Higginbotham v. City of Pleasant Grove
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action Number CV-12-BE-252-S |
| Parties | BARRY C. HIGGINBOTHAM, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, et. al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This Section 1983 case, filed by a pro se Plaintiff, comes before the court on six motions to dismiss filed by all remaining Defendants: "Motion to Dismiss" filed by the Pleasant Grove Police Department (doc. 24), requesting the dismissal of all claims against it with prejudice; "Motion to Dismiss Official Capacity Claims" filed by Mayor Brasseale, Sergeant Roberts, Officer Bullard, Officer Reed, Officer Grigsby, and Officer Lawson (doc. 25); "Motion to Dismiss" filed by Mayor Brasseale and Director Knight (doc. 26), requesting the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against them in their individual capacities; "Motion to Dismiss" filed by the City of Pleasant Grove (doc. 28); "Motion to Dismiss" filed by Officer Grigsby (doc. 30), requesting the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against him in his individual capacity; and "Motion for Partial Dismissal" filed by Sergeant Roberts, Officer Bullard, Officer Reed, and Officer Lawson (doc. 31), requesting the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against them in their individual capacities, except those asserted in Count Six against Officers Roberts, Bullard,and Reed.
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the court FINDS as follows: that the Pleasant Grove Police Department's motion to dismiss (doc. 24) is due to be GRANTED; that the motion to dismiss official capacity claims (doc. 25) is due to be GRANTED; that the motion to dismiss individual claims against Officer Grigsby (doc. 30) is due to be GRANTED; that the other motions (docs. 26, 28, & 31) are due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The following Defendants are due to be DISMISSED as party Defendants: Pleasant Grove Police Department, Officers Grigsby and Lawson, and Director Knight.
On January 24, 2012, the Plaintiff, Barry Higginbotham, filed a 63 page Complaint (doc. 1) against 23 Defendants containing five counts; a "Judicial Notice" (doc. 2), advising the Defendants that he was proceeding pro se; a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 3); and "Motion to Quash Arrest and Stay Court" (doc. 4), claiming that his arrest criminally violated his federal civil rights. On April 17, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Quash Probation Order" (doc. 5), alleging, among other things, that the Order's issuance "constitutes the crime of extortion in the first degree" and violated a number of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. He also filed documents and affidavits in support of those claims (doc. 6). The 23 Defendants included the City of Pleasant Grove and a number of its city officials and police officers as well as judges and a prosecutor.
On August 15, 2012, this court entered an Order (doc. 7) denying the motions to quash, and granting the motion to proceed as a pauper. Further, because the court has an obligation to review sua sponte the merits of in forma pauperis matters, the court's Order (doc. 7), assubsequently clarified and modified (doc. 9), dismissed all claims in the Complaint, some with prejudice and some without prejudice. (Doc. 7). On September 14, 2012, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (doc. 10) and then, on September 24, 2012, a Second Amended Complaint (doc. 13).
The Second Amended Complaint contains eleven counts: Count One - a claim for unlawful search and seizure in violation of his constitutional rights; Count Two - a claim for excessive use of force based on alleged actions of Defendants Bullard, Reed, and Roberts, in violation of his constitutional rights; Count Three - a claim for inadequate training and supervision against the City of Pleasant Grove, Mayor Brasseale, Director Knight; Count Four - a claim that the City of Pleasant Grove, its Police Department, Mayor Brasseale and Director Knight were deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff's constitutional right based on the custom and policy of tolerating excessive force and unlawful searches and seizures on the part of Pleasant Grove police officers; Count Five - a claim for the tort of outrage; Count Six - a claim based on the alleged assault of the Plaintiff by Defendants Bullard, Reed, and Roberts; Count Seven - a claim based on the alleged false arrest and false imprisonment of the Plaintiff by Defendant Reed and the City of Pleasant Grove; Count Eight - a claim for the alleged violation of the Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; Count Nine - a claim for the alleged malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution by Defendant Reed, the Pleasant Grove Police Department, and the City of Pleasant Grove; Count 10 - a claim alleging the defamation of the Plaintiff's character by Defendants Roberts and the Pleasant Grove Police Department; and Count Eleven - a claim that the City of Pleasant Grove and the Pleasant Grove Police Department subjected the Plaintiff to double jeopardy.
On October 4, 2013, the court entered an Order finding that the Second Amended Complaint complies with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 14). On November 27, 2012, the remaining Defendants filed the motions to dismiss currently under consideration. The court stayed discovery and obligations under Rule 26 pending resolutions of those motions. (Doc. 34).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The motion to dismiss in the instant case attacks the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff. Although the court is required to show leniency to a pro se plaintiff's pleadings, his complaint is still "subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Pro se complaints must "comply with the procedural rules that govern pleadings." Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 Fed. Appx. 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005).
Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement, but Rule 8 generally does not require "detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). It does, however, "demand[ ] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pleadings that contain nothing more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not meet Rule 8 standards nor do pleadings suffice that arebased merely upon "labels or conclusions" or "naked assertions" without supporting factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.
The Supreme Court explained that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). To be plausible on its face, the claim must contain enough facts that "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" the complaint must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The Supreme Court has recently identified "two working principles" for the district court to use in applying the facial plausibility standard. The first principle is that, in evaluating motions to dismiss, the court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations; however, the court does not have to accept as true legal conclusions even when "couched as [] factual allegation[s]" or "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The second principle is that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679. Thus, under prong one, the court determines the factual allegations that are well-pleaded and assumes their veracity, and then proceeds, under prong two, to determine the claim's plausibility given the well-pleaded facts. That task is "context-specific" and, to survive the motion, the allegationsmust permit the court based on its "judicial experience and common sense. . . to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claim must be dismissed. Id.
The Second Amended Complaint contains 27 single-spaced pages of facts. The court will attempt to condense them.
Higginbotham states in his pleading that he has been a member of the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) for the last fourteen years. Higginbotham is not a resident of the City of Pleasant Grove. Several members of the NAMI reside in Pleasant Grove, however, and Higginbotham indicates that the existence of relationships with NAMI residents of Pleasant Grove is one of the reasons he visits Pleasant Grove frequently.
According to the Second Amended Complaint, the genesis of Higginbotham's complicated feud with the Pleasant Grove police department and city officials occurred on March 27, 2010 when he began visiting Bill How...
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