Higgins v. Jefferson County, Ky.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2004
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2-H.
• Parties: James HIGGINS, Plaintiff v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

344 F.Supp.2d 1004 James HIGGINS, Plaintiff
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 3:03-CV-2-H. United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, at Louisville. July 28, 2004.

Fred R. Radolovich, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

Angela Summers Goudy, Suzanne D. Cordery, Louisville, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HEYBURN, Chief Judge.

This case arises out of disciplinary action the Jefferson County Corrections Department took against an employee, James Higgins, which resulted in his termination. Plaintiff now alleges violations of his constitutional due process rights. Higgins alleges that Defendants violated both his property interest in his employment or the liberty interest in preserving the integrity of his name. The analysis for each is essentially the same. The Court concludes that the notice and hearing Plaintiff actually received prior to his termination together with the availability of more extensive hearings afterwards protected all his constitutional

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due process rights. The Court therefore will sustain Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I.

On June 16, 2002, Plaintiff restrained a belligerent arrestee and during the course of doing so, a struggle ensued and the arrestee was injured. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff gave oral statements to his immediate supervisor and completed an extraordinary incident report. After police staff reviewed a video of the incident, Lieutenant Colonel Green ("Lt.Green") placed Plaintiff on "no inmate contact" orders pending further review of the incident. On June 18, Lt. Green reviewed the incident on video and placed Plaintiff on administrative leave of absence pending an investigation by the Department of Corrections. He notified Plaintiff by sending both a suspension letter and a Disciplinary Action Notice (the "Action Notice"). The suspension letter indicated he was to report on June 21 for his administrative hearing. The Action Notice stated the charges against Plaintiff, described the incident, and set out the reasoning behind the charges. Lt. Green did not interview Plaintiff in the course of his investigation as required by the then applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement between Jefferson County and the Teamsters Local Union 783 (the "CBA").¹

On June 21, Lt. Green once again served Plaintiff with the Action Notice this time in the presence of his union steward, Officer Anthony Summerall, and Plaintiff signed it. Defendants assert that after serving Plaintiff the Action Notice, a disciplinary action meeting was held with Plaintiff, Lt. Green, and the union steward all present.² Plaintiff admits that he did speak during this meeting, mostly apologizing for the incident, but asserts that there was no real or meaningful "opportunity to be heard" and amounted to a direct firing. Plaintiff was then given a letter terminating his employment.

On June 24, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to appeal the disciplinary action. Plaintiff followed Step 1 of the grievance procedure set out in Article 7, Section 4(B),³ by submitting a written appeal to Chief of Corrections Horton as to the discipline imposed in the June 21 disciplinary action meeting.

⁴ A few days later, Defendant Horton denied the grievance. Plaintiff did not proceed to Step 2 of the mediation and the grievance process, therefore, ended.⁵

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Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights by failing to provide him with an opportunity to be heard prior to his termination. Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's constitutional law claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).⁶ The only issue is whether the disciplinary action meeting and other procedures provided Plaintiff with an adequate due process during and after the termination process.⁷

II.

The Supreme Court has said that prior to termination a public employee dismissable only for cause is entitled to a limited pre-termination hearing followed by a more comprehensive post-termination hearing. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). An employee is not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination, but is entitled to (1) notice of the charges against him and (2) an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing before discharge. See id. The pre-termination process "should be an initial check against mistaken decisions — essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." Id. at 545-546, 105 S.Ct. 1487. The Sixth Circuit has explained that a public employee terminable only for "just cause" under the CBA, had a constitutional right to "oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Buckner v. City of Highland

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Park, 901 F.2d 491, 494 (6th Cir.1990). "To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487.

The pre-termination process need not be elaborate, and the amount of process depends, in part, on the importance of the competing interests at stake. Id. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487; see also FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The specific dictates of due process are determined by considering factors such as the employee's interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)).

Here Plaintiff received notice of the pending termination when he was served with the Action Notice. The only question is whether Plaintiff had an "opportunity to be heard" before his discipline — an explanation of the employer's evidence and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Id. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Plaintiff did have an opportunity to explain his side of the incident immediately after it occurred and then wrote his synopsis of events in his extraordinary incident report. Lt. Green's June 18 letter suspended Plaintiff pending a Corrections Department investigation and set the date for an administrative hearing. The original Action Notice, served on June 19, explained the charges with great specificity and also detailed which actions violated specific provisions of the CBA.⁸ Defendants were not constitutionally required to share their internal investigation or include Plaintiff's input in such an investigation. See Parks v. City of Chattanooga, 74 Fed.Appx. 432, 442-443 (6th Cir.2003).

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