Higgins v. Ringwig
| Decision Date | 24 June 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 100-69,100-69 |
| Citation | 267 A.2d 654,128 Vt. 534 |
| Parties | Walter HIGGINS and Elizabeth Higgins v. Alex RINGWIG and Doris Ringwig. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Myers & Spear, Essex Junction, for plaintiffs.
Harry L. Goetz, Winooski, for defendants.
Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.
This is a suit in chancery whereby the plaintiffs seeks to restrain the defendants from interfering with their use of a certain roadway. Evidence was taken and findings made by the chancellor. A decree was entered dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court for review.
In order to pinpoint the roadway in dispute, we first refer to Route 15 as running in a more or less north-south direction. This route is intersected by Palmer Lane which extends westerly a distance of approximately eighteen hundred feet. Palmer Lane is admittedly a public highway and maintained by the Town of Jericho.
Beginning at the westerly terminal of Palmer Lane and continuing in a somewhat westerly direction to premises of the plaintiffs is the roadway in controversy. At one time this road continued on in a general northerly direction to the remnants of a sugarhouse located on plaintiffs' premises. It was formerly referred to as the sugarhouse road. From the sugarhouse there is evidence that use had been previously made of a road or path leading westerly, a distance of about one-half mile, to the Cilley Hill Road, so-called.
In connection with the sugarhouse operation, the plaintiffs' predecessors in title used the Palmer Lane and the sugarhouse road for many years as a means of ingress and egress thereto. This operation was abandoned between twenty-five and thirty years ago. Years ago logs were hauled over this path. Neighboring farms also used it in driving their cattle to and from pasture lands. It has also been used by hunters and berry pickers. Over the years a stone wall was erected on each side of a portion of the roadway in question by unknown persons. The distance between the stone walls is about twenty-two feet. At one time a wire fence existed on top of the southerly stone wall. This roadway has since become overgrown with heavy brush and trees.
In 1955 the defendants purchased land located on the northerly side of this roadway. Another parcel was purchased by them in 1958. Later, in 1966 or 1967, two westerly lots located on the northerly side of this roadway were sold. One was conveyed to Adam F. and Rita R. Bortz, and the other lot to Clifford J. and Jeanette Provost. The Provost lot is located westerly of the Bortz property and adjoins the easterly line of plaintiffs' property. The two stonewalls are located southerly of these two lots.
Defendants, at their expense, have bulldozed, graveled and maintained a road from the westerly terminal of Palmer Lane westerly a distance of approximately six hundred feet. From this point Mr. & Mrs. Bortz have also bulldozed an additional four hundred feet westerly to gain access to their lot.
Neither the plaintiffs' deed nor defendants' deeds, by which they acquired their respective land in the Town of Jericho, mentioned a pent road or thoroughfare.
The only access to the Provost property is over the disputed roadway. The deed contains no right of way provision. The deed from the defendants to Mr. & Mrs. Bortz defines the roadway as 'a certain pent road' and further grants a right of way defined as 'said right of way being defined by prior consistent usage.'
In some of the deeds forming the chain of title to defendants' land their property is bounded on the south by this roadway. Likewise, the chain of title to the property located on the southerly side of this roadway described the property as bounded on the north by a roadway.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants have denied them permission to use the roadway extending from the westerly terminal of Palmer Lane to their property. They seek injunctive relief against the barrier which the defendants erected to close the roadway from all traffic.
The defendants claim ownership of the disputed roadway. As an alternative, they also urge that they have acquired the exclusive right to use the area in question by adverse possession thereof.
By finding No. 8, the chancellor reported:
'That Earl Barlett, who formerly owned the property now owned by defendants Ringwig, testified to the fact that he believed the boundaries of the property to be the stone walls on either side of the roadway and that he had not owned the roadway itself.'
To say the least, the record before us fails to demonstrate that the defendants have record legal title to the area in question through the deeds of their predecessors. No finding was made by the chancellor on this precise issue. Following are the two controversial findings.
20. The defendants were the only users of the disputed area from the time they purchased the land and premises in 1955, such use being a means of ingress and egress for their cows to the meadow land. This sole use continued for over ten years until the defendants sold two lots in 1966. Since 1966, the defendants and the purchasers of said two lots have been the sole users of...
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Roy v. Woodstock Cmty. Trust, Inc.
...plaintiffs rely on 12 V.S.A. § 501 for the statutory fifteen-year period, which they have the burden to prove. Higgins v. Ringwig, 128 Vt. 534, 538, 267 A.2d 654, 656 (1970) (the “burden of proving adverse possession,” including the “statutory period of fifteen years,” is on the party asser......
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Roy v. Woodstock Cmty. Trust, Inc.
...plaintiffs rely on 12 V.S.A. § 501 for the statutory fifteen-year period, which they have the burden to prove. Higgins v. Ringwig, 128 Vt. 534, 538, 267 A.2d 654, 656 (1970) (the "burden of proving adverse possession," including the "statutory period of fifteen years," is on the party asser......
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Russell v. Pare
...the use or possession by the claimant. Laird Properties v. Mad River Corp., 131 Vt. 268, 277, 305 A.2d 562 (1973); Higgins v. Ringwig, 128 Vt. 534, 538, 267 A.2d 654 (1970); 12 V.S.A. § The doctrine derives from two separate but related theories. The first theory is the old doctrine of pres......
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Estate of Neil, In re
...to prove adverse possession sufficient to supersede the property interests of any titleholders of record. See Higgins v. Ringwig, 128 Vt. 534, 538, 267 A.2d 654, 656 (1970). Here, petitioner's burden of proof is greater than in the usual case because he seeks to prove that his possession ha......
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Ruminations
...the limitation of actions," March 10, 1787, 14 State Papers of Vermont 340. 69. Lysakv. Grull, 174 Vt. 523(2002). 70. Higginsv. Ringwig, 128 Vt. 534(1970). 71. Adams v. Soule, 33 Vt. 538(1860). 72. Larry L. Teply, Ralph U. Whitten, 8c Denis F. McLaughlin, Cases, Text, and Problems on Civil ......