Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago

• Decision Date: 03 April 1922
• Docket Number: 3609.
• Citation: 280 F. 525
• Parties: HIESTON v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CHICAGO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

280 F. 525

HIESTON v. NATIONAL CITY BANK OF CHICAGO.

No. 3609.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

April 3, 1922

Submitted February 8, 1922.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Dan Thew Wright and Philip Ershler, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

F. D McKenney, J. S. Flannery, and G. B. Craighill, all of Washington, D.C., for appellee.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

Appellant defendant below, guaranteed the payment of her husband's indebtedness to appellee, a bank in Chicago, Ill. Subsequently, on default of the husband, the bank sued her and procured judgment in the state of Maryland. The bank instituted this suit in the District of Columbia upon the Maryland judgment for the purpose of subjecting defendant's property in this District to the payment of the debt. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff bank, defendant appealed.

Appellant relies upon a statute of this District which provides:

'All the property, real, personal, and mixed, belonging to a woman at the time of her marriage, and all such property which she may acquire or receive after her marriage from any person whomsoever, by purchase, gift, grant, devise bequest, descent, in the course of distribution, by her own skill, labor, or personal exertions, or as proceeds of a judgment at law or decree in equity, or in any other manner, shall be her own property as absolutely as if she were unmarried, and shall be protected from the debts of the husband and shall not in any way be liable for the payment thereof. ' Code D.C. Sec. 1151.

It is conceded that the judgment is in every respect valid and enforceable in the state of Maryland, but it is urged on behalf of defendant that the cause of action which formed the basis of that judgment may be inquired into to determine whether the judgment may be enforced against the property of the plaintiff in this District. To sustain this contention would mean the denial of full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings resulting in the Maryland judgment.

Chief Justice Marshall, affirming the rule announced in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, 3 L.Ed. 411, interpreting the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution (article 4, Sec. 1), and the statute enacted in pursuance thereof (R.S. Sec. 905 (Comp. St. Sec. 1519)), said:

'The doctrine there held was that the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court of the United States. ' Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 4 L.Ed. 378.

It is clear that the inhibition of the statute of the District of Columbia could not have been pleaded in the Maryland court, since the guaranty of the wife for the payment of her husband's debts created a valid obligation, not only in Maryland, but in Illinois, where the obligation was incurred. The rule announced in the Hampton Case has been consistently followed by the courts of this country and was quoted with approval in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236, 28 Sup.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039.

The obligation to accord full faith and credit to a valid judgment, other than for lack of jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter, or for the enforcement of a penalty, is without limitation. As was said by Chief Justice White in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 Sup.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann.Cas. 1:

'The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by states to the judicial decrees of other states. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one state is embraced by the full faith and credit clause, that constitutional provision commands that the other states shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the state where rendered. Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317.' Applying this rule to the present case, the courts of the District of Columbia must give the Maryland judgment the same force and effect to which it was entitled in that state; and, being admittedly a valid judgment in that state, it must be accorded the same status in this District.

Counsel for defendant, however, attempts to avoid the logical result of the interpretation placed upon the degree of effect to be given the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution on the ground that the enforcement of this judgment is in conflict with the statutes and public policy of this District, and cites in support of this position State of Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 8 Sup.Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239. In that case a judgment was rendered in favor of the state of Wisconsin against a foreign insurance corporation. An original suit was brought in the Supreme Court upon the judgment. The...