Higgins v. Inspector Gen., Civil Action No. 10–cv–2027 (ESH).
| Decision Date | 03 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10–cv–2027 (ESH). |
| Citation | 851 F.Supp.2d 178 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | Sharrelle HIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Defendant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eden J. Brown Gaines, Amadeo & Gaines, LLC, National Harbor, MD, for Plaintiff.
Claire M. Whitaker, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Sharrelle Higgins has sued the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. She alleges that, because of her race (African–American) and sex (female), she was not selected for the position of Deputy Assistant Inspector General (“DAIG”). Defendant now moves to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I. FACTS
Higgins was hired by OIG 1 in 2004 as Deputy Director of Human Resources. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), Ex. 1 (“Higgins Application”) at 2–3.) 2 In October 2005, Helen Albert, then serving as DAIG, promoted plaintiff to become Director of Human Resources. (Compl. ¶ 7; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.'s Mot.”), Ex. 8 (“Albert Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–3.) From that time until she left OIG, Albert was her first line supervisor and Dennis Raschka, the Assistant Inspector General (“AIG”), was her second line supervisor. (Id. ¶ 3; Def.'s Mot., Ex. D (“Raschka Decl.”) ¶ 1.) Raschka focused on day-to-day administrative operations while Albert focused on external affairs, including congressional and media relations. (Raschka Decl. ¶ 3.) Although Albert was her direct supervisor, Higgins interacted more with Raschka, who was her mentor.
In June 2009, Albert reclassified Higgins' position to make her the Director of OIG's Human Capital and Management Services, which gave her additional responsibilities to “round out her experience.” (Def.'s Mot., Ex. C (“Raschka Dep.”) 92:2–92:22; Raschka Decl. ¶ 2.) In this role, she assumed duties including contracting, procurement, and space management. (Higgins 1st Dep. 23:20–26:14.)
In fall 2009, Raschka announced that he was planning to retire and that Albert would be promoted to AIG. In November 2009, an announcement was circulated inviting applications for the newly vacant position of DAIG, which is a Senior Executive Service (“SES”) position 3 with oversight of a staff of 47. (Def.'s Mot, Ex. 2 (“Vacancy Announcement”) at 1.) The announcement described the DAIG's responsibilities, to include: coordinating strategic and contingency planning; overseeing the development of administrative and management reports (such as the mandatory semiannual report to Congress); directing assessments of OIG programs, policies, and procedures; providing management and leadership with respect to the budgetary process; overseeing OIG's procurement and contracting functions; providing leadership over all information technology policies and practices, human resources issues, and the program integrity (hotline) function; and overseeing congressional relations and public affairs, including external relations for OIG. ( Id. at 1–2.) Because external relations had become so important to OMAP during Albert's tenure as DAIG (Raschka Decl. ¶ 3), Albert modified the draft announcement to ensure that congressional relations were identified as a key element of the position. (Def.'s Mot., Ex. E (“Farrior Decl.”) ¶ 3.)
The requisite qualifications included executive-level leadership and management skills,4 as well as demonstrated ability in position-specific areas. ( See id. at 2–6.) Applicants were also required to show competency in a wide range of managementsupport areas, including strategic planning and performance management and reporting, budget, procurement, contracting, space and property management, human resources management, training, information technology management, equal employment opportunity, program integrity, and matters involving congressional relations; leading the planning, managing, implementing, and directing of management and administrative support activities; and in meeting and reaching consensus on complex issues with individuals, groups, and high level officials. ( Id. at 2–3.)
Applications that met the minimum qualifications were passed on to the Executive Review Board (“ERB”) for ranking.5 ( See Farrior Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4; Exh. 3 (Instructions to ERB).) The ERB panel consisted of Raschka; Lester Davis, DAIG for the Office of Investigations; and Brenda Patterson, DAIG for the Office of Audit. (Farrior Decl. ¶ 4.) The applicants who the ERB rated as “best qualified” were interviewed by Raschka and Albert.6 ( Id. ¶ 7.) Among the “best qualified” were Higgins and Frank Rokosz, a Caucasian male who was then the Assistant Director at the OIG's Technical Oversight and Planning Division within the Office of Audit. ( Id.) In addition to interviewing the candidates, Albert also spoke to their colleagues. ( See Def.'s Mot., Ex. 6 (“Albert Aff.”) at 6–7.)
In January 2010, Albert selected Rokosz as DAIG. ( Id. at 8.) Inspector General Stephens subsequently concurred in her selection. ( See Def.'s Mot., Ex. 9 (Merit Staffing Certificate); Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 14 (“Stephens Dep.”) 46:16–46:19, 49:19–50:3; Raschka Dep. 93:7–93:19; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 19 (“Albert Dep.”) 44:15–44:18; see also Def.'s Mot., Ex. K (“Matthews Decl.”) ¶ 7.) Albert personally told Higgins that she had not been selected (Albert Aff. at 7), and Stephens sent an email to all OIG employees informing them that Rokosz had been chosen. ( See Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 21 at 12.) 7
After Rokosz' selection, Higgins left her position in OIG. (Albert Aff. at 14.) On November 24, 2010, she filed suit, claiming that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race and gender when she was not promoted to be DAIG. Following a period of discovery, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). There is a “genuine issue” of material fact if a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1031 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). A moving party is thus entitled to summary judgment against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505;see also Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C.Cir.1989). However, the non-moving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). “While summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of her obligation to support her allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Calhoun v. Johnson, No. 95–2397, 1998 WL 164780, at *3, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22376, at **7–8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1998) (internal citation omitted), aff'd,No. 99–5126, 1999 WL 825425, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 25165 (D.C.Cir. Sept. 27, 1999).
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The “two essential elements” of a discrimination claim under this section are “that (1) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (2) because of the plaintiff's race ... [or] sex.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2008).
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, Title VII claims are assessed under a burden-shifting framework set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Pursuant to that framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Higgins must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [challenged employment action].’ ” Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). However, the D.C. Circuit has stressed that once an employer has proffered a...
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