A17A0720
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • October 27, 2017
    ...agreement, entered into in conjunction with a consent judgment, as a binding agreement, enforceable as a contract. See Hicks v. Walker , 265 Ga. App. 495, 496, 594 S.E.2d 710 (2004).Because a settlement agreement is a contract, it is subject to the usual rules of [contract] construction. Wh......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 cases
  • Langley v. State, S21G0783
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 1, 2022
    ...of the defendant's sentence for his second conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.3 See 868 S.E.2d 761 Jones , 265 Ga. App. at 495, 594 S.E.2d 706. The Court of Appeals vacated Langley's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See Langley ......
  • State v. Jones, No. A03A2320.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • February 10, 2004
    ...It is well settled that OCGA § 16-13-30(d) gives the sentencing judge discretion to impose either a sentence between ten and forty [265 Ga. App. 495] years or life imprisonment for a second or subsequent conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.5 Therefore, 594 S.E.2d 7......
  • Langley v. State, S21G0783
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • February 1, 2022
    ...ten years of the defendant's sentence for his second conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.[3] See Jones, 265 Ga.App. at 495. The Court of Appeals vacated Langley's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See Langley, 358 Ga.App. at 345. ......
  • Strategic Law LLC v. Pain Mgmt. & Wellness Ctrs. of Ga., LLC, A17A0720
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • October 27, 2017
    ...agreement, entered into in conjunction with a consent judgment, as a binding agreement, enforceable as a contract. See Hicks v. Walker , 265 Ga. App. 495, 496, 594 S.E.2d 710 (2004).Because a settlement agreement is a contract, it is subject to the usual rules of [contract] construction. Wh......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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