Higgason v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 01 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-5984.,00-5984. |
| Citation | 288 F.3d 868 |
| Parties | Gary L. HIGGASON, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert F. STEPHENS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Robert L. Treadway (argued and briefed), Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
James M. Herrick (argued and briefed), Kentucky State Police Legal Office, Frankfort, KY, William B. Pettus (briefed), Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General Civil & Environmental Law, Frankfort, KY, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before SILER and CLAY, Circuit Judges; GRAHAM, District Judge.*
Plaintiff, Gary L. Higgason, M.D., appeals from the district court's judgment entered on May 18, 2000, dismissing Plaintiff's civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Robert F. Stephens, in his official capacity as Secretary of Justice Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky and as acting Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police; Gary Rose, individually; Dennis Benningfield, individually; Dwaine Barnett, individually; and Barry Bertram, individually (who together constitute Kentucky's Commonwealth's Attorney for Green County, and officials of the Kentucky State Police), in connection with Plaintiff's indictment for twelve counts of attempted murder of his mother, which was ultimately dismissed by the state trial court. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
Following the dismissal of the criminal charges brought against Plaintiff in the Green Circuit Court, Green County, Kentucky, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim on February 29, 2000, in federal district court seeking injunctive relief from Stephens and monetary relief from Rose, Benningfield, and Bertram. Plaintiff also sought monetary damages from Defendants Rose, Benningfield, and Bertram in connection with pendent state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment, defamation, and perjury. Defendants were specifically sued in the following capacities: 1) Robert F. Stephens is Secretary of the Justice Cabinet for the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is acting Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police; 2) Rose was, at the time of the alleged wrongful actions, the Commissioner of the Kentucky State Police and is now simply employed by the Kentucky State Police; 3) Benningfield was, at the time of the alleged wrongful actions, a detective with the Kentucky State Police and is now employed by the Kentucky State Police in its Driver Testing Division; 4) Barnett was, at the time of the alleged wrongful actions, employed by the Kentucky State Police as a trooper and was identified as a "spokesman" for the Kentucky State Police in news reports, and is currently employed by the Kentucky State Police; 5) Bertram is and was at the time of the alleged wrongful actions, Kentucky's Commonwealth's Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, comprising, among others, Green County, Kentucky.
Defendant Bertram filed a motion to dismiss the § 1983 action on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, and also requested that the pendent state law claims should therefore be dismissed. Defendants Stephens, Rose, Benningfield and Barnett collectively filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff had failed to set forth a basis for injunctive relief and had failed to state a colorable civil rights claim. These Defendants also argued that the state claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. All Defendants attached exhibits to their motions such as affidavits and various pieces of documentary evidence.
In response, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to Count II of his complaint regarding Benningfield's alleged violation of Plaintiff's civil rights under § 1983. Plaintiff claimed that because Defendants went beyond the pleadings in filing their motions to dismiss, the motions should be interpreted as ones for summary judgment under Rule 56. Plaintiff therefore claimed that his cross-motion for summary judgment as to Benningfield was procedurally proper and should be granted inasmuch as no genuine issue of material fact remained for trial that Benningfield's conduct was wrongful under an objective standard.
On May 18, 2000, the district court entered its judgment dismissing Plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice, dismissing Plaintiff's pendent state law claims without prejudice, and denying all pending motions as moot. The district court contemporaneously issued its memorandum opinion and order. In so doing, the district court found that the statement in the Green Circuit Court's Order of Dismissal of the criminal charges against Plaintiff, to the effect that probable cause had existed to bring the charges, constituted res judicata or collateral estoppel as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the May 18, 2000 judgment; and on July 12, 2000, the district court denied Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
This matter arises out of the arrest and indictment of Plaintiff, a medical doctor, by Defendants on twelve counts of attempted murder of Plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff's mother, Margie Higgason ("Margie"), was about sixty-nine years old at the time. Margie lived in Green County, Kentucky at all times relevant to this matter, while Plaintiff lived in Lexington, Fayette County, Kentucky during the relevant time period. Plaintiff's sister, Sharon Higgason ("Sharon"), lived with Margie in Green County. Sharon is developmentally disabled to the degree that she is capable of rational thought only to the level of a small child. Sharon has been found incompetent for legal and testamentary purposes. Sharon was, however, able to obtain a driver's license at about age thirty-seven by attending a special driving school and having the questions on the driver's test read to her.
Sharon had been prescribed a medication called Serax (generic name oxazepam) to control her panic attacks. Serax is an anti-anxiety drug belonging to the group of anxiolytics known as benzodiazepines. Margie had been prescribed "nerve pills" for as long as Plaintiff could remember, and she had a history of going from doctor to doctor in search of prescriptions for her "nerve pills." One of Margie's physicians prescribed an anti-anxiety drug known as Ativan (generic name lorazepam); this drug belongs to the same group of anxiolytics as Serax-benzodiazepines. Margie had been prescribed several different anti-anxiety drugs belonging to the benzodiazepine group over the years.
Sharon found that if she gave Margie up to three capsules of Serax at a time, Margie would become sedated and Sharon would be free to take the car out driving unsupervised. Sharon frequently engaged in this practice because she enjoyed the freedom. However, the doses of Serax that Sharon gave to Margie were never life threatening. Serax is one of the mildest drugs in the benzodiazepine class, such that it would be virtually impossible to take a sufficient quantity to cause death or serious injury. Plaintiff's complaint states that "[a]ccording to lab data supplied to the medical community by Wyeth Ayerst Pharmaceuticals, manufacturer of Serax, a minimum of 2500 15 mg. tablets administered orally as a single dose would have been necessary to be life threatening to someone of Mrs. Higgason's approximate size and weight." (J.A. at 14.) It is believed that Sharon fed Margie one-tenth of one percent of this amount.
Plaintiff states in his complaint that he has not given or fed any prescription medication to Margie, or any other drugs of any kind, and that he has no desire to harm Margie in any way. Plaintiff contends that on two occasions he saved Margie's life—once when she had colon cancer and once when she had breast cancer.
On or about October 7, 1997, Sharon allegedly fed Margie some Serax, and then took Margie to Dr. John W. Burress, in Campbellsville, Kentucky for an office visit. During the visit, Dr. Burress informed Margie that he would no longer be her physician because of her constant calling and overdramatized symptoms. Dr. Burress became aware that Margie was seeing multiple physicians for the purpose of obtaining prescriptions. Dr. Burress ordered a blood test for Margie to check for the presence of benzodiazepines. The test revealed that Margie had Ativan in her system, which Burress had prescribed for her, but the test also revealed that Margie had Serax in her system, which Burress had not prescribed. The report indicated that the amount of Serax in Margie's blood was higher than the therapeutic dose, but not life threatening. Burress reported his findings to the Kentucky Department for Social Services in Greensburg, informing the agency that Margie had a high dose of Serax in her blood, and that he had not prescribed Serax for her.
The Department of Social Services began an investigation of the matter and ultimately referred the case to the Kentucky State Police. Defendant, Detective Benningfield, was assigned to investigate the matter. Benningfield contacted Margie, who allegedly suffered from, among other things, senile dementia and early Alzheimer's disease, and asked Margie to take Sharon to the Social Services office in Greensburg to meet with him. Margie complied, and after extensive questioning by Benningfield, Margie told him that she thought her net worth was about $200,000. Benningfield also extensively questioned Sharon, repeatedly suggesting that Sharon and Plaintiff were conspiring to kill Margie to collect on her estate. Based on statements made to him by Sharon, who Plaintiff claims was very intimidated by Benningfield as an armed male figure, Benningfield recommended that Plaintiff be charged with twelve counts of attempted murder of Margie. Thereafter, Bertram brought charges against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 5, 1997, Benningfield...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rogers v. Detroit Police Dept.
...in light of clearly established rights.' Tucker v. City of Richmond, Ky., 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 2002)). The court must only consider the facts known to the officers at the time the conduct was undertaken. Hale v. Kart, 39......
-
Curry v. School Dist. of the City of Saginaw
...of the clearly established rights.'" Tucker v. City of Richmond, Ky., 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir2004) (citing Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 ......
-
McKinley v. City of Mansfield
...of the Supreme Court, this Court, or other Courts of Appeal — at the time the defendant allegedly infringed it. See Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir.1993)). Finally, if the right is clearly established,......
-
Plymale v. Dyer
...jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer.” Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir.2002). Similar to the CSB findings, the federal indictment against Officer Plymale further supports the absence of defendants' ra......
-
Addressing the problem: the judicial branches
...limitations. B. Statute of Limitations A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Higgason v. Stephens , 288 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2002). . . . . As rightly observed by Contractor-Defendants, the public record here was sufficient to alert Plaintiffs as to a......
-
Addressing the Problem: The Judicial Branches
...**** B. Statute of Limitations A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Higgason v. Stephens , 288 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2002). **** As rightly observed by Contractor-Defendants, the public record here was suicient to alert Plaintifs as to a possible conn......
-
Addressing the Problem: The Judicial Branches
...* * * * B. Statute of Limitations A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2002). * * * * As rightly observed by Contractor-Defendants, the public record here was suicient to alert Plaintifs as to a possible......
-
Addressing The Problem: The Judicial Branches
...limitations. B. Statute of Limitations A district court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Higgason v. Stephens , 288 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2002). . . . . THE JUDICIAL BRANCHES 273 As rightly observed by Contractor-Defendants, the public record here was sufficient t......