Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No. 83-T-489-S.
| Decision Date | 03 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-T-489-S. |
| Citation | 681 F. Supp. 752 |
| Parties | Maryann H. HIDLE, Plaintiff, v. GENEVA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Coleman D. Hamm, Jr., Amari & Hamm, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.
Donald B. Sweeney, Jr., Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, Ala., Joseph P. Hughes, Hughes & Danner, Geneva, Ala., for defendant.
In this lawsuit, premised on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17, plaintiff Maryann H. Hidle successfully challenged the refusal of defendant Geneva County Board of Education to hire her as an assistant principal because of her sex. This cause is now before the court on Hidle's motion for attorney fees and costs. For the reasons that follow, the court has concluded that the motion should be granted, and that Hidle is entitled to $169,539.50 for attorney fees and $1,916.89 for expenses.
This case was tried before another judge, who found that the board of education for the Geneva County, Alabama school system violated Title VII by refusing to hire Hidle as an assistant principal because of her sex. The court did not award back-pay, but did order the school board to offer Hidle the next vacant assistant principalship. Hidle then filed a motion to alter and amend judgment, questioning the court's failure to award her backpay and to instate her immediately into the job she was wrongly denied. The court not only denied Hidle's motion, it set aside its earlier finding of discrimination, and entered judgment in favor of the school board. Hidle appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case "with instructions to reinstate the judgment for plaintiff as originally granted and to grant plaintiff the relief requested in her motion to alter or amend, namely: `restore her to the position she would have occupied in the absence of the violation of Title VII, pay her backpay with interest and enjoin further violation of Title VII by the defendant.'" Hidle v. Geneva County Board of Education, 792 F.2d 1098, 1100 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1296, 94 L.Ed.2d 152 (1987). After remand, the case was reassigned to this judge, and the court carried out the appellate court's instructions.
The attorney fee provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k), authorizes courts to award reasonable fees to prevailing civil rights litigants. Hidle is unquestionably the prevailing litigant in this lawsuit and is thus entitled to reasonable attorney fees.
The court will determine what constitutes a reasonable fee in accordance with the 12 factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974). These factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and the ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
The number of hours reasonably expended to prosecute the lawsuit and the prevailing market rate provide an important starting point for any fee determination. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939-40, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In making its fee award, the court will therefore start by determining: (a) the number of hours reasonably devoted to this litigation; and (b) the prevailing market rate for non-contingent work performed by similarly situated attorneys in similar cases in the community. The product of these two figures will provide the court with a "lodestar" figure. The court will then determine whether any portion of this lodestar fee should be adjusted upwards or downwards. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1040.
A. Reasonable Hours
Hidle was represented by Coleman D. Hamm, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., and Ann K. Norton. Wiggins claims 545.45 hours, Hamm claims 135.9 hours,1 and Norton claims 58.10 hours.
The court has considered two Johnson factors — the novelty and difficulty of the case, and the amount involved and the result obtained — in assessing the reasonableness of the hours claimed.2 While sex discrimination litigation is in general no longer novel, this case was difficult to try because it required a sophisticated understanding and presentation of complex principles of law and a substantial amount of evidence. Moreover, the issues that arose after this court set aside its original finding of discrimination were novel; as the court of appeals noted, this was "an unusual if not unique case," Hidle, 792 F.2d at 1099. In spite of these substantial obstacles, Hidle's lawyers obtained completely successful results; Hidle was awarded backpay and instated into an assistant principalship. Moreover, although this was not a class action, the results obtained by Hidle's attorneys should discourage employment discrimination in the Geneva County School System, if not in a broader area, in the future. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-79, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2696, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (). Based on the two Johnson factors of novelty and results obtained, the court finds that, as a general matter, the claimed hours are reasonable.
The court's conclusion that the hours are reasonable is also supported by its examination of the time sheets listing the hours claimed by each of the attorneys. There does not appear to be any unnecessary duplication of efforts among the attorneys, and all of the hours listed appear to be directly related to this particular litigation. Furthermore, Wiggins, who entered and took primary responsibility of the case shortly after it was filed, stated in his affidavit that the hours needed for him to familiarize himself with the case in ways that would not have been needed if Hamm had remained primarily responsible were deleted from the fee request. The attorneys have exercised reasonable `billing judgment.' The court therefore finds the following hours to be reasonable and compensable:
Wiggins _________________________ 545.45
Hamm ____________________________ 135.90
Norton __________________________ 58.10
B. Prevailing Market Rate
To determine the prevailing market rate the court will consider the following Johnson factors: customary fee; skill required to perform the legal services properly; the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; time limitations; preclusion of other employment; undesirability of the case; nature and length of professional relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases.
Customary Fee. Hidle contends that the customary fee for attorneys of similar experience in the community supports an hourly non-contingent fee of $135 for Wiggins, $90 for Hamm, and $80 for Norton. The evidence shows that, in the Alabama, attorneys with approximately the same experience as Wiggins charge a non-contingent fee ranging between $90 and $200 an hour; attorneys with approximately the same experience as Hamm, $95 an hour; and attorneys with approximately the same experience as Norton, $75 an hour.
Skill Required to Perform the Legal Services Properly. The work product of Hidle's attorneys demonstrates a high degree of skill in complex civil rights litigation.
Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys. Wiggins has been practicing for over 13 years. He enjoys a well deserved reputation for civil rights advocacy of the highest order. Hamm has been practicing for over seven years, and Norton has been practicing for over one year. While neither of them has an extensive civil rights background, they enjoy a good reputation in the legal community, and they both exhibited a high degree of skill and ability in this litigation.
Time Limitations. This factor requires "some premium" where there has been "priority work that delays the lawyer's other legal work." Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. There is no evidence of such limitations here.
Preclusion of Other Employment. This factor "involves the dual consideration of otherwise available business which is foreclosed because of conflicts of interest which occur from the representation, and the fact that once the employment is undertaken the attorney is not free to use the time spent on the client's behalf for other purposes." Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. There is no substantial evidence of this.
Undesirability of the Case. In general, civil rights litigation, such as this, is seen as undesirable because it stigmatizes an attorney as a "civil rights lawyer" and thus tends to deter fee-paying clients from seeking assistance from that lawyer. See York v. Alabama State Board of Education, 631 F.Supp. 78, 85 (M.D.Ala.1986). This particular case was especially undesirable in light of the hostility some members of the community took toward Hidle's position. This hostility is evidenced by, among other things, the petition for further relief filed by ten sets of parents of school children from the Hartford Middle School, demanding that their children not be taught by Hidle, whose responsibilities as an assistant principal include teaching.
Nature and Length of Relationship with Client. Hamm has represented Hidle since the litigation began in 1983; Wiggins has represented her in this case since February 1984; and...
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