Higginbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission
Decision Date | 31 October 1938 |
Docket Number | 34936 |
Citation | 192 La. 525,188 So. 395 |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Parties | HIGGINBOTHAM v. PUBLIC BELT RAILROAD COMMISSION et al |
On Rehearing March 6, 1939; Second Rehearing Denied April 3 1939
Judgment of the Court of Appeal affirmed.
John D Nix, Jr., and Walter B. Hamlin, both of New Orleans, for Hazel Young Higginbotham.
Rosen Kammer, Wolff & Farrar, of New Orleans, for Public Belt Railroad Commission.
William Boizelle, Asst. City Atty., of New Orleans, for City of New Orleans.
Relatrix is the surviving widow of George Ernest Higginbotham, who departed this life on the 2nd day of September 1937, in the parish of Jefferson, while in the employ of respondents, and is the duly qualified Natural Tutrix of their minor child, George Ernest Higginbotham, Jr.
Relatrix was married to George Ernest Higginbotham in the Parish of St. Bernard, November 2, 1934, and she and her husband, subsequent to their marriage, established the matrimonial domicile in the City of New Orleans, Parish of Orleans.
The suit of relatrix against respondents was filed in the Civil District for the Parish of Orleans, and is founded upon the following allegations of the petition:
The prayer of relatrix is for judgment in her favor, individually, and as Natural Tutrix of her minor child, against defendants, jointly, severally and in solido, for $ 20.21 per week over a period of 300 weeks, or $ 6,063, together with the sum of $ 150, and for all costs of suit.
After hearing had, judgment was rendered by the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans in favor of relatrix, individually, and as natural tutrix, as prayed for.
On appeal by respondents to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, the exception of no right of action tendered by respondents was maintained, the judgment appealed from was reversed, and the suit of relatrix, individually, and as natural tutrix, was dismissed at her cost.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans is now before this court for review under the writ of certiorari herein granted.
(1) There is only one issue presented in this case. Respondents contend that the Huey P. Long Bridge is an instrumentality used in interstate commerce, and that this case falls under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59. On the other hand, relator asserts that the right of action arises under the State Workmen's Compensation Law, Act No. 20 of 1914, § 1, the deceased being an employee of the Public Belt Railroad Commission.
The pertinent part of Section 1 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act reads as follows:
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative * * * for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." U.S. Code, title 45, chapter 2, § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65.
In Fluitt v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 187 La. 87, 94, 174 So. 163, 165, this Court said:
In the petition in this case there is no allegation that the Public Belt Railroad of the City of New Orleans is an interstate railroad, or that the Huey P. Long Bridge is used as a transportation facility by common carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
The mere allegation in the petition "That the said George Ernest Higginbotham at the time of his death was engaged by said defendants as maintenance man on the Huey P. Long Bridge, in the Parish of Jefferson," does not, by any means, show that deceased was engaged, either "in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to such transportation as to be practically a part of it."
In order to bring the cause of action within the plain terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it is necessary to allege also that, while the employee is engaged in interstate transportation, he was also injured, or that his death resulted, from the negligence of some officer, agent, or employee of such interstate common carrier. However, in the petition in this case there is no allegation that the death of the husband of relatrix was caused by the negligence of any officer, agent, or other employee of any interstate common carrier using the Huey P. Long Bridge as a transportation facility, nor is there any allegation that his death resulted by any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, machinery, track, roadbed, works, or by any defect in the Huey P. Long Bridge, or in any of its appliances. It is not alleged that the deceased was run over and killed by any engineor train of any interstate common carrier, through fault or negligence, while crossing this Bridge. On the contrary, the allegation is that, inline with his duties of plumbing the piers of the Bridge, the deceased was working below the superstructure of the Bridge, when the metal wire attached to his belt, and which he was using as a plumb-bar, came in contact with an uninsulated wire of the Louisiana Power and Light Co., engaged in lighting the Bridge, and he deceased was electrocuted and fell from the Bridge to the pavement.
This allegation of the petition shows clearly that tthe injury received by the husband of relatrix and resulting in his death, was an accidental injury, arising out of and in the course of his employment, without fault or negligance upon the part of respondents, or of any common carrier using the Bridge, thereby bringing the cause of action clearly within Section 1 of the State Workmen's Compensation Law, Act No. 20 of 1914.
The defect in the appliance that caused the death of the husband of relatrix was not an appliance owned and operated by respondents, or by any common carrier using the Bridge, but an appliance owned and operated negligently by the Louisiana Power and Light Co., taking the allegations of the petition as true, in passing upon the exception of no right of action.
(2) It is true that the exception of no right of action was overruled by the trial Judge, and the case was tried on its merits.
But the testimony in the case fails to show that the death of the husband of relatrix was due to any fault or negligence whatever upon the part of respondents, or any common carrier using this Bridge.
Nor is there any proof that his death was due to negligence by reason of any defect or insufficiency in the cars, engines, appliances, machinery, bridge or other equipment of any common carrier, or in the plumd-bar used by deceased in determining the horizontal movement of the piers of the Bridge.
The Operation, construction, repair, removal, maintenance, and demolition of railways, railroads and bridges are declared to be hazards, under Section 1, subd. 2(a), of the State Workmen's Compensation Law, Act No. 20 of 1914.
Section 1 of this Act declares that the Act shall apply only to the following: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State of California v. Taylor
...was applicable to public railroads. Mathewes v. Port Utilities Commission, D.C.E.D.S.C., 32 F.2d 913; Higginbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (Sup.Ct.La.); Maurice v. State, 43 Cal.App.2d 270, 110 P.2d 706 (Cal.Dist.Ct. of App.) (involving the Belt Railroad......
-
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department, 157
...despite a claim of sovereign immunity. Mathewes v. Port Utilities Comm'n, 32 F.2d 913 (D.C.E.D.S.C.1929); Higginbotham v. Public Belt R. Comm'n, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1938); Maurice v. State, 43 Cal.App.2d 270, 110 P.2d 706 (Cal.Dist.C.A.1941). Thus we could not read the FELA differentl......
-
Morris v. Hankins
... ... public domain; (2) Joseph B. Wolfe & Co., by tax collector to ... ...
-
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. PARISH SCHOOL BD.
...77 U.S. 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871); Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244, 63 U.S. 244, 16 L.Ed. 248 (1859); Higginbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1938). The services performed by the river tugboats herein are clearly "part of or facilitates the stream of inter......