Higgins v. Karp
| Decision Date | 20 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 15435,15441,s. 15435 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Theresa HIGGINS, Administratrix (Estate of Stephanie Freeman), et al. v. Herbert KARP, Executor (Estate of Ethel Karp), et al. Herbert KARP, Executor (Estate of Ethel Karp) v. Drzislav CORIC, Administrator (Estate of Robert Freeman). |
Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Susan M. Cormier, Hartford and Paul A. Lange, Trumbull, for appellant (defendant Drzislav Coric, as administrator of the estate of Robert Freeman).
David T. Ryan, Hartford, with whom were Stephen F. Traub, Eric P. Smith, New Haven and, on the brief, Daniel F. Sullivan and Bradford S. Babbitt, Hartford, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court, in the hearing required by our remand in Higgins v. Karp, 239 Conn. 802, 811, 687 A.2d 539 (1997), properly excluded additional evidence on the issue of whether good cause existed to set aside defaults against Drzislav Coric, the administrator of the estate of Robert Freeman (hereafter referred to as the defendant), for failure to plead. The trial court concluded that: (1) our decision in Higgins mandated that the trial court, on remand, was limited to the record as it existed at the time of the first hearing on the defendant's motions to set aside the defaults; and (2) based on its review of that record, the defendant failed to demonstrate that good cause existed to set aside the defaults. On appeal, 1 the defendant claims that the trial court misinterpreted our remand in Higgins to prohibit the introduction of additional evidence, and that its failure to exercise its discretion pursuant to Practice Book § 376 2 was improper. The defendant further claims that the evidence was relevant and that its exclusion was harmful. We agree with the defendant and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
This is the second time that we have considered this case. The underlying facts are set out fully in our previous opinion; see Higgins v. Karp, supra, 239 Conn. at 804-807, 687 A.2d 539; but we briefly summarize the facts relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. This litigation arises out of the April 12, 1993 crash of a Piper aircraft en route from Groton, Connecticut, to Cortland, New York, in which the pilot, Robert Freeman, his daughter, Stephanie Freeman, and Ethel Karp were killed. On February 19, 1994, the plaintiff Theresa Higgins, the mother of Stephanie Freeman, brought an action individually 3 and as administratrix of her daughter's estate against, inter alia, the defendant 4 alleging negligence in the death of her daughter. On May 17, 1994, the plaintiff Herbert Karp, the husband of Ethel Karp, also brought an action against the defendant. 5
In their respective actions against the defendant, the plaintiffs moved for defaults for failure to plead. Karp was granted a default against the defendant on July 25, 1994, and Higgins was granted a default on August 26, 1994. The plaintiffs filed individual claims for a hearing in damages on March 13 and 15, 1995. In April, 1995, attorney Paul Lange filed an appearance on behalf of the estate of Robert Freeman, in lieu of attorney Thomas Wilson.
Higgins v. Karp, supra, 239 Conn. at 806, 687 A.2d 539. The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court. 6 Id., at 807, 687 A.2d 539.
In Higgins, we concluded that, because the trial court had considered the actions of the insurer of the aircraft, a nonparty, it "exceeded the scope of its discretion by focusing on factors irrelevant to whether there was good cause to set aside the defaults." Id., at 811, 687 A.2d 539. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of the trial court, vacated the orders denying the motions to set aside the defaults, and remanded the cases to the trial court "to determine, on the basis of factors other than the conduct of [the insurer of the aircraft], whether good cause exists to set aside the defaults entered against [the defendant]." (Emphasis added.) Id.
Pursuant to our remand, the trial court 7 held a hearing to reconsider the defendant's motions to set aside the defaults. At that hearing, the trial court considered only the record that had been before the original trial court. That record included: (1) a memorandum of law filed by Lange, the defense counsel; (2) an affidavit by Wilson, the former defense counsel, which set forth the reasons why he had not answered the complaints brought against the defendant in a timely fashion; and (3) a memorandum of law, in opposition, filed by the plaintiffs' counsel. Wilson stated in the affidavit that the failure to plead had been the result of difficulty defending the case because of: (1) the death of Robert Freeman; (2) the insolvency of Freeman's estate, which had hindered Wilson's ability to conduct an investigation of the crash and thereby prevented him from formulating adequate defenses; (3) the complexity of the cases; (4) the refusal by the insurer of the aircraft to appear and defend; and (5) his inability to obtain the National Transportation Safety Board report until late 1994.
The defendant sought to offer into evidence the following three discovery documents that had existed at the time of the initial hearing, but that had not been included in the original record: (1) Higgins' request for production dated May 13, 1994; (2) Higgins' interrogatories dated May 13, 1994; and (3) the defendant's responses to Higgins' interrogatories dated August 31, 1994. The defendant argued that these documents were relevant to the determination of whether good cause had existed because they demonstrated his due diligence. The defendant also sought to introduce an excerpt from the transcript of the oral argument that took place before this court in the first appeal in which attorney David Ryan, the counsel for Karp, stated that the defendant's delay in pleading had not caused his client any prejudice. 8 The defendant argued that this excerpt should be admitted because prejudice was a relevant factor for the trial court to consider.
The trial court sustained the plaintiffs' objection to the introduction of all four documents on the basis that "the Supreme Court has mandated this trial court to look at what was before the trial court on that date, and only what was before the trial court on that date to make a determination as to whether or not the motion to reopen should have, in fact, been granted as opposed to denied." Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motions to set aside the defaults. This appeal followed.
The defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded the proffered evidence because our decision in Higgins did not limit the trial court, on remand, to the evidence that was before the original court, and the proffered evidence was relevant to the determination of whether to set aside the defaults. The defendant further claims that the exclusion of the evidence was harmful. We agree.
We first address whether the trial court properly construed our remand. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly interpreted our decision in Higgins to require that, on remand, its determination of whether good cause existed to set aside the defaults was to be based solely on what was before the original trial court. We disagree with the plaintiffs' interpretation of our remand.
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 65, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Halpern v. Board of Education, supra, at 313, 649 A.2d 534.
Applying these principles to the present case, we cannot agree with the plaintiffs that our decision in Higgins limited the trial court, on remand, to the record as it existed at the time of the original hearing. We instructed the trial court to determine whether good cause exists, without considering irrelevant factors such as the conduct of nonparties. The plaintiffs claim that our statement that the trial court "should have, evaluate[d] the merits of the motions according to the reasons that [defense counsel] put forth on [the defendant's] behalf, namely, the obstacles raised by Robert Freeman's death and the insolvency of Freeman's estate"; Higgins v. Karp, supra, 239 Conn. at 811, 687 A.2d 539; supports their argument that the trial court was supposed...
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