Higgins v. Dwen
Decision Date | 10 November 1881 |
Citation | 100 Ill. 554,1881 WL 10669 |
Parties | VAN H. HIGGINSv.JAMES G. DWEN. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. MURRAY F. TULEY, Judge, presiding.
Mr. VAN H. HIGGINS, pro se.
Mr. JAMES DARLOW, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was a bill for a specific performance of a contract for the sale and purchase of forty-two acres of land in Cook county. The vendor tendered a deed, and the purchaser was willing to receive it and pay for the land if he could obtain a perfect title, but denies that the vendor can make such a title.
There are no disputed facts in the case, and it all depends on the question whether James G. Dwen took title to this land by the will of his wife, Ellen L. Dwen, deceased. The circuit court held he did, and the decree was affirmed on appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, and the case is brought by appeal to this court.
The controversy grows out of the construction of this clause of the will: “I give and bequeath to my husband, James G. Dwen, all moneys and properties, real and personal, of every description, in the city of Chicago, county of Cook, and in Ogle county, State of Illinois; also, all money and properties which may hereafter come to me, by reason of will or otherwise, he to pay all my just debts,” etc.
On the one side it is claimed, that the true meaning of the language gives Dwen only the property in the city of Chicago and in Ogle county, and not in Cook county outside of the limits of the city. On the other hand it is claimed, that title to all real estate situated in the city, and in Cook county outside of the city, as well as any situated in Ogle county, passed to the devisee, under the language of the will. This is the question presented for determination by this record.
The question may not be altogether free from doubt, but we are of opinion the latter view is correct. The language will bear that construction equally well, if not better, than the other. Testatrix held real estate in the city, and in Cook county out of the city, also in Ogle county, and on considering the clause the intention seems to have been to devise the entire property of testatrix to her husband. Had such not been the case, after using the language employed some reservation or exception would have been made to exclude...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Stevenson v. Stevenson
...N. E. 89. Further, he is presumed to have intended to dispose of his whole estate, and not to die intestate as to any part of it. Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554;Hayward v. Loper, 147 Ill. 41, 35 N. E. 225;King v. King, 168 Ill. 273, 48 N. E. 582. So strong is this presumption, it was said in......
-
In re Will of Weien
...which will prevent either partial or total intestacy. Ross v. Ayrhart, 138 Iowa 117; Given v. Hilton, 95 U.S. 591 (24 L.Ed. 458); Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554; Cate v. Cranor, 30 Ind. 292; Trusty Trusty, (Ky.) 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1127, 59 S.W. 1094; Dole v. Johnson, 3 Allen 364; Saxton v. Webbe......
-
In re Weien's Will
...partial or total intestacy. Ross v. Ayrhart (decided at present term) 115 N. W. 906;Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. 591, 24 L. Ed. 458;Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554;Cate v. Cranor, 30 Ind. 292;Trusty v. Trusty (Ky.) 59 S. W. 1094;Dole v. Johnson, 3 Allen (Mass.) 364;Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 619,......
-
Vestal v. Garrett
...publishes a will intends to dispose of his whole estate thereby, unless there is something in the will to rebut that presumption (Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554;Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338, 23 N. E. 603); and, secondly, by the fact that he did dispose of all his other property by will, and......