Higdon v. Higdon

• Citation: 321 Ga.App. 260,739 S.E.2d 498
• Decision Date: 10 April 2013
• Docket Number: A12A2188.,A12A2145,Nos. A12A1763,s. A12A1763
• Parties: HIGDON v. HIGDON (three cases).
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

321 Ga.App. 260
739 S.E.2d 498

HIGDON
v.
HIGDON (three cases).

Nos. A12A1763, A12A2145, A12A2188.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 28, 2013.
Reconsideration Denied April 10, 2013.

[739 S.E.2d 500]

Alex Higdon, pro se.

Bovis, Kyle & Burch, Erin Shane Stone, Atlanta, Winfield Lennard Pollidore, for Appellee.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

[321 Ga.App. 260]These related appeals arise from custodial issues involving Alex and Jane Higdon's four children following their divorce. ¹ We note as a preliminary matter that Dr. Higdon's appeals are deficient in several respects. He has failed to provide a concise statement of the applicable standard of review as required by Court of Appeals Rule 25(a)(3), and has not stated the method of preservation of his enumerations of error as required by Rule 25(a)(1). Moreover, even though Dr. Higdon's briefs contain extensive statements of facts, few, if any, of these facts are supported with citations to the record or transcript in violation of Court of Appeals Rule 25(a)(1). We recognize that Dr. Higdon is acting pro se; nevertheless, “that status does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the law, including the rules of this [C]ourt.” Simon v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga.App. 119, 120(1), 650 S.E.2d 783 (2007).

In Case No. A12A1763, Dr. Higdon appeals from the order of the trial court denying his multiple motions to find Mrs. Higdon in contempt for allegedly violating provisions in an earlier temporary order. In Case No A12A2145, Dr. Higdon appeals from the order of the trial court denying his habeas corpus petition to restore his visitation and custody rights. And, in Case No. A12A2188, Dr. Higdon appeals the trial court's order prohibiting him from future filings without permission of the court.²

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment in Cases No. A12A1763 and A12A2188, and dismiss as moot Case No. A12A2145.

[321 Ga.App. 261]Case No. A12A1763

In this appeal, we review Dr. Higdon's challenge to the trial court's order addressing the parties' motions for contempt. We initially transferred this appeal to the Supreme Court, which determined that the appeal did not invoke its divorce and alimony jurisdiction and transferred it back to this Court. In its order, the Supreme Court explained that because it had “previously denied the application addressing the child support contempt ... the only remaining issue is applicant's contention that the trial court erred in not holding [Mrs. Higdon] in contempt of the child custody provisions.” Thus, as “any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be,” OCGA § 9–11–60(h), we only consider whether the trial court erred in denying Dr. Higdon's motion to hold Mrs. Higdon in contempt for violating certain child custody provisions in the temporary order. See Egerton v. Jolly, 133 Ga.App. 805, 806(1), 212 S.E.2d 462 (1975).

The facts establish that the Higdons filed several motions for contempt against each other related to the custody and support issues arising from provisions in a February 4, 2011 temporary order. The order incorporated a June 9, 2010 temporary consent order, and provided, among other things, that the parents would have temporary joint custody of the four children and shared medical decision-making for the children. The order

[739 S.E.2d 501]

also provided the mother with child support of $1859, and divided the couples' possessions from the marital residence. The final judgment and divorce decree was filed on June 13, 2011, and per the parenting plan, Mrs. Higdon was granted final decision making on healthcare, education and extracurricular issues, and primary physical custody. Dr. Higdon filed a motion for new trial.

On August 30, 2011, after a hearing, the court entered an order on the parties' various contempt motions.³ It granted Mrs. Higdon's motion to hold Dr. Higdon in contempt for failing to pay child support, but denied Dr. Higdons' several motions to hold Mrs. Higdon in contempt for alleged violations of the temporary order.

[321 Ga.App. 262]1. In this appeal, we only consider whether the trial court erred in its refusal to hold Mrs. Higdon in contempt and whether it erred in finding that Dr. Higdon “came to court with unclean hands.”

“[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine if a party is in contempt of its order, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless grossly abused.” Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 11(4), 709 S.E.2d 263 (2011). “Thus, the question of whether a contempt has occurred is for the trial court[.]” Gallaher v. Breaux, 286 Ga.App. 375, 377, 650 S.E.2d 313 (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

a. Dr. Higdon contended that the trial court erred in failing to cite Mrs. Higdon for contempt for failing to obtain certain medical evaluations and treatments for the children as ordered in a February 4, 2011 temporary order and in finding that he “came to court with unclean hands.”

Mrs. Higdon testified at the hearing on the contempt motions that she had received only about $1,000 total in child support over the previous six months, although she had been awarded $1,858 per month in child support. She also testified that Dr. Higdon was responsible for half of the uncovered medical expenses, but would pay his half only sporadically. In that respect, she testified that she had paid $7,317 in medical expenses for the children, but Dr. Higdon had not reimbursed her for his half of those expenses.

The trial court found that Dr. Higdon exhibited unclean hands by not paying child support or half of the uncovered medical expenses, which directly contributed to the contempt claim he had brought against Mrs. Higdon for her alleged failure to obtain medical treatment for the children. Regarding the medical treatments, the trial court held that Dr. Higdon's actions had “resulted in [Mrs. Higdon's] chosen doctor ... declin[ing] to treat the parties' children.” The trial court quoted from a letter from the doctor that the cancellation was due to the “ ‘complexity’ of the issues surrounding the family,” and “most notably” due to Dr. Higdon's “inappropriate and confrontational behavior” that had been experienced by her office staff. The trial court also found that Dr. Higdon's failure to pay child support contributed to the Mrs. Higdon's inability to obtain the medical evaluations and treatment.

“Unclean hands” is a shorthand reference to OCGA § 23–1–10, which states: “He who would have equity must do equity and must give effect to all equitable rights of the other party respecting the subject matter of the action.” See Dobbs v. Dobbs, 270 Ga. 887, 888, 515 S.E.2d 384 (1999) (noting that OCGA § 23–1–10 “embodies both the ‘unclean hands' doctrine and the concept that ‘one will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.’ ” (citations and [321 Ga.App. 263]punctuation omitted). Under the unclean hands doctrine, wrongdoing must be directly related to the claim against which unclean hands is asserted. Adams v. Crowell, 157 Ga.App. 576, 577(2), 278 S.E.2d 151 (1981).

“Given the foregoing, no abuse of discretion resulted upon the trial court's refusal to [hold Mrs. Higdon in contempt as to the medical treatments] under the doctrine of unclean hands.”

[739 S.E.2d 502]

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