Higgins v. Delta Elevator Service Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-P-1495,96-P-1495
• Citation: 45 Mass.App.Ct. 643,700 N.E.2d 833
• Parties: Louise A. HIGGINS & another 1 v. DELTA ELEVATOR SERVICE CORPORATION.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 833

700 N.E.2d 833

45 Mass.App.Ct. 643

Louise A. HIGGINS & another ¹ v. DELTA ELEVATOR SERVICE CORPORATION.

No. 96-P-1495.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued April 6, 1998.

Decided Oct. 21, 1998.

Michael D. Weisman, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Thomas F. Healy, Boston, for defendant.

Before ARMSTRONG, LENK and BECK, JJ.

LENK, Justice.

Louise Higgins brought this negligence action against Delta Elevator Service Corporation claiming that her pre-existing multiple sclerosis was exacerbated as a result of injuries she suffered when she tripped and fell while exiting an elevator that did not level properly after being serviced by Delta. In a special verdict, the jury found that Delta was negligent, but that Delta's negligence was not a direct cause of an aggravation or acceleration of Higgins's multiple sclerosis. On appeal, Higgins contends that the judge erred when instructing the jury as to their evaluation of certain expert medical testimony and as to the law concerning exacerbation of a pre-existing condition. In its cross appeal, Delta contends that the judge erred both in refusing to exclude the testimony of Higgins's liability expert and in instructing the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We affirm.

Facts. The facts, as related at trial, are as follows. In June of 1986, Louise Higgins was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. At that time, and for approximately six years thereafter, her symptoms were mild and intermittent, comprised primarily of heaviness in her right leg and an occasional backache. Higgins's multiple sclerosis did not limit her range of activities in any way. On May 21, 1992, Higgins tripped and fell as she was exiting from elevator no. 27 at the John Hancock Tower in Boston when the elevator misleveled, landing between one and three inches below the lobby floor. The following day, Higgins's multiple sclerosis symptoms worsened significantly and, by the time of trial, she was unable to walk without assistance and had reduced her work hours from forty hours per week to twelve hours per week.

Dr. Charles M. Poser, a neurologist at the Beth Israel Hospital who specializes in the treatment of persons with multiple sclerosis, testified that concussional trauma of the sort suffered by Higgins can cause an exacerbation of pre-existing multiple sclerosis. Dr. Poser testified that when concussional trauma causes an alteration of the blood brain barrier it can disrupt the myelin sheath which, in turn, impairs the flow of nerve impulses between the brain and the rest of the body. There was testimony from the defendant's experts that Dr. Poser's conclusion as to causation is not generally accepted by other neurologists specializing in multiple sclerosis. Delta accordingly challenged the admission of Dr. Poser's opinion testimony during voir dire and attacked it through vigorous cross-examination at trial. In his final jury charge, the trial judge instructed the jury that it was Higgins's burden to prove causation by expert testimony, and to demonstrate the reliability of her expert's opinion. He instructed the jury that they "must determine whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and applicable to the facts at issue" and directed them to look at specific factors brought out in the testimony as being probative of the reliability of Higgins's expert medical opinion testimony.

After the jury verdict, in which Delta was found negligent in its maintenance or repair of elevator no. 27, ² but was not found to have caused the exacerbation of Higgins's multiple sclerosis, Higgins filed a motion for a new trial. Higgins's motion was denied and this appeal followed.

1. The plaintiff's appeal.

a. Causation instruction. In instructing the jury on the evaluation of the medical testimony on causation, the judge listed several factors articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), to be considered in assessing the evidence. ³ Higgins asserts that this instruction was a fundamental and improper invasion of the jury's exclusive province to evaluate expert witness testimony. She claims that the instruction also improperly increased her burden of proof as to the validity of her medical expert's scientific evidence by improperly focusing on, and limiting the jury's evaluation of such evidence to, certain specific factors enumerated in Daubert. Lastly, she contends that, by instructing the jury on the Daubert standard with respect to expert testimony on negligence or damages, the judge prejudicially focused the attention of the jury on the reliability of the medical experts. ⁴

In Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994), the Supreme Judicial Court accepted the basic reasoning of Daubert 215708;0032;1993130674;RP;;; ⁵ as being consistent with its own test of demonstrated reliability. Thus, while noting that "general acceptance in the relevant scientific community will continue to be the significant, and often the only, issue," the Supreme Judicial Court accepted the idea that a proponent of relevant scientific opinion evidence could demonstrate the reliability or validity of the underlying scientific theory or process by some means other than general acceptance. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342.

The judge must play a "gatekeeper" role in determining whether to admit such evidence. In doing so, the judge must preliminarily assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Ibid., quoting from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. at 592-593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court in Daubert described several factors bearing on this assessment: (1) whether the scientific theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested"; (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) "the known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (4) "general acceptance," Daubert, supra at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, making clear, however, that these factors are not meant to provide a "definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d 1342.

Here, the judge did act as gatekeeper. He determined both that the reasoning or methodology underlying Dr. Poser's testimony was scientifically valid and that such reasoning or methodology could properly be applied to the facts in issue; hence the evidence was admitted. ⁶ Higgins argues that the Daubert factors are for the gatekeeper's reliability determination only and that once the question of admissibility has been decided, the jury need not make that determination again based on Daubert factors but should instead weigh such testimony just as they would any other expert testimony admitted in evidence.

As an initial matter, in reviewing the propriety of the challenged instruction, "we read 'the charge as a whole, and [do] not ... scrutiniz[e] bits and pieces removed from their context.' " Commonwealth v. Hill, 387 Mass. 619, 624-625, 442 N.E.2d 24 (1982) (citations omitted). We are to be concerned with the over-all impact of the charge upon the jury. Commonwealth v. Little, 384 Mass. 262, 265, 424 N.E.2d 504 (1981). Viewing the charge in this light, and recognizing that the challenged instruction arguably might have been better left unsaid, we discern no error requiring reversal. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 390 Mass. 308, 313, 455 N.E.2d 632 (1983).

Here, the judge "gave a comprehensive and correct instruction on the evaluation of expert testimony," explaining to the jury that in determining what weight to give to an expert opinion they should consider the facts or materials on which each opinion was based. ⁷ See Commonwealth v. Rosier, 425 Mass. 807, 817, 685 N.E.2d 739 (1997). Later, in his instruction on causation, the judge informed the jury that in evaluating the credibility of the expert medical testimony on causation, they "may consider" evidence bearing on peer review and publication of the theory, testing of the theory, the level of acceptance of the theory, and anecdotal evidence supporting or not supporting the theory. Contrary to Higgins's contention, the judge did not instruct the jury that the expert medical testimony was required to satisfy each of these listed factors.

"There is nothing improper in a judge's pointing out factors to be considered by the jury in weighing the credibility of oral testimony so long as he does so fairly, gives the jury no indication of whom he believes, and clearly places the function of ultimate appraisal of the testimony on the jury." Commonwealth v. Avery, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 137, 142, 437 N.E.2d 242 (1982), quoting from Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 6 Mass.App.Ct. 738, 742-743, 383 N.E.2d 851 (1978), S. C., 378 Mass. 296, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979). Compare Shahzade v. C.J. Mabardy, Inc., 411 Mass. 788, 794, 586 N.E.2d 3 (1992) (error for trial judge to instruct jury that emergency room records admitted into evidence were " 'pure, unadulterated hearsay,' that hearsay is unreliable, and that emergency room records are particularly suspect"). "Once the judge makes a preliminary finding that a witness is qualified to render expert opinion, as was done here, the jury may continue to evaluate the witness's qualifications. The jury's function, vis--vis an expert witness, is to assess the soundness and credibility of his opinions." Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 573, 574 N.E.2d 978 (1991). "It is not ... a function of instructions about experts to declare that they are all created equal." Grassis v. Retik, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 595, 603, 521 N.E.2d 411 (1988). Nor is it improper for a judge to instruct the jury that t...